Philebus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Philebus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 11
Section 12
Section 13
Section 14
Section 15
Section 16
Section 17
Section 18
Section 19
Section 20
Section 21
Section 22
Section 23
Section 24
Section 25
Section 26
Section 27
Section 28
Section 29
Section 30
Section 31
Section 32
Section 33
Section 34
Section 35
Section 36
Section 37
Section 38
Section 39
Section 40
Soc. And an unjust and thoroughly bad man is the reverse?
Pro. Of course.
Soc. But, as we were just now saying, every man is full of many hopes?
Pro. Yes, to be sure.
Soc. And there are in all of us written words which we call hopes?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. And also the images painted there; and often a man sees an abundance of gold coming into his possession, and in its train many pleasures; and he even sees a picture of himself enjoying himself immensely.
Pro. Yes, certainly.
Soc. Shall we or shall we not say that of these pictures those are for the most part true which are presented to the good, because they are friends of the gods, whereas those presented to the bad are for the most part false?
Pro. Surely we must say that.
Soc. Then the bad also, no less than the good, have pleasures painted in their souls, but they are false pleasures.
Pro. Yes, surely.
Soc. Then the bad rejoice for the most part in the false, and the good in true pleasures.
Pro. That is inevitably true.
Soc. According to our present view, then, there are false pleasures in the souls of men, imitations or caricatures of the true pleasures; and pains likewise.
Pro. There are.
Soc. We saw, you remember, that he who had an opinion at all always really had an opinion, but it was sometimes not based upon realities, whether present, past, or future.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And this it was, I believe, which created false opinion and the holding of false opinions, was it not?
Pro. Yes.
Soc. Very well, must we not also grant that pleasure and pain stand in the same relation to realities?
Pro. What do you mean?
Soc. I mean that he who feels pleasure at all in any way or manner always really feels pleasure, but it is sometimes not based upon realities, whether present or past, and often, perhaps most frequently, upon things which will never even be realities in the future.
Pro. This also, Socrates, must inevitably be the case.
Soc. And the same may be said of fear and anger and all that sort of thing—that they are all sometimes false?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Well, can we say that opinions become bad or good except as they become false?
Pro. No.
Soc. And we understand, I believe, that pleasures also are not bad except by being false.