Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (237).

1. That some things are at once sins and punishments of sin, some sins and causes of sin, and others sins that are both causes and punishments of sin. It must nevertheless be known that some things are sins in such a way that they are also punishments of sins. Hence Augustine², on the passage of Psalm 57, Fire fell upon them and they did not see the sun, says: “The fire of pride, concupiscence, and anger is understood. ‘Few see these punishments’; therefore the Apostle especially recalls them in the Letter to the Romans³, and lists many things that are sins and punishments of sin. Between the first sin of apostasy and the final punishment of eternal fire, the intermediate things are both sins and punishments of sin.”

Gregory also says in On Ezekiel⁴: “For one who despises and does not wish to repent, God places a stumbling block where he will stumble more grievously. For sin that is not quickly erased through repentance is either sin and cause of sin, or sin and punishment of sin, or sin at once cause and punishment of sin. Hence Moses⁵: The sins of the Amorites are not yet complete. And David says⁶: Add iniquity upon their iniquity. Another Prophet⁷: Blood has touched blood, that is, sin has been added to sin. Paul also says⁸: Therefore God handed them over to dishonorable passions, etc.; and again⁹: That they may always fill up their sins. The angel also says to John¹⁰: Let the filthy become still filthier.” From these testimonies it is gathered that something can be both sin and punishment of sin.

1 Questions, 23 (PL 40, 16ff.). 2 Chap. 3, no. 2 (p. 534). 3 See above, Distinction 32, chap. 3 (p. 514).

Chapter 1, no. 1. From Lombard’s Gloss on Ps. 57:9 and Gloss on Rom. 1:26 (PL 191, 538 B, 1334 D). — No. 2. From the Ordinary Gloss on Ezek. 3:20 (apud Lyranum, IV, 216b).

Chapter 2 (238).

1. A question arising from the foregoing: namely, whether it is the punishment of sin insofar as it is sin. It is therefore reasonably asked whether it is the punishment of sin insofar as it is sin.

2. The reason why it is not. This does not seem so, since every punishment of sin is just; hence Augustine in the book Retractations¹: “Every punishment of sin is just, and is called a penalty.” If, therefore, a sin that is sin and punishment of sin is punishment of sin insofar as it is sin, since every just punishment comes from God’s justice, it seems that insofar as it is sin it is just and proceeds from God.

1 Expositions on the Psalms 57:9, nos. 18–19 (PL 36, 687ff.; CCL 39, 724ff.). See also Against Julian, Unfinished Work, I, chap. 47: “Know that sin, punishment of sin, and both together are different things, that is, sin itself can also be punishment of sin” (PL 45, 1068). 2 See Rom. 1:21–32. 3 Book I, homily 11, nos. 23–25 (PL 76, 915 A–B, 916 B–C); see Ezek. 3:20. 4 Gen. 15:16. 5 Ps. 68:28. 6 Hos. 4:2. 7 Rom. 1:26. 8 1 Thess. 2:16. 9 Rev. 22:11. 10 Book I, chap. 9, no. 5 (PL 32, 598; CSEL 36, 44ff.); from On Free Choice, III, chap. 18, no. 51: “Every punishment, if it is just, is a punishment of sin and is called a penalty” (PL 32, 1296; CSEL 74, 132).

3. Their response, where it is taught in what sense sin is called punishment of sin or punishment. To this they respond that sin is called the punishment of sin because through the sin into which a human being falls deservedly on account of a preceding sin, when God abandons him, the good nature is corrupted. Just as eternal fire is called the punishment of the wicked because they are tormented by it, although the torment of the wicked is not the fire itself but occurs in a human being through the fire, so through sin nature is corrupted and the good of nature diminished. This diminution and corruption of good is a passion and punishment; but it is not essentially the sin through which it occurs. Sin is called this, as was stated above, because as soon as a human being sins, that corruption occurs in him through sin. Yet this occurs with God as its author: that punishment or passion, which is the corruption of good, is from God. Its matter and cause, so to speak, is nevertheless the sin, which is not from God.

4. Augustine. Augustine seems to have noted and understood this according to that sense when he says in the book On the Predestination of the Saints¹: “By predestination God foreknew the things he himself was going to do; but God also foreknew what he himself was not going to do, that is, all evils. For although some things are sins in such a way that they are also punishments of sin, according to the Apostle’s statement²: God handed them over to passions, etc., it is nevertheless not God’s sin, but judgment”—that is, punishment. In Scripture punishment is often understood by the name judgment³. — Here, for those who attend carefully, he seems to intimate that things that are sins and punishments of sin belong to God not insofar as they are sins, but insofar as they are punishments. For after saying that God would not do certain evils, that is, sins, because someone could object that certain sins are also punishments of sin and every punishment of sin is just and therefore from God, as though determining in what respect he does or does not do them, he added the rest. According to the foregoing understanding, sins are certainly called punishments.

