Alcibiades 1
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Alcibiades 1 in the Greek text edited by John Burnet.
Section 103
Section 104
Section 105
Section 106
Section 107
Section 108
Section 109
Section 110
Section 111
Section 112
Section 113
Section 114
Section 115
Section 116
[116] Soc. Might we not describe their different effects as follows:—You may call either of them evil in respect of the evil which is the result, and good in respect of the good which is the result of either of them?
Al. Yes.
Soc. And they are honourable in so far as they are good, and dishonourable in so far as they are evil?
Al. True.
Soc. Then when you say that the rescue of a friend in battle is honourable and yet evil, that is equivalent to saying that the rescue is good and yet evil?
Al. I believe that you are right, Socrates.
Soc. Nothing honourable, regarded as honourable, is evil; nor anything base, regarded as base, good.
Al. Clearly not.
Soc. Look at the matter yet once more in a further light: he who acts honourably acts well?
Al. Yes.
Soc. And he who acts well is happy?
Al. Of course.
Soc. And the happy are those who obtain good?
Al. True.
Soc. And they obtain good by acting well and honourably?
Al. Yes.
Soc. Then acting well is a good?
Al. Certainly.
Soc. And happiness is a good?
Al. Yes.
Soc. Then the good and the honourable are again identified.
Al. Manifestly.
Soc. Then, if the argument holds, what we find to be honourable we shall also find to be good?
Al. Certainly.
Soc. And is the good expedient or not?
Al. Expedient.
Soc. Do you remember our admissions about the just?
Al. Yes; if I am not mistaken, we said that those who acted justly must also act honourably.
Soc. And the honourable is the good?
Al. Yes.
Soc. And the good is expedient?
Al. Yes.
Soc. Then, Alcibiades, the just is expedient?
Al. I should infer so.
Soc. And all this I prove out of your own mouth, for I ask and you answer?
Al. I must acknowledge it to be true.
Soc. And having acknowledged that the just is the same as the expedient, are you not (let me ask) prepared to ridicule any one who, pretending to understand the principles of justice and injustice, gets up to advise the noble Athenians or the ignoble Peparethians, that the just may be the evil?
Al. I solemnly declare, Socrates, that I do not know what I am saying. Verily, I am in a strange state, for when you put questions to me I am of different minds in successive instants.
Soc. And are you not aware of the nature of this perplexity, my friend?
Al. Indeed I am not.
Soc. Do you suppose that if some one were to ask you whether you have two eyes or three, or two hands or four, or anything of that sort, you would then be of different minds in successive instants?