Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (259).

1. Whether an evil will and evil action in the same human being and concerning the same thing are one sin or several. Since an evil will and an operation are sin, it is commonly asked whether in the same human being and concerning the same thing these two are one sin or different sins. For example, if someone steals by his will, he had an evil will, which is sin, and an evil act, which is likewise sin. These two are different, namely will and action; but are they different sins or one?

2. Objection against those who say that it is one sin. Some say that it is one sin. Others say that they are different sins, because since it is clear that these two are different, either two different sins are being spoken of, or two different things that are not sins. — Response. Others answer that these two are different, but not sins. They are not sins but one sin, because one transgression or disobedience is admitted in both, whether when one wills or when one acts, and there is one contempt. It is lesser when sin is contained in the will alone, but greater when action is added to the will; thus the sin becomes greater but not more numerous when the will is committed to action.

3. Another objection against the same people. They are still objected to as follows: If these two are only one sin, when someone first conceives an evil will and then commits the deed, he is not guilty of anything except what he was guilty of before the deed, when sin still consisted in the will alone. For no one is guilty of eternal death except on account of sin. But no sin was admitted by the action that had previously been admitted by the will; therefore, by sinning in action this person does not become liable to damnation for anything other than he was liable for when he offended by will alone. — Response. They also answer this by saying that the thief is indeed made guilty only on account of sin; and although his will and action are one sin, he was nevertheless made guilty by acting for something other than he had been guilty of when offending by will alone, because he is guilty for the act, which is other than the will, although it is not another sin.

4. Another objection against the same people. The question is pressed further by saying that these two are different sins because they are transgressions of different commandments. The act of theft is prohibited by one commandment of the law, namely, “You shall not steal”; the will to steal by another, namely, “You shall not covet your neighbor’s property.” Since these are two different commandments by which the two things are prohibited, it is clear that they are two different transgressions, and therefore different sins. — Response. They also say in response that the commandments by which these two are separately prohibited are indeed different, as Augustine teaches in On Exodus; nevertheless, when they are not observed, only one transgression is incurred and one sin contracted, although two different things are prohibited by them. Conversely, there are two commandments of charity by which two things are commanded to be loved, but one charity is commended to us in them.

1 Rubric omitted in MRVW. 3 Response omitted in RVW. 5 are] be, BCNRTVW. 18 Response omitted in MRVW. 24 against] contrary to, BCX. 30 Response omitted in RVW.

1 Book I, chap. 12, no. 26 (PL 32, 1235; CSEL 74, 26). 2 Book III, chap. 17, no. 49 (PL 32, 1205; CSEL 74, 130ff.), from which the Master also took the preceding authorities from On Free Choice. 3 Exod. 20:15; Deut. 5:19. 4 Exod. 20:17; Deut. 5:21.

1 Among them, the author of the Summa of Sentences, III, 15 (PL 171, 1142 B; 176, 113 C). 2 For example, Robert Pullus, Sentences, VI, 2 (PL 186, 865 A–B).

Augustine teaches in On Exodus; nevertheless, when they are not observed, only one transgression is incurred and one sin contracted, although two different things are prohibited by them. Conversely, there are two commandments of charity by which two things are commanded to be loved, but one charity is commended to us in them.

Chapter 2 (260).

1. Whether sin committed by someone remains in him until he repents. It is also commonly asked: when someone has committed sin willingly, and the will to do it and the action have passed away, but he has not yet truly repented, whether that sin remains in him until he repents. It does not seem so, because the will that existed before no longer exists, and he neither wills nor does what he previously willed and did.

2. Response determining the question. It must not be overlooked that sin is said to be in someone and to pass away in two ways: in act and in guilt. It is in someone in act while what is sin itself, whether action or will, is in the sinner; but it is in guilt when, whether the sin has passed away or is present, the human mind is polluted and corrupted on its account and the whole human being is bound to perpetual punishments. Sin is never in someone in act without also being in guilt, except original sin; but it is sometimes in guilt after it has passed away in act.

Chapter 3 (261).

1. The ways in which guilt is spoken of in Scripture. Guilt is understood in Scripture in many ways: as fault, punishment, or obligation to temporal or eternal punishment. If the sin is mortal, it binds us to eternal punishment; if venial, it binds us to temporal punishment.

2. What mortal sin is. — What venial sin is. There are two kinds of sins, mortal and venial. Mortal sin is that by which a human being deserves eternal death: “crime,” as Augustine says, “is what is worthy of accusation and condemnation”; venial sin, however, is what does not burden a human being with the guilt of perpetual death, but nevertheless deserves punishment and is easily forgiven.

Chapter 4 (262).

1. On the ways of distinguishing sins, which are assigned in many ways. — First distinction. Sins have various distinctions in Scripture. It is said there that sin is committed in two ways, namely by desire and fear, as Augustine teaches on the passage of the Psalm, Set on fire with fire and dug up. He says that all mortal sins are included under these two: he calls those “set on fire” that arise from desires that inflame us evilly, and those “dug up” that arise from fear that humbles us evilly. This occurs when someone desires what should not be desired or fears what should not be feared.

