Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (231).

1. What sin is. After this we must see what sin is. — Augustine, to Faustus⁵: “Sin is, as Augustine says, every word, deed, or desire that is done against the law of God.” — Augustine. Another description⁶: The same author, in the book On Two Souls⁷: “Sin is the will to retain or obtain what justice forbids.” — Both definitions concern actual sin, and mortal rather than venial sin. The first definition shows that sin is an evil will, whether a wicked utterance or action—that is, an evil act both interior and exterior. The second shows it to be an interior act alone: for, as was said above⁸, the will is a movement of the soul; therefore it is an interior act.

2. Ambrose also says in the book On Paradise: “What is sin except transgression of divine law and disobedience to heavenly commands? Therefore sin exists in the transgressor, but there is no fault in the one who commands. Sin would not exist if there had been no prohibition.

¹ privation, OPX.]

1 Ibid., chap. 13 (PL 40, 237ff.; CCL 46, 55), where the immediately following text is also found. 2 Against Faustus, XXII, chap. 27 (PL 42, 418; CSEL 25, 621). 3 Chap. 11, no. 15 (PL 42, 105; CSEL 25, 70), through the Retractations, I, chap. 15, no. 4 (PL 32, 609; CSEL 36, 75). 4 Dist. 26, chap. 2, no. 1 (p. 471). 5 Chap. 8, no. 39 (PL 14 [1845], 292 C–D; CSEL 32-I, 295ff.).

But if sin did not exist, not only wickedness but perhaps virtue also would not exist, since, unless there had been seeds of some wickedness, virtue could neither subsist nor excel.” Here Ambrose defines sin as transgression of the law and disobedience.

3. John says: “Whoever commits sin also commits iniquity, and sin is iniquity.” On this passage Augustine says¹: “Nomos in Greek is law in Latin; hence anomia, iniquity, which is against the law or without law. Hence he says, ‘Sin is iniquity’; whatever we sin, we do against the law of God. Hence²: ‘I have counted as transgressors all the sinners of the earth’—not only those who despise the written law, but also those who corrupt the innocence of the natural law.”

Chapter 2 (232).

1. He sets out various opinions about sin. Accordingly, because of the diversity of these words, many have held different opinions about sin. — Threefold opinion about sin *. Some said that only the evil will is sin, and not exterior acts; others said both the will and acts; others said neither, claiming that all acts are good, are from God, and have God as their author, while evil is nothing, as Augustine says in On John³: “All things were made through him, and without him nothing was made”—that is, sin, which is nothing; and human beings become nothing when they sin.”

2. Augustine also said above⁴ that “evil is the privation or corruption of good.” He also says in the book Eighty-Four Questions⁵: “The highest evil has no measure, for it lacks every good, whereas measure is something good. It therefore does not exist, since it is contained by no form, and all this evil has been discovered from the privation of form.” — Likewise, in Ecclesiastical Dogmas⁶ it is said that “evil or wickedness was not created by God, but invented by the devil, who himself was created good.” — The same author also shows in the book Against the Manichaeans⁷ what it is to sin, saying: “What else is it to sin except to err in the precepts of truth or in truth itself? But if they do not do this voluntarily, sinners are judged unjustly.” What, then, should be held amid such great variety? What should be said?

5–10 Addition omitted in LMPV, transposed to the margin at p. 526, line 13 in R, to p. 527, line 25 in WX, and to p. 529, line 17 in O; in the text in T and in the third column in BCW. 13–14 Rubric omitted in RVW. 17 Praevaricantes] praevaricatores BCX. 20 privation of good added in BCNOPX.

1 John 3:4. 2 Rather, Bede on this passage (PL 93, 100 A–B). 3 Ps. 118:119. 4 In chapter 1, nos. 1–2. 5 Tractate 1, no. 13 (PL 35, 1385; CCL 36, 7). 6 Dist. 34, chap. 4, no. 2 (p. 526ff.). 7 Questions, 6 (PL 40, 13). 8 On the Orthodox Faith, IV, 20 (PL 42, 1218). 9 Namely, Gennadius, chap. 27.

Chapter 2, no. 1. A. M. Landgraf, The Dependence of Sin on God, in History of Dogma, I-2, 204–281; R. Blomme, The Doctrine of Sin; O. Lottin, The Problem of Intrinsic Morality from Abelard to Saint Thomas Aquinas, in Psychology and Morality, II, 421–424; The Moral Intention from Peter Abelard to Saint Thomas Aquinas, ibid., IV, 309–319.

3. The true opinion about sin is proposed. It can rightly be said, and should be freely taught, that sin is an evil act, interior and exterior—namely, an evil thought, utterance, and action. Nevertheless, sin consists principally in the will, from which evil works proceed as evil fruits from an evil tree¹.

4. The teaching of some who say that the evil will and act, insofar as they exist, are natures and therefore good, but insofar as they are evil, are sins. Some, carefully attending to Augustine’s words, which he uses above² and in other passages of Scripture, teach not foolishly that the evil will and evil acts, insofar as they exist or insofar as they are acts, are good; but insofar as they are evil, they are sins. They say that every will and every act is God’s good nature insofar as it is an act or will, and comes from God as its author; but insofar as it occurs disorderly and against the law and lacks its proper end, it is sin. Thus, insofar as it is sin, it is nothing: for it is neither a substance nor a nature.

