Sentences, Books I–II

Sole chapter (252).

1. Whether all acts should be judged from their end so that they are called simply good or evil. After this, something should be added concerning acts: whether they too, like the will, should be judged good or evil from their end. Although, according to some, all acts are good insofar as they exist, not all should nevertheless be called simply good, nor all rewarded; rather, some are called simply evil, as others are good.

1 See Eccles. 7:30. 2 More precisely, in Fulgentius, On Faith to Peter, chap. 25, no. 66 (PL 65, 700 D–701 A; CCL 91A, 752ff.). 3 On Ezekiel 1:7 (PL 25 [1845], 22 B; CSEL 75, 12). 4 Concerning these, above, Dist. 35, chap. 2, no. 4 (p. 531).

Distinction XL. Cf. O. Lottin, The Problem of Intrinsic Morality..., in Psychology and Morality, II, 421–425; and The Moral Intention..., ibid., IV, 317ff. — Nos. 1–2. See the Summa of Sentences, III, 15 (PL 171, 1141 D–1142 C; 176, 113 A–C).

2. Which acts should be called simply good, and which simply evil. For those acts are simply and truly good that have a good cause and intention, that is, that accompany a good will and tend toward a good end. Those should be called simply evil that have a perverse cause and intention. — Hence Ambrose says: “Your affection gives a name to your work.” And Augustine, on Psalm 31: “Let no one count his good works before faith. They seem to me like great strength and a very swift course off the road. For where faith was not, there was no good work. Intention makes the work good; faith directs the intention. Do not attend too closely to what a person does, but to what he attends to when he does it, toward what he directs the sinews of the best governance.”

3. These testimonies seem to intimate that works are good or evil from affection and end. The Truth agrees with this when he says in the Gospel: “A good tree cannot make evil fruits, nor an evil tree good fruits.” By the name tree is understood not the nature of the human mind but the will, which, if it is evil, makes not good but evil works; but if it is good, it makes good, not evil works.

4. Whether all human works are good or evil from affection and end. It is asked whether all human works are good or evil from affection and end.

5. The opinion of some who say that all acts are indifferent. It seems so to some, who say that all acts are indifferent: that they are neither good nor evil in themselves, but that every act is good from a good intention and evil from an evil one. According to them, any act can be good if it is performed with a good intention.

1 Rubric omitted in RVW. 7 faith] end, BLM, corrected in B. 13 Truth] Lord, BCN. 14 nor] and not, LRW. 15 good] to make, added in CNT. 18 and] or, NRV. 21 Rubric omitted in RVW. 22 all] acts, added in BCX.

1 On Duties, I, chap. 30, no. 147 (PL 16 [1845], 66 A). 2 Expositions II on Psalm 31, no. 4 (PL 36, 259; CCL 38, 227). 3 Matt. 7:18. Ordinary Gloss on Matt. 7:17. 4 Peter Abelard, Ethics, chaps. 3 and 7, and Dialogue (PL 178, 643 D–644 A, 650 B, 1652 B).

III, 15 (PL 171, 1141 D–1142 C; 176, 113 A–C), which here recapitulates Peter Abelard’s position (cf. Ethics, chap. 3; PL 178, 644 A) and Hugh’s (On the Sacraments, II, 14, 6; PL 176, 561 A); cf. O. Lottin, in Psychology and Morality, IV, 316; and R. Blomme, The Doctrine of Sin, 19. Augustine’s authority is read in the Master’s Gloss on Rom. 3:28 (PL 191, 1365 A–B). — No. 5: From the Summa of Sentences, ibid.

6. The opinion of others, who make a threefold distinction among acts. Others think that some acts are evil in themselves, so that they can be nothing but sins even if they have a good cause; and that some are good in themselves, so that even if they have an evil cause they nevertheless do not cease to be good. — They confirm this with Augustine’s testimony, who says that something good is sometimes not done well. What someone does unwillingly or necessarily is not done well, because he does not do it with a good intention, as Augustine says in On John: “Servile fear,” he says, “is not in charity: although one believes God in it, one does not nevertheless believe in God; and if something good is done, it is not done well.” “For no one does something good unwillingly, even if what he does is good.” — Here you have it: someone does not do well what is good; therefore he does what is good with an evil intention. Hence they assert that certain works are such that they are good in a way that they cannot be evil, however they are done; conversely, some are so evil that they cannot be good, whatever the cause from which they are done; and others are works that are good or evil from their end or cause. They refer to these the testimonies of the Saints in which, they say, the judgment of works is measured by affection or intention. Thus these people offer a threefold distinction of acts.

