Alcibiades 1
Plato (428–347 BC)
Plato's Alcibiades 1 in the Greek text edited by John Burnet.
Section 103
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Section 109
[109] Soc. But if you were offering advice to another and said to him—This food is better than that, at this time and in this quantity, and he said to you—What do you mean, Alcibiades, by the word ‘better’? you would have no difficulty in replying that you meant ‘more wholesome,’ although you do not profess to be a physician: and when the subject is one of which you profess to have knowledge, and about which you are ready to get up and advise as if you knew, are you not ashamed, when you are asked, not to be able to answer the question? Is it not disgraceful?
Al. Very.
Soc. Well, then, consider and try to explain what is the meaning of ‘better,’ in the matter of making peace and going to war with those against whom you ought to go to war? To what does the word refer?
Al. I am thinking, and I cannot tell.
Soc. But you surely know what are the charges which we bring against one another, when we arrive at the point of making war, and what name we give them?
Al. Yes, certainly; we say that deceit or violence has been employed, or that we have been defrauded.
Soc. And how does this happen? Will you tell me how? For there may be a difference in the manner.
Al. Do you mean by ‘how,’ Socrates, whether we suffered these things justly or unjustly?
Soc. Exactly.
Al. There can be no greater difference than between just and unjust.
Soc. And would you advise the Athenians to go to war with the just or with the unjust?
Al. That is an awkward question; for certainly, even if a person did intend to go to war with the just, he would not admit that they were just.
Soc. He would not go to war, because it would be unlawful?
Al. Neither lawful nor honourable.
Soc. Then you, too, would address them on principles of justice?
Al. Certainly.
Soc. What, then, is justice but that better, of which I spoke, in going to war or not going to war with those against whom we ought or ought not, and when we ought or ought not to go to war?
Al. Clearly.
Soc. But how is this, friend Alcibiades? Have you forgotten that you do not know this, or have you been to the schoolmaster without my knowledge, and has he taught you to discern the just from the unjust? Who is he? I wish you would tell me, that I may go and learn of him—you shall introduce me.
Al. You are mocking, Socrates.
Soc. No, indeed; I most solemnly declare to you by Zeus, who is the God of our common friendship, and whom I never will forswear, that I am not; tell me, then, who this instructor is, if he exists.
Al. But, perhaps, he does not exist; may I not have acquired the knowledge of just and unjust in some other way?
Soc. Yes; if you have discovered them.
Al. But do you not think that I could discover them?
Soc. I am sure that you might, if you enquired about them.
Al. And do you not think that I would enquire?
Soc. Yes; if you thought that you did not know them.
Al. And was there not a time when I did so think?