5. They prove by authorities that all wills and acts are good insofar as they exist. They prove that every will and action is good insofar as it exists from what Augustine says in the book Eighty-Four Questions³: “God is the cause only of good; therefore he is not the author of evil, because he is the author of all things that exist, and insofar as they exist, they are good.” — The same author, proving that nothing happens by chance in the world, says in the same work⁴: “Whatever happens by chance happens randomly; whatever happens randomly does not happen by providence ...”

5. “Whatever happens by chance happens randomly; whatever happens randomly does not happen by providence. If, therefore, some things happen by chance in the world, the whole world is not governed by providence; if the whole world is not governed by providence, there is some nature or substance that does not belong to the work of providence. But everything that exists, insofar as it exists, is good. For that good is supreme, by participation in which other goods exist; and everything mutable is good, insofar as it exists, not through itself but through participation in that good—which we also call divine providence. Nothing, therefore, happens by chance in the world.” — They rely on these testimonies to show that everything that exists is good insofar as it exists. Hence Augustine says in On Christian Doctrine¹: “He who is supremely and first of all is wholly immutable; and the other things that exist cannot exist unless from him; and they are good insofar as they have received being.”

6. What follows from the foregoing. From the foregoing it is gathered and inferred that if an evil will and evil action exist, they are good insofar as they exist. But who denies that there is an evil will and an evil action? An evil will or action is therefore good insofar as it exists. And insofar as it is a will or action it is likewise good; but it is evil through a defect, and that defect is not from God, nor is it anything.

7. On the defect of the will. Augustine seems to have noted this in the book Eighty-Four Questions², saying: “A defect is that of the will by which a human being is made worse; as reason teaches, this defect is far removed from God’s will.”

8. Another proof that every act is good insofar as it exists. They also prove in another way that every act, interior or exterior, is good insofar as it exists: for there would be no evil act unless it were a good thing, because no thing is evil unless that same thing is good. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion³: “Every nature is good; and no thing is evil that would not be a nature. Evil therefore cannot exist unless there were some good.” Although this seems to be said absurdly, the connection of the reasoning compels us to say it.

9. He briefly summarizes the points made. From the testimonies cited above they assert that all acts are good things insofar as they exist, and that nothing is evil—that is, sin—unless it is also in some respect good. They proclaim God the author of all things that exist insofar as they exist, and say that everything that exists exists by his will and is, insofar as it exists, a nature.

10. Objection against those who say that all acts are good insofar as they exist. The following objection is made to them: If everything that exists is good and is a nature insofar as it exists, then adultery, homicide, and similar things are good and are natures insofar as they exist, and occur by God’s will. If that is so, those who do such things act well, which is utterly absurd. — Their response. They answer as follows: they do indeed say that adultery, homicide, and similar things do not simply denote acts, but defects of acts; and that the acts themselves of adultery and homicide, insofar as they exist or insofar as they are acts, are from God and are good natures, but not insofar as they are adultery and homicide. Therefore they say it does not follow that, if the acts that are homicides and adulteries are from God, homicides and adulteries are from God.

11. Another objection of theirs against the same people. They are also opposed in another way: If nothing is evil that is not a nature or good thing, how then are these sins—such as not believing in God, not going to church, and the like—sins, since these are not natures, indeed do not exist at all? For not going to church, not believing, and the like are not a thing or any thing. — Response, in which they teach that expressions by negation posit something, such as not believing in God and the like. To this they say that by these and similar expressions, which seem simply to denote privations and to posit nothing because they are expressed by negation, something is truly posited and acts are signified through them. For not believing in Christ, they say, is unbelief, and the name unbelief signifies an evil act of the mind. Likewise, when it is said, “It is evil not to go to church,” contempt on the part of the one who does not go is signified—that is, an evil will or purpose. For this is to turn away from good, and therefore it is evil; just as conversely to turn away from evil is good. Therefore, just as turning away from evil posits something, namely the will and purpose of avoiding evil—for what is wholly nothing cannot be good—so turning away from good signifies “what exists,” namely the will and purpose of evil. In this respect that general description of mortal sin which Augustine gave above¹ is true.

²

1 Chap. 32, no. 35 (PL 34, 32; CSEL 80, 27; CCL 32, 26). 2 Questions, 3 (PL 40, 11). 3 Chap. 13 (PL 40, 237; CCL 46, 55).

³ et added TVW. 16 sequi] sequitur LOPT, which O corrects. 19 illorum omitted LMN. 24–25 Rubrica omitted RVW. 31 Hoc] Hec BCO.]

No. 10. Summa of Sentences, III, 15 (PL 171, 1141 D–1142 A; 176, 113 A–B).

Chapter 3 (233).