2. Second distinction. Elsewhere it is said that sin occurs in three ways, namely in thought, word, and deed. Hence Jerome, On Ezekiel: “There are three general offenses to which the human race is subject: we sin either in thought, speech, or deed.” A fourth mode is sometimes added, namely habit; this was signified in the four-day-old Lazarus.

3. Third. It is also said that a human being sins against God, against himself, and against his neighbor. Against God, when he thinks wrongly about God, as a heretic; or presumes to usurp what belongs to God by participating unworthily in the sacraments; or makes God’s name contemptible by perjury. He sins against his neighbor when he unjustly harms his neighbor; against himself when he harms himself and not another.

1 Rubric omitted in MRVW. 5–6 First distinction omitted in MRVW. 13 Second distinction omitted in RVW. 16–17 also sometimes is transposed in BCV. 19 Third omitted in MRVW. 22 makes contemptible by perjury is transposed in LRT.

1 Questions on the Heptateuch, II, q. 71 (PL 34, 620ff.; CSEL 28-II, 135–138; CCL 33, 102ff.). 2 See Matt. 22:37–39. 3 On Ezekiel 43:23–25 (PL 25 [1845], 427 B; CCL 75, 421); and below, Book IV, Dist. 16, chap. 1. 4 See John 11:39; cf. Augustine, On John, tractate 49, no. 3 (PL 35, 1748; CCL 36, 421).

Chapter 4, no. 1. Summa of Sentences, III, 16 (PL 171, 1142 C; 176, 113 C); the Master’s Gloss on Ps. 79:17 (PL 191, 766 A–B). — No. 2: Ordinary Gloss on Ezek. 43:25 (apud Lyranum, IV, 281a). — No. 3: Summa of Sentences, cited above.

Chapter 5 (263).

How offense and sin differ. It also has different names: it is called both sin and offense. “Offense perhaps is,” as Augustine says in Questions on Leviticus, “to turn away from good; sin is to do evil. For to turn away from good is one thing, and to do evil another. Sin is therefore the perpetration of evil, offense the abandonment of good. The name itself shows this. For what else does delictum mean except something abandoned? And what does the one who commits an offense abandon except good? Or offense is what is done unknowingly, while sin is committed knowingly. Nevertheless, sin is indifferently called offense and offense sin.”

Chapter 6 (264).

On the seven principal vices. It must also be known that there are seven capital or principal vices, as Gregory says in On Exodus: vainglory, anger, envy, acedia or sadness, avarice, gluttony, and lust. As Chrysostom says, these were signified by the seven peoples occupying the land promised to Israel. From these, as from seven springs, all the deadly corruptions of souls flow. They are called capital because all evils arise from them. There is no evil that does not derive its origin from one of these.

Chapter 7 (265).

1. On pride, which is the root of all evils. Nevertheless, all evils, both these and others, arise from pride, because, as Gregory says, “pride is the root of every evil, of which it is said: Pride is the beginning of every sin”; it is “love of one’s own excellence.”

2. On the four kinds of pride. Gregory says that it has four kinds: “The first is when someone attributes to himself the good he has; the second, when he believes it was given by God but nevertheless on account of his own merits; the third, when he boasts of having what he does not have; the fourth, when, despising others, he wants to appear unique.” Pride is therefore rightly called the root of every evil.

3. That desire is the root of all evils. What the Apostle says seems opposed to this: The desire for money is the root of all evils. For if desire is the root of all evils, then of pride. How, then, is pride the root and beginning of every sin?

Chapter 8 (266).

In what sense both pride and desire are called the root of all evils. It is understood that both statements are right if by both expressions the kinds of individual sins, not individual sins of the kinds, are understood to be included. For there is no kind of sin that does not sometimes proceed from pride, nor any that does not at some time descend from desire. There are some people who become proud from desire, and some who become desirous from pride. “For,” as Augustine says, “a human being who was not a lover of money would not be so unless he thought that by this he was more excellent”¹; therefore he desires wealth in order to excel. Thus desire arises from pride. There is also someone who would not love excellence unless he thought that by it he would have greater wealth; therefore he strives to excel because he loves having wealth. Pride, that is, love of excellence, is born in him from desire. It is therefore clear that sometimes desire arises from pride and sometimes pride from desire; and therefore it is rightly said of both that they are the root of every evil.

¹ John added in NTV.]

²

³

⁴ every evil, MRV. 5 is omitted in MTVW, transposed after pride in LR, after Beginning (4) in X. 6 Rubric omitted in MRVW. 10 root transposed after evil in OP. 12 Rubric omitted in RVW. 17 namely omitted in BCVX and added in LOVW.] ^{5 6}