Alcibiades 1
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Alcibiades 1 in the Greek text edited by John Burnet.
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Section 109
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Section 112
Section 113
Section 114
Section 115
Section 116
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[130] Soc. And the user of the body is the soul?
Al. Yes, the soul.
Soc. And the soul rules?
Al. Yes.
Soc. Let me make an assertion which will, I think, be universally admitted.
Al. What is it?
Soc. That man is one of three things.
Al. What are they?
Soc. Soul, body, or both together forming a whole.
Al. Certainly.
Soc. But did we not say that the actual ruling principle of the body is man?
Al. Yes, we did.
Soc. And does the body rule over itself?
Al. Certainly not.
Soc. It is subject, as we were saying?
Al. Yes.
Soc. Then that is not the principle which we are seeking?
Al. It would seem not.
Soc. But may we say that the union of the two rules over the body, and consequently that this is man?
Al. Very likely.
Soc. The most unlikely of all things; for if one of the members is subject, the two united cannot possibly rule.
Al. True.
Soc. But since neither the body, nor the union of the two, is man, either man has no real existence, or the soul is man?
Al. Just so.
Soc. Is anything more required to prove that the soul is man?
Al. Certainly not; the proof is, I think, quite sufficient.
Soc. And if the proof, although not perfect, be sufficient, we shall be satisfied;—more precise proof will be supplied when we have discovered that which we were led to omit, from a fear that the enquiry would be too much protracted.
Al. What was that?
Soc. What I meant, when I said that absolute existence must be first considered; but now, instead of absolute existence, we have been considering the nature of individual existence, and this may, perhaps, be sufficient; for surely there is nothing which may be called more properly ourselves than the soul?
Al. There is nothing.
Soc. Then we may truly conceive that you and I are conversing with one another, soul to soul?
Al. Very true.
Soc. And that is just what I was saying before—that I, Socrates, am not arguing or talking with the face of Alcibiades, but with the real Alcibiades; or in other words, with his soul.
Al. True.
Soc. Then he who bids a man know himself, would have him know his soul?