Laws
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Laws in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with R. G. Bury's English translation.
Book 1
Section 624
Section 625
Section 626
Section 627
Section 628
Section 629
Section 630
Section 631
Section 632
Section 633
Section 634
Section 635
Section 636
Section 637
Section 638
Section 639
Section 640
Section 641
Section 642
Section 643
Section 644
Section 645
Section 646
Section 647
Section 648
Section 649
Section 650
Book 2
Section 652
Section 653
Section 654
Section 655
Section 656
Section 657
Section 658
Section 659
Section 660
Section 661
Section 662
Section 663
Section 664
Section 665
Section 666
Section 667
Section 668
Section 669
Section 670
Section 671
Section 672
Section 673
Section 674
Book 3
Section 676
Section 677
Section 678
Section 679
Section 680
Section 681
Section 682
Section 683
Section 684
Section 685
Section 686
Section 687
Section 688
Section 689
Section 690
Section 691
Section 692
Section 693
Section 694
Section 695
Section 696
Section 697
Section 698
Section 699
Section 700
Section 701
Ath.By compositions of such a character, set to similar words, they bred in the populace a spirit of lawlessness in regard to music, and the effrontery of supposing themselves capable of passing judgment on it. Hence the theater-goers became noisy instead of silent, as though they knew the difference between good and bad music, and in place of an aristocracy in music there sprang up a kind of base theatrocracy. For if in music, and music only, there had arisen a democracy of free men, such a result would not have been so very alarming; but as it was, the universal conceit of universal wisdom and the contempt for law originated in the music, and on the heels of these came liberty. For, thinking themselves knowing, men became fearless; and audacity begat effrontery. For to be fearless of the opinion of a better man, owing to self-confidence, is nothing else than base effrontery; and it is brought about by a liberty that is audacious to excess.
Meg. Most true.
Ath. Next after this form of liberty would come that which refuses to be subject to the rulers; and, following on that, the shirking of submission to one’s parents and elders and their admonitions; then, as the penultimate stage, comes the effort to disregard the laws; while the last stage of all is to lose all respect for oaths or pledges or divinities,—wherein men display and reproduce the character of the Titans of story, who are said to have reverted to their original state, dragging out a painful existence with never any rest from woe. What, again, is our object in saying all this? Evidently, I must, every time, rein in my discourse, like a horse, and not let it run away with me as though it had no bridle in its mouth, and so get a toss off the donkey (as the saying goes): consequently, I must once more repeat my question, and ask—With what object has all this been said?
Meg. Very good.
Ath. What has now been said bears on the objects previously stated.
Meg. What were they?
Ath. We said that the lawgiver must aim, in his legislation, at three objectives—to make the State he is legislating for free, and at unity with itself, and possessed of sense. That was so, was it not?
Meg. Certainly.
Ath. With these objects in view, we selected the most despotic of polities and the most absolutely free, and are now enquiring which of these is rightly constituted. When we took a moderate example of each—of despotic rule on the one hand, and liberty on the other,—we observed that there they enjoyed prosperity in the highest degree but when they advanced, the one to the extreme of slavery, the other to the extreme of liberty, then there was no gain to either the one or the other.