Parmenides

Ceph. And again each of the parts possesses unity and being, and the smallest of parts is composed of these two parts, and thus by the same argument any part whatsoever has always these two parts; for always unity has being and being has unity; and, therefore, since it is always becoming two, it can never be one. Certainly. Then it results that the existent one would be infinite in number? Apparently. Let us make another fresh start. In what direction? We say that the one partakes of being, because it is? Yes. And for that reason the one, because it is, was found to be many. Yes. Well then, will the one, which we say partakes of being, if we form a mental conception of it alone by itself, without that of which we say it partakes, be found to be only one, or many? One, I should say. Just let us see; must not the being of one be one thing and one itself another, if the one is not being, but, considered as one, partakes of being? Yes, that must be so. Then if being is one thing and one is another, one is not other than being because it is one, nor is being other than one because it is being, but they differ from each other by virtue of being other and different. Certainly. Therefore the other is neither the same as one nor as being. Certainly not. Well, then, if we make a selection among them, whether we select being and the other, or being and one, or one and the other, in each instance we select two things which may properly be called both? What do you mean? I will explain. We can speak of being? Yes. And we can also speak of one? Yes, that too. Then have we not spoken of each of them? Yes. And when I speak of being and one, do I not speak of both? Certainly. And also when I speak of being and other, or other and one, in every case I speak of each pair as both? Yes. If things are correctly called both, can they be both without being two? They cannot. And if things are two, must not each of them be one? Certainly. Then since the units of these pairs are together two, each must be individually one. That is clear. But if each of them is one, by the addition of any sort of one to any pair whatsoever the total becomes three? Yes. And three is an odd number, and two is even? Of course. Well, when there are two units, must there not also be twice, and when there are three, thrice, that is, if two is twice one and three is thrice one? There must. But if there are two and twice, must there not also be twice two? And again, if there are three and thrice, must there not be thrice three? Of course. Well then, if there are three and twice and two and thrice, must there not also be twice three and thrice two? Inevitably.