Philebus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Philebus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 11
Section 12
Section 13
Section 14
Section 15
Section 16
Section 17
Section 18
Section 19
Section 20
Section 21
Section 22
Section 23
Section 24
Section 25
Section 26
Section 27
Section 28
Section 29
Section 30
Section 31
Section 32
Section 33
Section 34
Section 35
Soc. Of drink, or of being filled with drink?
Pro. Of being filled, I suppose.
Soc. The man, then, who is empty desires, as it appears, the opposite of what he feels for, being empty, he longs to be filled.
Pro. That is very plain.
Soc. Well then, is there any source from which a man who is empty at first can gain a comprehension, whether by perception or by memory, of fulness, a thing which he does not feel at the time and has never felt before?
Pro. It cannot be done.
Soc. And yet he who desires, desires something, we say.
Pro. Of course.
Soc. And he does not desire that which he feels; for he is thirsty, and that is emptiness, but he desires fulness.
Pro. Yes.
Soc. Then somehow some part of him who is thirsty can apprehend fulness.
Pro. Yes, obviously.
Soc. But it cannot be the body, for that is empty.
Pro. True.
Soc. The only remaining possibility is that the soul apprehends it, which it must do by means of memory; for what other means could it employ?
Pro. No other, I should say.
Soc. And do we understand the consequences of this argument?
Pro. What are the consequences?
Soc. This argument declares that we have no bodily desire.
Pro. How so?
Soc. Because it shows that the endeavor of every living being is always towards the opposite of the actual conditions of the body.
Pro. Yes, certainly.
Soc. And the impulse which leads towards the opposite of those conditions shows that there is a memory of the opposite of the conditions.
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. And the argument, by showing that memory is that which leads us towards the objects of desire, has proved that all the impulse, the desire, and the ruling principle in every living being are of the soul.
Pro. Quite right.
Soc. So the argument denies utterly that the body hungers or thirsts or has any such affection.
Pro. Very true.
Soc. Let us consider a further point in connection with those very affections. For I think the purpose of the argument is to point out to us a state of life existing in them.
Pro. Of what sort of life are you speaking, and in what affections does it exist?
Soc. In the affections of fulness and emptiness and all which pertain to the preservation and destruction of living beings, and I am thinking that if we fall into one of these we feel pain, which is followed by joy when we change to the other.
Pro. That is true.
Soc. And what if a man is between the two?
Pro. How between them?