7. Augustine seems to think otherwise: he says that human works are good or evil from intention and cause, except for certain things that are sins in themselves. Augustine most clearly teaches in the book Against Lying that all acts are judged good or evil according to intention and cause, except certain acts that are so evil that they can never be good, even if they seem to have a good cause. “It makes a very great difference,” he says, “by what cause, end, or intention something is done. But those things that are certainly sins are not to be done under any pretext of a good cause, any supposedly good end, or any seemingly good intention. Human works, if they have good or evil causes, are sometimes good and sometimes evil, when they are not sins in themselves. Thus providing food for the poor is good if it is done from mercy with right faith; and marital intercourse is good when it is done for begetting, if it is done with the faith by which children are begotten for rebirth. These things are evil again if they have evil causes: for example, if a poor person is fed for the sake of boasting, or one sleeps with his wife for the sake of lust, or children are begotten not to be nourished for God but for the devil. But when the works themselves are sins, such as thefts, sexual violations, and blasphemies, who would say that they should be done for good causes, or that they are not sins, or—what is more absurd—that they are just sins? Who would say, ‘Let us steal from the rich so that we may have something to give the poor,’ or ‘Let us give false testimony, not so that the innocent may be harmed, but rather so that they may be saved’? For there are two goods here: that the needy be fed and that the innocent not be punished. Or who would say that adultery should be committed so that through the woman with whom it is committed a human being may be freed from death? Why do we not also suppress true wills and substitute false ones, so that inheritances may go not to those who do no good but rather to those who help the needy? Why should those evils not be done for the sake of these goods, if for the sake of these goods those things are not evil? Why should a good man not seize wealth from filthy prostitutes who enrich adulterers, so that he may distribute it to the needy, if no evil is evil when it is done for a good?”

8. Not only why something is done, but also what is done must be considered. “Who would say this except someone trying to overturn human affairs, morals, and laws? For once we grant that in evil acts it must be asked not what is done but why it is done, so that any acts done for good causes are not judged evil in themselves, what crime could not rightly be said to be possible—not only with impunity but even gloriously? In it punishment would not be feared but reward hoped for. Yet justice rightly punishes the one who says that he took surplus from a rich man to give to a poor one; the forger who corrupts another’s will so that the heir might be the one who would give generous alms rather than one who gives none; and the one who shows that he committed adultery in order through the woman with whom he committed it to free a human being from death.”

1 Rubric omitted in RVW. 2 are] be, BCV. 7 says omitted in NOP. 10 also omitted in BCLRV, interlinear in OT. 12 they assert is transposed in BCN. 15 be done] are done, L; omitted, MX; marginal in R. 16 And omitted in BCOPX. 24 Interest] but, added in BCOP. 8 have] may have, LMRTW (Augustine). 22 evil? omitted in BCLV. 23 Rubric omitted in RVW. 25 can rightly is transposed in LMRTV.

1 Confessions, I, chap. 12, no. 19 (PL 32, 669; CSEL 33, 17). 2 Florus of Lyon on Rom. 8:15 (apud Bede’s Complete Works, VI, Cologne, 1688, 148–149); the Gloss (PL 191, 1439 D); Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, chap. 32, no. 56. 3 I John 4:18. 4 Confessions, ibid.; Prosper’s Sentences. 5 Those cited above, no. 2 (p. 557). 6 Chap. 7, no. 18 (PL 40, 528ff.; CSEL 41, 489ff.).

No. 6. Augustine’s authorities are excerpted from the Master’s Gloss on Rom. 8:15 (PL 191, 1439 D); see the other notes given above concerning them.

9. The one who steals out of desire is worse than the one who steals out of mercy. But “someone may say: Is every thief therefore to be equated with the thief who steals from a desire to show mercy? Who would say that? Yet of these two neither is good merely because one is worse: the one who steals out of desire is worse than the one who steals out of mercy. But if every theft is sin, one must abstain from every theft. For who would say that one ought to sin, even if one sin is more serious and another less serious? At present, however, we are asking what act is sin or not, not what is more or less serious.”

10. Attend, reader, with your whole mind’s consideration to the words set out; they provide no useless exercise. You will recognize which act is sin: namely, the act that has an evil cause—and not only that one, because there are some acts which, even if they have a good cause, are nevertheless sins, as was stated above.

11. From this it seems to follow that an evil will or action is not always judged from its end, as in things that are sins in themselves. For the will that does evil for some cause seems to have a good end; the will is not evil from its end, nor does the action become evil from the will, but the will becomes perverse from the action. — Some place the act of the Jews among those things that are evil in themselves. Some place there the act of the Jews, who thought that by crucifying Christ they were rendering service to God; for they say that they could have a good end, namely service to God, and nevertheless assert that their will and action were perverse.

12. No exception is made for good things in Augustine’s foregoing words: every good will is good from its end, and every good action is good from its end and will. But not every evil will is evil from its end, nor is every evil action evil from its end and will. Everything that has an evil cause is evil, but not everything that has a good cause is good. Therefore, when it is said that a work receives its name from affection, this rule is generally true; but among evil things it excludes those that are evil in themselves. All human works are therefore judged good or evil according to intention and cause, except those that are evil in themselves, that is, those that cannot be done without transgression.

13. Some say that the foregoing things cannot be done for a good end. Some nevertheless contend that these things never have a good cause. One who steals what belongs to another in order to give it to the poor does not steal for a good purpose, they say: for it is not good to give another’s property to the poor. One who offers a sacrifice to God from robbery, as the authority says, does the same as if he sacrificed his son before his father or offered God the sacrifice of a dog. The offering of the wicked is abominable to God. Likewise, they say that freeing a human being from death through adultery is evil: although freeing a human being from death is good, they assert that freeing him in this way is evil.

14. They note in Augustine’s foregoing words that these things are not done for a good end. Hence they say that Augustine carefully moderated and cautiously worded his statement above when he said that “those things that are certainly sins are not to be done with any supposedly good end or any seemingly good intention.” For he did not simply say with a good end and with a good intention, but added supposedly and seemingly, because such things are not done with a good end and good intention, but with an intention that seems good and an end that is thought good but is not. Augustine did not therefore, they say, exclude these things because they have evil causes, but because they have causes that seem good and are nevertheless evil.