Parmenides

Ceph. It is at rest, no doubt, if it is in itself; for being in one, and not passing out from this, it is in the same, namely in itself. It is. But that which is always in the same, must always be at rest. Certainly. Well, then, must not, on the contrary, that which is always in other be never in the same, and being never in the same be not at rest, and being not at rest be in motion? True. Then the one, being always in itself and in other, must always be in motion and at rest. That is clear. And again, it must be the same with itself and other than itself, and likewise the same with all other things and other than they, if what we have said is true. How is that? Everything stands to everything in one of the following relations: it is either the same or other; or if neither the same or other, its relation is that of a part to a whole or of a whole to a part. Obviously. Now is the one a part of itself? By no means. Then it cannot, by being a part in relation to itself, be a whole in relation to itself, as a part of itself. No, that is impossible. Nor can it be other than itself. Certainly not. Then if it is neither other nor a part nor a whole in relation to itself, must it not therefore be the same with itself? It must. Well, must not that which is in another place than itself—the self being in the same place with itself—be other than itself, if it is to be in another place? I think so. Now we saw that this was the case with one, for it was in itself and in other at the same time. Yes, we saw that it was so. Then by this reasoning the one appears to be other than itself. So it appears. Well then, if a thing is other than something, will it not be other than that which is other than it? Certainly. Are not all things which are not one, other than one, and the one other than the not one? Of course. Then the one would be other than the others. Yes, it is other. Consider; are not the absolute same and the absolute other opposites of one another? Of course. Then will the same ever be in the other, or the other in the same? No. Then if the other can never be in the same, there is no existing thing in which the other is during any time; for if it were in anything during any time whatsoever, the other would be in the same, would it not? Yes, it would. But since the other is never in the same, it can never be in any existing thing. True. Then the other cannot be either in the not one or in the one. No, it cannot. Then not by reason of the other will the one be other than the not one or the not one other than the one. No.