Philebus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Philebus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 11
Section 12
Section 13
Section 14
Section 15
Section 16
Section 17
Section 18
Section 19
Section 20
Section 21
Section 22
Section 23
Section 24
Section 25
Section 26
Section 27
Section 28
Section 29
Section 30
Section 31
Section 32
Section 33
Section 34
Section 35
Section 36
Section 37
Section 38
Section 39
Section 40
Section 41
Section 42
Section 43
Soc. Excellent. But you believe, I fancy, that some such change must always be taking place in us, as the philosophers say; for all things are always flowing and shifting.
Pro. Yes, that is what they say, and I think their theory is important.
Soc. Of course it is, in view of their own importance. But I should like to avoid this argument which is rushing at us. I am going to run away; come along and escape with me.
Pro. What is your way of escape?
Soc. We grant you all this let us say to them. But answer me this, Protarchus, are we and all other living beings always conscious of everything that happens to us of our growth and all that sort of thing—or is the truth quite the reverse of that?
Pro. Quite the reverse, surely; for we are almost entirely unconscious of everything of that sort.
Soc. Then we were not right in saying just now that the fluctuations and changes cause pains and pleasures.
Pro. No, certainly not.
Soc. A better and more unassailable statement would be this.
Pro. What?
Soc. That the great changes cause pains and pleasures in us, but the moderate and small ones cause no pains or pleasures at all.
Pro. That is more correct than the other statement, Socrates.
Soc. But if that is the case, the life of which we spoke just now would come back again.
Pro. What life?
Soc. The life which we said was painless and without joys.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. Let us, therefore, assume three lives, one pleasant, one painful, and one neither of the two; or do you disagree?
Pro. No, I agree to this, that there are the three lives.
Soc. Then freedom from pain would not be identical with pleasure?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. When you hear anyone say that the pleasantest of all things is to live all one’s life without pain, what do you understand him to mean?
Pro. I think he means that freedom from pain is pleasure.
Soc. Now let us assume that we have three things; no matter what they are, but let us use fine names and call one gold, another silver, and the third neither of the two.
Pro. Agreed.
Soc. Now can that which is neither become either gold or silver?
Pro. Certainly not.
Soc. Neither can that middle life of which we spoke ever be rightly considered in opinion or called in speech pleasant or painful, at any rate by those who reason correctly.
Pro. No, certainly not.