Parmenides
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Parmenides in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
Section 126
Section 127
Section 128
Section 129
Section 130
Section 131
Section 132
Section 133
Section 134
Section 135
Section 136
Section 137
Section 138
Section 139
Section 140
Section 141
Section 142
Ceph.Then it has no being even so as to be one, for if it were one, it would be and would partake of being; but apparently one neither is nor is one, if this argument is to be trusted. That seems to be true. But can that which does not exist have anything pertaining or belonging to it? Of course not. Then the one has no name, nor is there any description or knowledge or perception or opinion of it. Evidently not. And it is neither named nor described nor thought of nor known, nor does any existing thing perceive it. Apparently not. Is it possible that all this is true about the one ? I do not think so. Shall we then return to our hypothesis and see if a review of our argument discloses any new point of view? By all means. We say, then, that if the one exists, we must come to an agreement about the consequences, whatever they may be, do we not? Yes. Now consider the first point. If one is, can it be and not partake of being? No, it cannot. Then the being of one will exist, but will not be identical with one; for if it were identical with one, it would not be the being of one, nor would one partake of it, but the statement that one is would be equivalent to the statement that one is one but our hypothesis is not if one is one, what will follow, but if one is. Do you agree? Certainly. In the belief that one and being differ in meaning? Most assuredly. Then if we say concisely one is, it is equivalent to saying that one partakes of being? Certainly. Let us again say what will follow if one is and consider whether this hypothesis must not necessarily show that one is of such a nature as to have parts. How does that come about ? In this way: If being is predicated of the one which exists and unity is predicated of being which is one, and being and the one are not the same, but belong to the existent one of our hypothesis, must not the existent one be a whole of which the one and being are parts? Inevitably. And shall we call each of these parts merely a part, or must it, in so far as it is a part, be called a part of the whole? A part of the whole. Whatever one, then, exists is a whole and has a part. Certainly. Well then, can either of these two parts of existent one—unity and being—abandon the other? Can unity cease to be a part of being or being to be a part of unity? No.