Parmenides
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Parmenides in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 126
Section 127
Section 128
Section 129
Section 130
Section 131
Section 132
Section 133
Section 134
Section 135
Section 136
Section 137
Section 138
Section 139
Section 140
Section 141
Section 142
Section 143
Section 144
Section 145
Section 146
Section 147
Section 148
Section 149
Section 150
Section 151
Ceph. But the one, being within itself, would also be contained by itself, and since it contains itself it would be greater than itself, and since it is contained by itself it would be less than itself; thus the one would be both greater and less than itself. Yes, it would. And is it true, moreover, that nothing can exist outside of the one and the others? Of course. But that which exists must always exist somewhere. Yes. And that which exists in anything will be smaller and will exist in the greater? One thing cannot exist in another in any other way, can it? No, it cannot. But since there is nothing else apart from the one and the others, and they must be in something, must they not be in one another, the others in the one and the one in the others, or else be nowhere at all? Clearly. And because the one is in the others, the others will be greater than the one, since they contain it, and the one less than the others, since it is contained; but because the others are in the one, the one will by the same reasoning be greater than the others, and the others less than the one. So it appears. Then the one is equal to and greater and less than itself and the others. Evidently. And if equal and greater and less, it will be of equal and more and less measures with itself and the others, and since of equal, more, and less measures, of equal, more, and less parts. Of course. And being of equal and more and less measures, it will be less and more in number than itself and the others and likewise equal in number to itself and the others. How is that? If it is greater than any things, it will be of more measures than they; and of as many parts as measures. Similarly if it is less or equal, the number of parts will be less or equal. True. Then one, being greater and less than itself and equal to itself, will be of more and less measures than itself and of equal measures with itself, and if of measures, of parts also? Of course. And being of equal parts with itself, it will also be equal in number to itself, and if of more parts, more in number, and if of less parts, less in number than itself. Clearly. And will not the one possess the same relation towards other things? Because it is shown to be greater than they, must it not also be more in number than they and because it is smaller, less in number? And because it is equal in size, must it not be also, equal in number to the others? Yes, it must. And so once more, as it appears, the one will be equal to, greater than, and less than itself and other things in number. Yes, it will. And does the one partake of time and if it partakes of time, is it and does it become younger and older than itself and other things, and neither younger nor older than itself and the others? What do you mean? If one is, it is thereby shown to be. Yes.