Laws

Ath. What is the definition of that object which has for its name soul? Can we give it any other definition than that stated just now—the motion able to move itself?

Clin. Do you assert that self-movement is the definition of that very same substance which has soul as the name we universally apply to it?

Ath. That is what I assert. And if this be really so, do we still complain that it has not been sufficiently proved that soul is identical with the prime origin and motion of what is, has been, and shall be, and of all that is opposite to these, seeing that it has been plainly shown to be the cause of all change and motion in all things?

Clin. We make no such complaint; on the contrary, it has been proved most sufficiently that soul is of all things the oldest, since it is the first principle of motion.

Ath. Then is not that motion which, when it arises in one object, is caused by another, and which never supplies self-motion to anything, second in order—or indeed as far down the list as one cares to put it,—it being the change of a really soulless body?

Clin. True.

Ath. Truly and finally, then, it would be a most veracious and complete statement to say that we find soul to be prior to body, and body secondary and posterior, soul governing and body being governed according to the ordinance of nature.

Clin. Yes, most veracious.

Ath. We recollect, of course, that we previously agreed that if soul could be shown to be older than body, then the things of soul also will be older than those of body.

Clin. Certainly we do.

Ath. Moods and dispositions and wishes and calculations and true opinions and considerations and memories will be prior to bodily length, breadth, depth and strength, if soul is prior to body.

Clin. Necessarily.

Ath. Must we then necessarily agree, in the next place, that soul is the cause of things good and bad, fair and foul, just and unjust, and all the opposites, if we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?

Clin. Of course we must.

Ath. And as soul thus controls and indwells in all things everywhere that are moved, must we not necessarily affirm that it controls Heaven also?

Clin. Yes.

Ath. One soul, is it, or several? I will answer for you—several. Anyhow, let us assume not less than two—the beneficent soul and that which is capable of effecting results of the opposite kind.

Clin. You are perfectly right.