Philebus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Philebus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 11
Section 12
Section 13
Section 14
Section 15
Section 16
Section 17
Section 18
Section 19
Section 20
Section 21
Section 22
Section 23
Section 24
Section 25
Section 26
Section 27
Section 28
Section 29
Section 30
Section 31
Section 32
Section 33
Section 34
Section 35
Section 36
Section 37
Section 38
Section 39
Section 40
Section 41
Pro. No; you have said quite the reverse of the truth, Socrates; for no one would be at all likely to call pains and pleasures bad because they are false, but because they are involved in another great and manifold evil.
Soc. Then of the evil pleasures which are such because of evil we will speak a little later, if we still care to do so; but of the false pleasures we must prove in another way that they exist and come into existence in us often and in great numbers; for this may help us to reach our decisions.
Pro. Yes, of course; that is, if such pleasures exist.
Soc. But they do exist, Protarchus, in my opinion; however, until we have established the truth of this opinion, it cannot be unquestioned.
Pro. Good.
Soc. Then let us, like athletes, approach and grapple with this new argument.
Pro. Let us do so.
Soc. We said, you may remember, a little while ago, that when desires, as they are called, exist in us, the soul is apart from the body and separate from it in feelings.
Pro. I remember; that was said.
Soc. And was not the soul that which desired the opposites of the conditions of the body and the body that which caused pleasure or pain because of feeling?
Pro. Yes, that was the case.
Soc. Then draw the conclusion as to what takes place in these circumstances.
Pro. Go on.
Soc. What takes place is this: in these circumstances pleasures and pains exist at the same time and the sensations of opposite pleasures and pains are present side by side simultaneously, as was made clear just now.
Pro. Yes, that is clear.
Soc. And have we not also said and agreed and settled something further?
Pro. What?
Soc. That both pleasure and pain admit of the more and less and are of the class of the infinite.
Pro. Yes, we have said that, certainly.
Soc. Then what means is there of judging rightly of this?
Pro. How and in what way do you mean?
Soc. I mean to ask whether the purpose of our judgement of these matters in such circumstances is to recognize in each instance which of these elements is greater or smaller or more intense, comparing pain with pleasure, pain with pain, and pleasure with pleasure.
Pro. Certainly there are such differences, and that is the purpose of our judgement.