Philebus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Philebus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 11
Section 12
Section 13
Section 14
Section 15
Section 16
Section 17
Section 18
Section 19
Section 20
Section 21
Section 22
Section 23
Section 24
Section 25
Section 26
Section 27
Section 28
Section 29
Section 30
Section 31
Section 32
Section 33
Section 34
Section 35
Section 36
Section 37
Section 38
Pro. Of course it does; and in such a case, Socrates, we call the opinion false; but nobody would ever call the actual pleasure false.
Soc. You are an eager advocate of the case of pleasure just now, Protarchus.
Pro. Oh no, I merely say what I hear.
Soc. Is there no difference, my friend, between the pleasure which is connected with right opinion and knowledge and that which often comes to each of us with falsehood and ignorance?
Pro. There is likely to be a great difference.
Soc. Then let us proceed to the contemplation of the difference between them.
Pro. Lead on as you think best.
Soc. Then this is the way I lead.
Pro. What way?
Soc. Do we agree that there is such a thing as false opinion and also as true opinion?
Pro. There is.
Soc. And, as we were saying just now, pleasure and pain often follow them—I mean true and false opinion.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And do not opinion and the power of forming an opinion always come to us from memory and perception?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Do we, then, believe that our relation to these faculties is somewhat as follows?
Pro. How?
Soc. Would you say that often when a man sees things at a distance and not very clearly, he wishes to distinguish between the things which he sees?
Pro. Yes, I should say so.
Soc. Next, then, would he not ask himself—
Pro. What?
Soc. What is that which is visible standing beside the rock under a tree? Do you not think a man might ask himself such a question if he saw such objects presented to his view?
Pro. To be sure.
Soc. And after that our gazer might reply to himself correctly It is a man?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Or, again, perhaps he might be misled into the belief that it was a work of some shepherds, and then he would call the thing which he saw an image.
Pro. Yes, indeed.
Soc. And if some one is with him, he might repeat aloud to his companion what he had said to himself, and thus that which we called an opinion now becomes a statement?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. But if he is alone when he has this thought, he sometimes carries it about in his mind for a long time.
Pro. Undoubtedly.
Soc. Well, is your view about what takes place in such cases the same as mine?
Pro. What is yours?
Soc. I think the soul at such a time is like a book.
Pro. How is that?