Hence the Apostle⁴ calls them dishonorable passions, because, as the authority says⁵, “although there are certain sins that give pleasure, they are nevertheless passions of nature and must not be so called,” because nature is corrupted through them.

Chapter 3 (239).

1. Although every sin can be called a punishment, not every sin is the punishment of sin. Although in this sense every mortal sin can be called a punishment, not every sin can be called the punishment of sin. For the punishment of sin, as was stated above⁶, is that whose cause is another preceding sin. Thus sin is called the punishment of sin in relation to what precedes, just as it is called the cause of sin in relation to what follows. It follows that the same sin is both cause and punishment of sin, but the punishment of one sin and the cause of another.

2. Gregory. As Gregory says in the Moral Works⁷: “Sin that is not dissolved by repentance soon draws a person to another by its weight; hence it is not only sin but also the cause of sin, since a subsequent fault arises from it. But sin that arises from sin is not only sin but also punishment of sin, because by a just judgment God darkens the sinner’s heart, so that on account of the merit of the preceding sin he also falls into another. The one whom he did not wish to free, he struck by abandoning him.” — Augustine, Against Julian⁸: “Therefore, as Augustine says, this is the punishment of a preceding sin, and yet it is itself also sin. By the judgment of the most just God, as the Apostle⁹ says of certain people, they have been handed over—whether by abandonment or in some other way that can be explained or not explained—to dishonorable passions, ‘so that crimes might be punished by crimes, and the punishments of sinners might not only be torments but also increases of vices. Those sins, therefore, which the Apostle remembered¹⁰, because they arise from pride, are not only sins but also punishments.’”

¹ says, OP. 14 and] also, BCOP. 18–19 Rubric omitted in MNRVW. 25 remembered] counts, LMNRVW; enumerates, T.]

1 Chapter 10, no. 19 (PL 44, 975). 2 Rom. 1:26. 3 For example, Matt. 23:33: “How will you flee from the judgment of Gehenna?”; and Mark 12:40: “These will receive a longer judgment.” 4 Rom. 1:26. 5 Ordinary Gloss on this passage (apud Lyranum, VI, 5c). 6 In chapter 2, no. 3. 7 Book XXV, chap. 9, no. 22 (PL 76, 334 B–C). 8 Book V, chap. 3, no. 10 (PL 44, 789). 9 See Rom. 1:26. 10 Augustine, Sermon 197, no. 1 (PL 38, 1022).

Chapter 3, no. 2. Gloss on Rom. 1:24 (PL 191, 1331 B); Gregory, Moral Works, at x 14a, z 8b; Gloss on Rom. 1:27 and 1:24 (PL 191, 1334 C–D, 1331 B).

3. From these points it is now clear that some sins are also punishments and causes of sin; that sin is the punishment of sin when it has a preceding sin as its cause; and that sin is the cause of sin when it is the merit of a subsequent fault.

Chapter 4 (240).

1. From the foregoing it seems to be signified that the very same things that are sins are also punishments of sin. But when he says “crimes are punished by crimes,” he seems to intimate that those very things that are sins are essentially punishments of sin, that is, punishments for sin. — To this they say that these and similar statements are made according to the foregoing account¹, and therefore should be understood according to the explanation already given. “For the understanding² of statements must be taken from the causes of speaking.”

2. It does not prejudice the truth if someone says that sins themselves are essentially punishments of sin. Nevertheless, it is thought not to prejudice the truth if someone says that those same things that are sins are, essentially, so to speak, punishments—that is, punishments of preceding sins—which are just and from God. Yet they are not from God insofar as they are sins, nor are they punishments of sin insofar as they are sins. Nevertheless, insofar as they are sins, they are privations of good; but, as was said above³, they are called privations causally and actively.

Chapter 5 (241).