1. Whether an evil act, insofar as it is sin, is the privation or corruption of good. They can also be asked: Since sin is, as was said above², the privation or corruption of good, and every evil act is sin, is it the privation or corruption of good insofar as it is sin or not? — He argues on both sides. For if it is the corruption of good insofar as it is sin, since the corruption or privation of good is a punishment for a human being, then insofar as it is sin it is a punishment. If that is so, then insofar as it is sin it seems to be good and to be from God. But if it is not the corruption of good insofar as it is sin, it is therefore asked in what respect it is corruption. For if it is corruption and not insofar as it is sin, since it is nothing except good apart from the fact that it is sin, then insofar as it is good it is the corruption or privation of good.

2. Response: it is said to be the privation or corruption of good insofar as it is sin, but not a punishment. They themselves also say in response that an evil act is not the privation or corruption of good insofar as it exists, or insofar as it is good, but insofar as it is sin; nevertheless, insofar as it is sin it is not a punishment or anything that is from God. For, as can be gathered from Augustine’s words cited above, sin is called the corruption or privation of good actively, not passively. Evil or sin is therefore called the corruption of good because it “deprives a good nature of good in some way; for if it does not deprive it of some good, it does no harm,” as Augustine said above³: “but it does harm; therefore it takes away good.” It does not harm except insofar as it is sin; therefore, insofar as it is sin, it deprives of good, and thus insofar as it is sin it is the privation or corruption of good.

⁴

1 Above, chap. 1, no. 1 (p. 529). 2 In Dist. 34, chap. 4, no. 2 (p. 526ff.). 3 Ibid. (p. 527, line 11).

Chapter 4 (234).

1. How it can corrupt good insofar as it is sin, when it is nothing. But since it is nothing insofar as it is sin, how can it corrupt or take away good? — Augustine’s response by analogy. Augustine teaches this in the book On the Nature of Good¹, saying: “Abstaining from food is not a substance, yet the substance of the body, if it wholly abstains from food, grows weak and breaks. Thus sin is not a substance”; nevertheless, through it the nature of the soul is corrupted.

2. That sin is properly the corruption of the soul, and how. Sin, that is, guilt, is properly the corruption of the soul. If it is asked in what the soul can be corrupted, this becomes clear in the parable of the man who fell among robbers², who stripped and wounded him. A human being falls among robbers when through sin he is dragged into the devil’s power; then through sin he is stripped of gratuitous goods, that is, virtues, and wounded in natural goods, which are reason or understanding, memory, intelligence, and the like, which are darkened and corrupted through sin. Through sin he is also deprived of that good by participation in which other goods exist, and he is deprived of it the more the more he withdraws from it.

Chapter 5 (235).

1. How a human being withdraws from God, namely through the dissimilarity produced by sin. A human being withdraws from God through sin, not by distance of place, because God is everywhere wholly and present to all; and “all things are in him,” as Augustine says in the book Eighty-Four Questions³, and he himself is not a place. Yet God’s place is abusively called the temple of God—not because God is contained by it, but because he is present to it and dwells in it. This is understood of a pure soul. Therefore, through sin a person becomes far from God not according to place, but in that he departs from God’s likeness; and he becomes farther the more unlike he becomes. — “Those things,” Augustine says in the book Eighty-Four Questions¹, “which are like God by participation receive dissimilarity; but likeness itself can in no way be dissimilar in any respect. Hence, since the Son is the likeness of the Father, he cannot be dissimilar to the Father in any respect: by participation in him whatever things are like God are like, and those things can receive dissimilarity. Nothing makes a human being so unlike God as sin.”

2. That sin is also the privation of the body’s good. Since sin is the corruption or privation of the good that is in the soul, it is also the privation and corruption of the body’s good: thus sin deprived the human body of the benefit of that immortality and impassibility which it had before sin.

4 Rubric omitted in NRVW. 5 you omitted in RTVW, deleted in N. 23 84] 83, X; corrected to 83 in TV.

1 More precisely, On Nature and Grace, chap. 20, no. 22 (PL 44, 257; CSEL 60, 248). 2 See Luke 10:30; cf. above, Dist. 25, chap. 7, no. 1 (p. 465). 3 Questions, 20 (PL 40, 16). 4 Questions, 23 (PL 40, 16ff.).

Chapter 4, no. 1. From the Summa of Sentences, III, 14 (PL 171, 1140 A; 176, 111 B). — For no. 2 cf. the same Summa (1141 A–B; 112 A–C). — Chapter 5. Cf. Peter Lombard, Sermon II on the Resurrection of the Lord (PL 171, 353 C–354 B).

Chapter 6 (236).

Whether punishment is the privation of good. It is also commonly asked whether punishment is the privation or corruption of good. — This can easily be answered if the foregoing is recalled. For above we said that privation or corruption of good is understood actively or passively, that is, according to efficacy or effect. Therefore privation or corruption of good is said both of sin and of punishment: of sin according to efficacy, because it deprives or corrupts good; but of punishment according to effect, that is, according to the suffering that is the effect of sin. Guilt is one thing and punishment another. The one belongs to God, that is, punishment; the other belongs to the devil or the human being, that is, guilt.