Alcibiades 2
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Alcibiades 2 in the Greek text edited by John Burnet.
Section 138
Section 139
Section 140
Section 141
Section 142
Section 143
Section 144
Section 145
Section 146
Section 147
Section 148
Section 149
Section 150
[150] The idea is inconceivable that the Gods have regard, not to the justice and purity of our souls, but to costly processions and sacrifices, which men may celebrate year after year, although they have committed innumerable crimes against the Gods or against their fellow-men or the state. For the Gods, as Ammon and his prophet declare, are no receivers of gifts, and they scorn such unworthy service. Wherefore also it would seem that wisdom and justice are especially honoured both by the Gods and by men of sense; and they are the wisest and most just who know how to speak and act towards Gods and men. But I should like to hear what your opinion is about these matters.
Al. I agree, Socrates, with you and with the God, whom, indeed, it would be unbecoming for me to oppose.
Soc. Do you not remember saying that you were in great perplexity, lest perchance you should ask for evil, supposing that you were asking for good?
Al. I do.
Soc. You see, then, that there is a risk in your approaching the God in prayer, lest haply he should refuse your sacrifice when he hears the blasphemy which you utter, and make you partake of other evils as well. The wisest plan, therefore, seems to me that you should keep silence; for your ‘highmindedness’—to use the mildest term which men apply to folly—will most likely prevent you from using the prayer of the Lacedaemonians. You had better wait until we find out how we should behave towards the Gods and towards men.
Al. And how long must I wait, Socrates, and who will be my teacher? I should be very glad to see the man.
Soc. It is he who takes an especial interest in you. But first of all, I think, the darkness must be taken away in which your soul is now enveloped, just as Athene in Homer removes the mist from the eyes of Diomede that ‘He may distinguish between God and mortal man.’ Afterwards the means may be given to you whereby you may distinguish between good and evil. At present, I fear, this is beyond your power.
Al. Only let my instructor take away the impediment, whether it pleases him to call it mist or anything else! I care not who he is; but I am resolved to disobey none of his commands, if I am likely to be the better for them.