Parmenides

Ceph. Then inasmuch as we assert that we are speaking the truth, we necessarily assert that we say that which is. Necessarily. Then, as it appears, the non-existent one exists. For if it is not non-existent, but gives up something of being to not-being, then it will be existent. Certainly. Then if it does not exist and is to continue to be non-existent, it must have the existence of not-being as a bond, just as being has the non-existence of not-being, in order to attain its perfect existence. For in this way the existence of the existent and the non-existence of the non-existent would be best assured, when the existent partakes of the existence of being existent and of the non-existence of not being non-existent, thus assuring its own perfect existence, and the non-existent partakes of the non-existence of not being existent and the existence of being non-existent, and thus the non-existent also secures its perfect non-existence. Very true. Then since the existent partakes of non-existence and the non-existent of existence, the one, since it does not exist, necessarily partakes of existence to attain non-existence. Yes, necessarily. Clearly, then, the one, if it does not exist, has existence. Clearly. And non-existence also, if it does not exist. Of course. Well, can anything which is in a certain condition be not in that condition without changing from it? No, it cannot. Then everything of that sort—if a thing is and is not in a given condition—signifies a change. Of course. But change is motion; we agree to that? It is motion. And did we not see that the one is and is not? Yes. Then we see that it both is and is not in a given condition. So it appears. And we have seen that the non-existent one has motion, since it changes from being to not-being. There is not much doubt of that. But if it is nowhere among existing things—and it is nowhere, if it does not exist—it cannot move from any place to another. Of course not. Then its motion cannot be change of place. No, it cannot. Nor surely can it turn in the same spot, for it nowhere touches the same for the same is existent, and the non-existent cannot be in any existent thing. No, it is impossible. Then the one, being non-existent, cannot turn in that in which it is not. No. And the one, whether existent or non-existent, cannot change into something other than itself; for if it changed into something other than itself, our talk would no longer be about the one, but about something else. Quite right. But if it neither changes into something else, nor turns in the same spot, nor changes its place, can it still move in any way? No how can it? But surely that which is without motion must keep still, and that which keeps still must be at rest. Yes, it must. Then the non-existent one is both at rest and in motion. So it appears.