Cratylus
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Cratylus in the Greek text edited by John Burnet, with Harold North Fowler's English translation.
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Hermogenes. But what is the meaning of the word κακόν which you used in many of your derivations?
Socrates. By Zeus, I think it is a strange word and hard to understand; so I apply to it that contrivance of mine.
Hermogenes. What contrivance?
Socrates. The claim of foreign origin, which I advance in this case as in those others.
Hermogenes. Well, probably you are right. But, if you please, let us drop these words and try to discover the reasons for the words καλόν (beautiful, noble) and αἰσχρόν (base).
Socrates. I think the meaning of αἰσχρόν is clear, and this also agrees with what has been said before. For the giver of names appears to me throughout to denounce that which hinders and restrains things from flowing, and in this instance he gave to that which always restrains the flow (ἀεὶ ἴσχει τὸν ῥοῦν) this name ἀεισχοροῦν, which is now compressed and pronounced αἰσχρόν.
Hermogenes. What about καλόν?
Socrates. That is harder to understand, and yet it expresses its meaning: it has been altered merely in accent and in the length of the O.
Hermogenes. How is that?
Socrates. I think this word denotes intellect.
Hermogenes. What do you mean?
Socrates. Why, what do you think is the cause why anything is called by a name? Is it not the power which gave the name?
Hermogenes. Why, certainly.
Socrates. And is not that power the intellect either of gods or of men or both?
Hermogenes. Yes.
Socrates. Are not that which called things by name and that which calls them by name (τὸ καλοῦν) the same thing, namely intellect?
Hermogenes. Yes, clearly.
Socrates. And are not all works which are done by mind and intelligence worthy of praise, and those that are not done by them worthy of blame?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Does not the medical power perform medical works and the power of carpentry works of carpentry? Do you agree to that?
Hermogenes. I agree.
Socrates. And the beautiful performs beautiful works?
Hermogenes. It must do so.
Socrates. And the beautiful is, we say, intellect?
Hermogenes. Certainly.
Socrates. Then this name, the beautiful, is rightly given to mind, since it accomplishes the works which we call beautiful and in which we delight.
Hermogenes. Evidently.
Socrates. What further words of this sort are left for us?