Laws

Ath. It is agreed also—if our argument is to be consistent— that a passion which shares in justice, becomes, so far, beautiful.

Clin. True.

Ath. But if we agree that a passion though just is unseemly, then justice and beauty will be at discord, when just things are called most unseemly.

Clin. What do you mean by that?

Ath. It is not hard to grasp. The laws we enacted a short time ago might seem to enjoin what is absolutely contrary to our present statements.

Clin. What statements?

Ath. We laid it down that it is just to put to death the temple-robber and the enemy of the rightly-enacted laws; and then, when we were minded to enact a host of similar rules, we held our hand, since we perceived that such rules involve passions infinite both in number and in magnitude, and that, although they are eminently just, they are also eminently unseemly. Thus the just and the beautiful will seem to us at one moment wholly identical, at another, utterly opposed, will they not?

Clin. I am afraid so.

Ath. Thus it is that by the multitude the beautiful and the just are flung apart, and inconsistent language is used about them.

Clin. It certainly seems so, Stranger.

Ath. Then let us look again at our own view, and see how far it is consistent in this respect.

Clin. What kind of consistency, and in respect of what, do you mean?

Ath. I believe that I expressly stated in our previous discourse,—or, if I did not do it before, please assume that I now assert—

Clin. What?

Ath. That all bad men are in all respects unwillingly bad; and, this being so, our next statement must agree therewith.

Clin. What statement do you mean?

Ath. This,—that the unjust man is, indeed, bad, but the bad man is unwillingly bad. But it is illogical to suppose that a willing deed is done unwillingly; therefore he that commits an unjust act does so unwillingly in the opinion of him who assumes that injustice is involuntary—a conclusion which I also must now allow; for I agree that all men do unjust acts unwillingly; so, since I hold this view—and do not share the opinion of those who, through contentiousness or arrogance, assert that, while there are some who are unjust against their will, yet there are also many who are unjust willingly,—how am I to prove consistent with my own statements? Suppose you two, Megillus and Clinias, put this question to me—If this is the state of the case, Stranger, what counsel do you give us in regard to legislating for the Magnesian State? Shall we legislate or shall we not? Legislate by all means, I shall reply.