Parmenides

Ceph. And because the parts are parts of a whole, the one would be limited by the whole; or are not the parts included by the whole? They must be so. But surely that which includes is a limit. Of course. Then the existent one is, apparently, both one and many, a whole and parts, limited and of infinite number. So it appears. Then if limited it has also extremes ? Certainly. Yes, and if it is a whole, will it not have a beginning, a middle, and an end? Or can there be any whole without these three? And if any one of these is wanting, will it still be a whole? It will not. Then the one, it appears, will have a beginning, a middle, and an end. It will. But surely the middle is equally distant from the extremes for otherwise it would not be a middle. No. And the one, apparently, being of such a nature, will partake of some shape, whether straight or round or a mixture of the two. Yes, it will. This being the case, will not the one be in itself and in other? How is that? Each of the parts doubtless is in the whole and none is outside of the whole. True. And all the parts are included in the whole ? Yes. And surely the one is all its parts, neither more nor less than all. Certainly. But the whole is the one, is it not? Of course. Then if all the parts are in the whole and all the parts are the one and the one is also the whole, and all the parts are included in the whole, the one will be included in the one, and thus the one will be in itself. Evidently. But the whole is not in the parts, neither in all of them nor in any. For if it is in all, it must be in one, for if it were wanting in any one it could no longer be in all; for if this one is one of all, and the whole is not in this one, how can it still be in all? It cannot in any way. Nor can it be in some of the parts; for if the whole were in some parts, the greater would be in the less, which is impossible. Yes, it is impossible. But not being in one or several or all of the parts, it must be in something else or cease to be anywhere at all? It must. And if it were nowhere, it would be nothing, but being a whole, since it is not in itself, it must be in something else, must it not? Certainly. Then the one, inasmuch as it is a whole, is in other and inasmuch as it is all its parts, it is in itself; and thus one must be both in itself and in other. It must. This being its nature, must not the one be both in motion and at rest? How is that?