Laws
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Laws in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with R. G. Bury's English translation.
Book 1
Section 624
Section 625
Section 626
Section 627
Section 628
Section 629
Section 630
Section 631
Section 632
Section 633
Section 634
Section 635
Section 636
Section 637
Section 638
Section 639
Section 640
Section 641
Section 642
Section 643
Section 644
Section 645
Section 646
Section 647
Section 648
Section 649
Section 650
Book 2
Section 652
Section 653
Section 654
Section 655
Section 656
Section 657
Section 658
Section 659
Section 660
Section 661
Section 662
Section 663
Section 664
Section 665
Section 666
Section 667
Section 668
Section 669
Section 670
Section 671
Section 672
Section 673
Section 674
Book 3
Section 676
Section 677
Section 678
Section 679
Section 680
Section 681
Section 682
Section 683
Section 684
Section 685
Section 686
Section 687
Section 688
Section 689
Section 690
Section 691
Section 692
Section 693
Section 694
Section 695
Section 696
Section 697
Section 698
Section 699
Section 700
Section 701
Section 702
Book 4
Section 704
Section 705
Section 706
Section 707
Section 708
Section 709
Section 710
Section 711
Section 712
Section 713
Section 714
Section 715
Section 716
Section 717
Section 718
Section 719
Section 720
Section 721
Section 722
Section 723
Section 724
Book 5
Section 726
Section 727
Section 728
Section 729
Section 730
Section 731
Section 732
Section 733
Section 734
Ath. and to these let us oppose four others—the foolish, the cowardly, the licentious, and the diseased. He that knows the temperate life will set it down as gentle in all respects, affording mild pleasures and mild pains, moderate appetites and desires void of frenzy; but the licentious life he will set down as violent in all directions, affording both pains and pleasures that are extreme, appetites that are intense and maddening, and desires the most frenzied possible; and whereas in the temperate life the pleasures outweigh the pains, in the licentious life the pains exceed the pleasures in extent, number, and frequency. Whence it necessarily results that the one life must be naturally more pleasant, the other more painful to us; and it is no longer possible for the man who desires a pleasant life voluntarily to live a licentious life, but it is clear by now (if our argument is right) that no man can possibly be licentious voluntarily: it is owing to ignorance or incontinence, or both, that the great bulk of mankind live lives lacking in temperance. Similarly with regard to the diseased life and the healthy life, one must observe that while both have pleasures and pains, the pleasures exceed the pains in health, but the pains the pleasures in disease. Our desire in the choice of lives is not that pain should be in excess, but the life we have judged the more pleasant is that in which pain is exceeded by pleasure. We will assert, then, that since the temperate life has its feelings smaller, fewer and lighter than the licentious life, and the wise life than the foolish, and the brave than the cowardly, and since the one life is superior to the other in pleasure, but inferior in pain, the brave life is victorious over the cowardly and the wise over the foolish; consequently the one set of lives ranks as more pleasant than the other: the temperate, brave, wise, and healthy lives are more pleasant than the cowardly, foolish, licentious and diseased. To sum up, the life of bodily and spiritual virtue, as compared with that of vice, is not only more pleasant, but also exceeds greatly in nobility, rectitude, virtue and good fame, so that it causes the man who lives it to live ever so much more happily than he who lives the opposite life. Thus far we have stated the prelude of our laws, and here let that statement end: after the prelude must necessarily follow the tune,—or rather, to be strictly accurate, a sketch of the State-organization.