Laws
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Laws in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with R. G. Bury's English translation.
Book 1
Section 624
Section 625
Section 626
Section 627
Section 628
Section 629
Section 630
Section 631
Section 632
Section 633
Section 634
Section 635
Section 636
Section 637
Section 638
Section 639
Section 640
Section 641
Section 642
Section 643
Section 644
Section 645
Section 646
Section 647
Section 648
Section 649
Section 650
Book 2
Section 652
Section 653
Section 654
Section 655
Section 656
Section 657
Section 658
Section 659
Section 660
Section 661
Section 662
Section 663
Section 664
Section 665
Section 666
Section 667
Section 668
Section 669
Section 670
Section 671
Section 672
Section 673
Section 674
Book 3
Section 676
Section 677
Section 678
Section 679
Section 680
Section 681
Section 682
Section 683
Section 684
Section 685
Section 686
Section 687
Section 688
Section 689
Section 690
Section 691
Section 692
Section 693
Section 694
Section 695
Section 696
Section 697
Section 698
Section 699
Section 700
Section 701
Section 702
Book 4
Section 704
Section 705
Section 706
Section 707
Section 708
Section 709
Section 710
Section 711
Section 712
Section 713
Section 714
Section 715
Section 716
Section 717
Section 718
Section 719
Section 720
Section 721
Section 722
Section 723
Section 724
Book 5
Section 726
Section 727
Section 728
Section 729
Section 730
Section 731
Section 732
Section 733
Section 734
Section 735
Section 736
Section 737
Section 738
Section 739
Section 740
Section 741
Section 742
Section 743
Section 744
Section 745
Section 746
Section 747
Book 6
Section 751
Section 752
Section 753
Section 754
Section 755
Section 756
Section 757
Ath. The selection of officials that is thus made will form a mean between a monarchic constitution and a democratic; and midway between these our constitution should always stand. For slaves will never be friends with masters, nor bad men with good, even when they occupy equal positions—for when equality is given to unequal things, the resultant will be unequal, unless due measure is applied; and it is because of these two conditions that political organizations are filled with feuds. There is an old and true saying that equality produces amity, which is right well and fitly spoken; but what the equality is which is capable of doing this is a very troublesome question, since it is very far from being clear. For there are two kinds of equality which, though identical in name, are often almost opposites in their practical results. The one of these any State or lawgiver is competent to apply in the assignment of honors,—namely, the equality determined by measure, weight and number,—by simply employing the lot to give even results in the distributions; but the truest and best form of equality is not an easy thing for everyone to discern. It is the judgment of Zeus, and men it never assists save in small measure, but in so far as it does assist either States or individuals, it produces all things good; for it dispenses more to the greater and less to the smaller, giving due measure to each according to nature; and with regard to honors also, by granting the greater to those that are greater in goodness, and the less to those of the opposite character in respect of goodness and education, it assigns in proportion what is fitting to each. Indeed, it is precisely this which constitutes for us political justice, which is the object we must strive for, Clinias; this equality is what we must aim at, now that we are settling the State that is being planted. And whoever founds a State elsewhere at any time must make this same object the aim of his legislation,—not the advantage of a few tyrants, or of one, or of some form of democracy, but justice always; and this consists in what we have just stated, namely, the natural equality given on each occasion to things unequal. None the less, it is necessary for every State at times to employ even this equality in a modified degree, if it is to avoid involving itself in intestine discord, in one section or another,—for the reasonable and considerate, wherever employed, is an infringement of the perfect and exact, as being contrary to strict justice; for the same reason it is necessary to make use also of the equality of the lot, on account of the discontent of the masses, and in doing so to pray, calling upon God and Good Luck to guide for them the lot aright towards the highest justice.