Alcibiades 1
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Alcibiades 1 in the Greek text edited by John Burnet.
Section 103
Section 104
Section 105
Section 106
Section 107
Section 108
Section 109
Section 110
Section 111
Section 112
Section 113
Section 114
Section 115
Section 116
Section 117
[117] Al. I begin to distrust myself, but still I do not suppose that I should.
Soc. You would feel no doubt; and for this reason—because you would know?
Al. I suppose so.
Soc. And the reason why you involuntarily contradict yourself is clearly that you are ignorant?
Al. Very likely.
Soc. And if you are perplexed in answering about just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable, good and evil, expedient and inexpedient, the reason is that you are ignorant of them, and therefore in perplexity. Is not that clear?
Al. I agree.
Soc. But is this always the case, and is a man necessarily perplexed about that of which he has no knowledge?
Al. Certainly he is.
Soc. And do you know how to ascend into heaven?
Al. Certainly not.
Soc. And in this case, too, is your judgment perplexed?
Al. No.
Soc. Do you see the reason why, or shall I tell you?
Al. Tell me.
Soc. The reason is, that you not only do not know, my friend, but you do not think that you know.
Al. There again; what do you mean?
Soc. Ask yourself; are you in any perplexity about things of which you are ignorant? You know, for example, that you know nothing about the preparation of food.
Al. Very true.
Soc. And do you think and perplex yourself about the preparation of food: or do you leave that to some one who understands the art?
Al. The latter.
Soc. Or if you were on a voyage, would you bewilder yourself by considering whether the rudder is to be drawn inwards or outwards, or do you leave that to the pilot, and do nothing?
Al. It would be the concern of the pilot.
Soc. Then you are not perplexed about what you do not know, if you know that you do not know it?
Al. I imagine not.
Soc. Do you not see, then, that mistakes in life and practice are likewise to be attributed to the ignorance which has conceit of knowledge?
Al. Once more, what do you mean?
Soc. I suppose that we begin to act when we think that we know what we are doing?
Al. Yes.
Soc. But when people think that they do not know, they entrust their business to others?
Al. Yes.
Soc. And so there is a class of ignorant persons who do not make mistakes in life, because they trust others about things of which they are ignorant?
Al. True.
Soc. Who, then, are the persons who make mistakes? They cannot, of course, be those who know?
Al. Certainly not.