Laws
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Laws in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with R. G. Bury's English translation.
Book 1
Section 624
Section 625
Section 626
Section 627
Section 628
Section 629
Section 630
Section 631
Section 632
Section 633
Section 634
Section 635
Section 636
Section 637
Section 638
Section 639
Section 640
Section 641
Section 642
Section 643
Section 644
Section 645
Section 646
Section 647
Section 648
Section 649
Section 650
Book 2
Section 652
Section 653
Section 654
Section 655
Section 656
Section 657
Section 658
Section 659
Section 660
Section 661
Section 662
Section 663
Section 664
Section 665
Section 666
Section 667
Section 668
Section 669
Section 670
Section 671
Section 672
Section 673
Section 674
Book 3
Section 676
Section 677
Section 678
Section 679
Section 680
Section 681
Section 682
Section 683
Section 684
Section 685
Section 686
Section 687
Section 688
Section 689
Section 690
Section 691
Section 692
Section 693
Section 694
Section 695
Section 696
Section 697
Section 698
Section 699
Section 700
Section 701
Section 702
Book 4
Section 704
Section 705
Section 706
Section 707
Section 708
Section 709
Section 710
Section 711
Section 712
Section 713
Section 714
Section 715
Section 716
Section 717
Section 718
Section 719
Clin. The poet speaks nobly, I should say.
Ath. He certainly does. Now I wish to put before you what I take to be the result of the foregoing argument.
Clin. Do so.
Ath. Let us address the lawgiver and say: Tell us, O lawgiver: if you knew what we ought to do and say, is it not obvious that you would state it?
Clin. Inevitably.
Ath. Now did not we hear you saying a little while ago that the lawgiver should not permit the poets to compose just as they please? For they would not be likely to know what saying of theirs might be contrary to the laws and injurious to the State.
Clin. That is quite true.
Ath. Would our address be reasonable, if we were to address him on behalf of the poets in these terms?—
Clin. What terms?
Ath. These:—There is, O lawgiver, an ancient saying—constantly repeated by ourselves and endorsed by everyone else—that whenever a poet is seated on the Muses’ tripod, he is not in his senses, but resembles a fountain, which gives free course to the upward rush of water and, since his art consists in imitation, he is compelled often to contradict himself, when he creates characters of contradictory moods; and he knows not which of these contradictory utterances is true. But it is not possible for the lawgiver in his law thus to compose two statements about a single matter; but he must always publish one single statement about one matter. Take an example from one of your own recent statements. A funeral may be either excessive or defective or moderate: of these three alternatives you chose one, the moderate, and this you prescribe, after praising it unconditionally. I, on the other hand, if (in my poem) I had a wife of surpassing wealth, and she were to bid me bury her, would extol the tomb of excessive grandeur; while a poor and stingy man would praise the defective tomb, and the person of moderate means, if a moderate man himself, would praise the same one as you. But you should not merely speak of a thing as moderate, in the way you have now done, but you should explain what the moderate is, and what is its size; otherwise it is too soon for you to propose that such a statement should be made law.
Clin. Exceedingly true.