Parmenides

Ceph.How, then, being of such a nature, can it be either younger or older or of the same age as anything? In no way. Then the one cannot be younger or older or of the same age as anything. No, evidently not. And can the one exist in time at all, if it is of such a nature? Must it not, if it exists in time, always be growing older than itself? It must. And the older is always older than something younger? Certainly. Then that which grows older than itself grows at the same time younger than itself, if it is to have something than which it grows older. What do you mean? This is what I mean: A thing which is different from another does not have to become different from that which is already different, but it must be different from that which is already different, it must have become different from that which has become so, it will have to be different from that which will be so, but from that which is becoming different it cannot have become, nor can it be going to be, nor can it already be different: it must become different, and that is all. There is no denying that. But surely the notion older is a difference with respect to the younger and to nothing else. Yes, so it is. But that which is becoming older than itself must at the same time be becoming younger than itself. So it appears. But surely it cannot become either for a longer or for a shorter time than itself; it must become and be and be about to be for an equal time with itself. That also is inevitable. Apparently, then, it is inevitable that everything which exists in time and partakes of time is of the same age as itself and is also at the same time becoming older and younger than itself. I see no escape from that. But the one had nothing to do with such affections. No, it had not. It has nothing to do with time, and does not exist in time. No, that is the result of the argument. Well, and do not the words was, has become, and was becoming appear to denote participation in past time? Certainly. And will be, will become, and will be made to become, in future time? Yes. And is and is becoming in the present? Certainly. Then if the one has no participation in time whatsoever, it neither has become nor became nor was in the past, it has neither become nor is it becoming nor is it in the present, and it will neither become nor be made to become nor will it be in the future. Very true. Can it then partake of being in any other way than in the past, present, or future? It cannot. Then the one has no share in being at all. Apparently not. Then the one is not at all. Evidently not.