Laws

Ath. But when a thing that has moved itself changes another thing, and that other a third, and the motion thus spreads progressively through thousands upon thousands of things, will the primary source of all their motions be anything else than the movement of that which has moved itself?

Clin. Excellently put, and we must assent to your argument.

Ath. Further, let us question and answer ourselves thus:—Supposing that the Whole of things were to unite and stand still,—as most of these thinkers venture to maintain,—which of the motions mentioned would necessarily arise in it first? That motion, of course, which is self-moving; for it will never be shifted beforehand by another thing, since no shifting force exists in things beforehand. Therefore we shall assert that inasmuch as the self-moving motion is the starting-point of all motions and the first to arise in things at rest and to exist in things in motion, it is of necessity the most ancient and potent change of all, while the motion which is altered by another thing and itself moves others comes second.

Clin. Most true.

Ath. Now that we have come to this point in our discourse, here is a question we may answer.

Clin. What is it?

Ath. If we should see that this motion had arisen in a thing of earth or water or fire, whether separate or in combination, what condition should we say exists in such a thing?

Clin. What you ask me is, whether we are to speak of a thing as alive when it moves itself?

Ath. Yes.

Clin. It is alive, to be sure.

Ath. Well then, when we see soul in things, must we not equally agree that they are alive?

Clin. We must.

Ath. Now stop a moment, in Heaven’s name! Would you not desire to observe three points about every object?

Clin. What do you mean?

Ath. One point is the substance, one the definition of the substance, and one the name; and, moreover, about everything that exists there are two questions to be asked.

Clin. How two?

Ath. At one time each of us, propounding the name by itself, demands the definition; at another, propounding the definition by itself, he demands the name.

Clin. Is it something of this kind we mean now to convey?

Ath. Of what kind?

Clin. We have instances of a thing divisible into two halves, both in arithmetic and elsewhere; in arithmetic the name of this is the even, and the definition is a number divisible into two equal parts.

Ath. Yes, that is what I mean. So in either case it is the same object, is it not, which we describe, whether, when asked for the definition, we reply by giving the name, or, when asked for the name, we give the definition,—describing one and the same object by the name even, and by the definition a number divisible into two halves?

Clin. Most certainly.