He clearly shows that some sins are punishment of sin, and that the punishment itself is just and from God. Augustine clearly teaches in the book Retractations⁴ that some things that are evil are done by a human being necessarily, and that those same things are just punishment of sin. “There are,” he says, “things done by necessity that ought to be condemned, when a human being wishes to do what is right and cannot. Hence the Apostle’s statement⁵: I do not do the good that I want, but the evil that I hate, that I do. And this one⁶: The flesh desires against the spirit, and the spirit against the flesh; for these oppose one another, so that you do not do the things you want. But all these things arise from the condemnation of death. For if this is not the punishment of a human being but nature, then none of these things are sins. If one does not depart from the condition in which the human being was naturally made, when he does these things he does what he ought. But if a human being is not good because he is in this condition, and does not have it in his power to be good—whether because he does not see what he ought to be, or because he sees it but cannot be what he sees he ought to be—who would doubt that this is punishment? Every punishment, however, if it is the punishment of sin, is just and is called a penalty. But if the punishment is unjust, since no one doubts that it is punishment, it was imposed on the human being by some unjust ruler. Since it is madness to doubt God’s omnipotence and justice, this punishment is just and is inflicted for some sin. For no one unjustly ruling could either seize a human being as though God were unaware, or extort this from one unwilling as though God were weaker, so as to torment the human being with an unjust punishment. It therefore remains that this just punishment comes from the condemnation of the human being.” By these and many other testimonies it is taught that some things are both sins and punishments of sin.

Chapter 6 (242).

1. On certain things that are undoubtedly sins and punishments, such as anger and envy. Moreover, there is no room for doubt that some sins are punishments without any qualification, such as envy, which is “sorrow over another’s good”⁷, and anger. These are sins also not insofar as they are punishments.

2. The same should be thought about desire, fear, and other things of this kind. Hence Augustine says in the book Eighty-Four Questions⁸: “Every disturbance is a passion; every desire is a disturbance; therefore every desire is a passion. But whenever a passion is in us, we suffer through that passion; therefore whenever desire is in us, we suffer through that desire, and we suffer insofar as it is desire. Every passion, however, insofar as we suffer it, is not sin. The same applies to fear. For it does not follow that, if we suffer fear, it is not sin for that reason, since many sins are things we suffer, but not insofar as we suffer them.”

² these, MOX. 14 to be done] done, OPX. 17 are omitted in LMNW, interlinear in RV. 21 rightly] right, BCW. 23 itself] can; to do added in OP.]

1 Above, p. 539, line 23. 2 Cf. above, chap. 3, no. 1. 3 Hilary’s words, as above, Book I, Dist. 35, chap. 6 (p. 536). 4 Chap. 9, no. 5 (PL 32, 597ff.; CSEL 36, 44ff.; from On Free Choice, III, chap. 18, no. 51, PL 32, 1295ff.; CSEL 74, 131ff.). 5 Rom. 7:15. 6 Gal. 5:17. 7 Interlinear Gloss on Rom. 1:29 (apud Lyranum, VI, 6r); Augustine defines it as “hatred of another’s happiness”; cf. On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, XI, chap. 14, no. 18 (PL 34, 436; CSEL 28-I, 346), and Expositions on the Psalms 104:25 (PL 37, 1399; CCL 40, 1545). 8 Questions, 77 (PL 40, 89).

3. That certain statement of Jerome seems to conflict with Augustine’s words cited above. It must be carefully noted that Jerome’s statement in Explanation of the Faith seems to conflict with Augustine’s words cited above, in which he says that certain things done necessarily are to be condemned and evil: “We execrate,” he says, “the blasphemy of those who say that anything impossible for a human being has been commanded by God, and that God’s commandments can be kept not by individuals but by everyone collectively.” A little later: “We say that those who, with Manichaeus, say that a human being cannot avoid sin are as much in error as those who, with Jovinian, assert that a human being cannot sin.” — Here Jerome says that it is an error for someone to say that a human being cannot avoid sin. But whoever says that certain things are done necessarily says that certain things cannot be avoided. Since Augustine says this, what he teaches seems either to be erroneous or what Jerome says seems not to be true.

4. Determination removing the contradiction from the middle position of the saints. To this it can be said that Augustine taught this according to the condition of our misery, to which ignorance and difficulty belong—as he says in the book On Free Choice—and which descended from a just condemnation. He included venial sins there. Jerome, however, speaks only about mortal sins, which each person, enlightened by grace, can avoid; or he says this about the human being according to the state of free choice before that sin.

5. He summarizes, in preparation for passing to other matters. We have set out with sufficient care the opinion of those who say that all acts are good natures and are good insofar as they exist. In this discussion we inserted certain matters that should not be understood as belonging only to their position, since all Catholics who think wisely hold them without hesitation. We also supported with testimonies of authorities and arguments the teaching of those who say that all acts are good in their essence, that is, insofar as they exist, but that some are sins insofar as they occur disorderly. — He repeats the foregoing in order to add to it. They also add that some acts are good not only in essence but in kind, such as feeding the hungry, which is an act belonging to the class of works of mercy. They say that certain acts are absolutely and perfectly good, commended not only by their essence or kind but also by their cause and end, such as those that proceed from a good will and aim at a good end.