Philebus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Philebus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 11
Section 12
Section 13
Section 14
Section 15
Section 16
Section 17
Section 18
Section 19
Section 20
Section 21
Section 22
Section 23
Section 24
Section 25
Section 26
Section 27
Section 28
Section 29
Section 30
Section 31
Section 32
Section 33
Soc. Have we, then, a third condition, besides those of feeling pleasure and pain?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Well then, do your best to bear it in mind; for remembering or forgetting it will make a great difference in our judgement of pleasure. And I should like, if you do not object, to speak briefly about it.
Pro. Pray do so.
Soc. You know that there is nothing to hinder a man from living the life of wisdom in this manner.
Pro. You mean without feeling pleasure or pain?
Soc. Yes, for it was said, you know, in our comparison of the lives that he who chose the life of mind and wisdom was to have no feeling of pleasure, great or small.
Pro. Yes, surely, that was said.
Soc. Such a man, then, would have such a life; and perhaps it is not unreasonable, if that is the most divine of lives.
Pro. Certainly it is not likely that gods feel either joy or its opposite.
Soc. No, it is very unlikely; for either is unseemly for them. But let us reserve the discussion of that point for another time, if it is appropriate, and we will give mind credit for it in contending for the second place, if we cannot count it for the first.
Pro. Quite right.
Soc. Now the other class of pleasure, which we said was an affair of the soul alone, originates entirely in memory.
Pro. How is that?
Soc. We must, apparently, first take up memory, and perception even before memory, if these matters are to be made clear to us properly.
Pro. What do you mean?
Soc. Assume that some of the affections of our body are extinguished in the body before they reach the soul, leaving the soul unaffected, and that other affections permeate both body and soul and cause a vibration in both conjointly and in each individually.
Pro. Let us assume that.
Soc. Shall we be right in saying that the soul forgets those which do not permeate both, and does not forget those which do?
Pro. Yes, certainly.
Soc. Do not in the least imagine that when I speak of forgetting I mean that forgetfulness arises in this case; for forgetfulness is the departure of memory, and in the case under consideration memory has not yet come into being; now it is absurd to speak of the loss of that which does not exist and has not yet come into being, is it not?
Pro. Certainly.
Soc. Then just change the terms.
Pro. How?