Parmenides

Ceph. And there will, we assert, seem to be a smallest among them but this proves to be many and great in comparison with each of the many minute fractions. Of course. And each mass will be considered equal to the many minute fractions for it could not appear to pass from greater to smaller, without seeming to enter that which is between them; hence the appearance of equality. That is reasonable. And although it has a limit in relation to another mass, it has neither beginning nor limit nor middle in relation to itself? Why is that? Because whenever the mind conceives of any of these as belonging to the masses, another beginning appears before the beginning, another end remains after the end, and in the middle are other more central middles than the middle, but smaller, because it is impossible to conceive of each one of them, since the one does not exist. Very true. So all being which is conceived by any mind must, it seems to me, be broken up into minute fractions; for it would always be conceived as a mass devoid of one. Certainly. Now anything of that sort, if seen from a distance and dimly, must appear to be one, but if seen from close at hand and with keen vision, each apparent one must prove to be unlimited in number, if it is really devoid of one, and one does not exist. Am I right? That is perfectly conclusive. Therefore the other things must each and all appear to be unlimited and limited and one and many, if the things other than one exist and one does not. Yes, they must. And will they not also appear to be like and unlike? Why? Just as things in a picture, when viewed from a distance, appear to be all in one and the same condition and alike. Certainly. But when you come close to them they appear to be many and different, and, because of their difference in appearance, different in kind and unlike each other. Yes. And so the groups of the other things must appear to be like and unlike themselves and each other. Certainly. And also the same and different, and in contact with one another and separated, and in all kinds of motion and in every sort of rest, and coming into being and perishing, and neither of the two, and all that sort of thing, which we can easily mention in detail, if the many exist and the one does not. Very true. Let us, then, go back once more to the beginning and tell the consequences, if the others exist and the one does not. Let us do so. Well, the others will not be one? Of course not. Nor will they be many for if they were many, one would be contained in them. And if none of them is one, they are all nothing, so that they cannot be many. True. If one is not contained in the others, the others are neither many nor one. No.