Parmenides

Plato

Parmenides

Plato (428–347 BC)

Plato's Parmenides in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.


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Ceph. Nor can anything which exists pertain to it for the moment it partook of anything which exists it would partake of existence. That is plain. Then neither greatness nor smallness nor equality pertains to it. No. Nor likeness nor difference, either in relation to itself or to other things. Clearly not. And can other things pertain to it, if nothing pertains to it? Impossible. Then the other things are neither like it nor unlike it, nor the same nor different. No. Well, then, will the notions of that or to that or some, or this or of this or of another or to another or past or future or present or knowledge or opinion or perception or definition or name or anything else which exists pertain to the non-existent? No. Then the non-existent one has no state or condition whatsoever. It appears to have none whatsoever. Let us then discuss further what happens to the other things, if the one does not exist. Let us do so. Well, they must exist; for if others do not even exist, there could be no talking about the others. True. But if we talk about the others, the others are different. Or do you not regard the words other and different as synonymous? Yes, I do. And we say that the different is different from the different, and the other is other than the other? Yes. Then if the others are to be others, there must be something of which they will be others. Yes, there must be. Now what can that be? For they cannot be others of the one, if it does not exist. No. Then they are others of each other; for they have no alternative, except to be others of nothing. True. They are each, then, others of each other, in groups; for they cannot be so one at a time, if one does not exist. But each mass of them is unlimited in number, and even if you take what seems to be the smallest bit, it suddenly changes, like something in a dream that which seemed to be one is seen to be many, and instead of very small it is seen to be very great in comparison with the minute fractions of it. Very true. Such masses of others would be others of each other, if others exist and one does not exist. Certainly. There will, then, be many masses, each of which appears to be one, but is not one, if one does not exist? Yes. And they will seem to possess, number, if each seems to be one and they are many. Certainly. And some will seem to be even and others odd, but all that will be unreal, if the one does not exist. True.

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