Parmenides
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Parmenides in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 126
Section 127
Section 128
Section 129
Section 130
Section 131
Section 132
Section 133
Section 134
Section 135
Section 136
Section 137
Section 138
Section 139
Section 140
Section 141
Section 142
Section 143
Section 144
Section 145
Section 146
Section 147
Section 148
Ceph. In so far as the one is other than the others and the others are other than the one, the one and the others are not in different states, but in the same state; but whatever is in the same state is like, is it not? Yes. Then in so far as the one is in the state of being other than the others, just so far everything is like all other things; for everything is other than all other things. So it appears. But the like is opposed to the unlike. Yes. And the other to the same. That is also true. But this, too, was shown, that the one is the same as the others. Yes, it was. And being the same as the others is the opposite of being other than the others. Certainly. In so far as it was other it was shown to be like. Yes. Then in so far as it is the same it will be unlike, since it has a quality which is the opposite of the quality which makes it like, for the other made it like. Yes. Then the same will make it unlike; otherwise the same will not be the opposite of the other. So it appears. Then the one will be both like and unlike the others, like in so far as it is other, unlike in so far as it is the same. Yes, that sort of conclusion seems to be tenable. But there is another besides. What is it? In so far as it is in the same state, the one is not in another state, and not being in another state it is not unlike, and not being unlike it is like but in so far as it is in another state, it is of another sort, and being of another sort it is unlike. True. Then the one, because it is the same as the others and because it is other than the others, for both these reasons or for either of them would be both like and unlike the others. Certainly. And likewise, since it has been shown to be other than itself and the same as itself, the one will for both these reasons or for either of them be both like and unlike itself. That is inevitable. Now, then, consider the question whether the one touches or does not touch itself and other things. I am considering. The one was shown, I think, to be in the whole of itself. Right. And the one is also in other things? Yes. Then by reason of being in the others it would touch them, and by reason of being in itself it would be prevented from touching the others, but would touch itself, since it is in itself. That is clear. Thus the one would touch itself and the other things. It would. But how about this? Must not everything which is to touch anything be next to that which it is to touch, and occupy that position which, being next to that of the other, touches it? It must. Then the one, if it is to touch itself, must lie next to itself and occupy the position next to that in which it is. Yes, it must.