Laws

Meg. Is not that a right conviction? Or what is your view?

Ath. Just consider what one ought to have in view in every instance, in order to justify the bestowal of such praise. And first, with regard to the matter now under discussion,—if the men who were then marshalling the army knew how to organize it properly, how would they have achieved success? Must it not have been by consolidating it firmly and by maintaining it perpetually, so that they should be both free themselves and masters over all others whom they chose, and so that both they and their children should do in general just what they pleased throughout the world of Greeks and barbarians alike? Are not these the reasons why they would be praised?

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. And in every case where a man uses the language of eulogy on seeing great wealth or eminent family distinctions or anything else of the kind, would it not be true to say that, in using it, he has this fact specially in mind,—that the possessor of such things is likely, just because of this, to realize all, or at least the most and greatest, of his desires.

Meg. That is certainly probable.

Ath. Come now, is there one object of desire—that now indicated by our argument—which is common to all men?

Meg. What is that?

Ath. The desire that, if possible, everything,—or failing that, all that is humanly possible—should happen in accordance with the demands of one’s own heart.

Meg. To he sure.

Ath. Since this, then, is what we all wish always, alike in childhood and manhood and old age, it is for this, necessarily, that we should pray continually.

Meg. Of course.

Ath. Moreover, on behalf of our friends we will join in making the same prayer which they make on their own behalf.

Meg. To be sure.

Ath. And a son is a friend to his father, the boy to the man.

Meg. Certainly.

Ath. Yet the father will often pray the gods that the things which the son prays to obtain may in no wise he granted according to the son’s prayers.

Meg. Do you mean, when the son who is praying is still young and foolish?

Ath. Yes, and also when the father, either through age or through the hot temper of youth, being devoid of all sense of right and justice, indulges in the vehement prayers of passion (like those of Theseus against Hippolytus, when he met his luckless end), while the son, on the contrary, has a sense of justice,—in this case do you suppose that the son will echo his father’s prayers?

Meg. I grasp your meaning. You mean, as I suppose, that what a man ought to pray and press for is not that everything should follow his own desire, while his desire in no way follows his own reason; but it is the winning of wisdom that everyone of us, States and individuals alike, ought to pray for and strive after.