Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (226).

What should be considered concerning sin. After the foregoing, certain matters concerning actual sin must be considered through careful investigation: namely, what was the origin and first cause of sin, whether a good thing or an evil thing; next, in what does sin exist; then what sin is, in how many ways it occurs, and the difference among sins.

Chapter 2 (227).

1. What was the first origin and cause of sin. The first cause and origin of sin was a good thing, because before the first sin there was nothing evil from which it could arise. Since it had an origin and cause, it arose either from good or from evil. But evil did not previously exist; therefore it arose from good. For sin first arose in an angel and afterward in a human being; and what was the angel except a good nature of God? The evil that was in the angel did not arise from God, nor from anything other than the angel; therefore it arose from good.

2. Hence Augustine in his responses against the heretic Julian¹. When Julian had said, “If sin is from nature, then nature is evil,” Augustine says: “I ask him, if he can, to answer: It is clear that from an evil will, as from an evil tree, all evil works are made as evil fruits; but from what does he say that the evil will itself arose, unless from good? For if from an angel, what is an angel except a good work of God? If from a human being, what was that human being except a good work of God? Indeed, what were these two before an evil will arose in them except a good work of God, and a good and praiseworthy nature? Evil therefore arises from good, and there was nothing from which it could arise except good. I therefore say that no evil preceded the evil will, but that it had its origin from good. — Here it is clearly said that the first cause and origin of evil was a good nature; nevertheless, it is shown what sin it caused, namely an evil will.

Chapter 3 (228).

That an evil will was the secondary cause of evils. The evil will, whether of an angel or of a human being, is also the cause of the subsequent evils, namely evil works and evil wills. — Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion¹: “We must have no doubt that the cause of the good things belonging to us is nothing but God’s goodness; but the cause of evil things is the will of mutable good, falling away from immutable good—first the angel’s, then the human being’s.” “This is the first evil of a rational creature, that is, the first privation of good.” — Here you have it: the first will of mutable good, that is, of an angel or a human being, falling away from immutable good, that is, from God, is the cause of evil things.

Chapter 4 (229).

1. In what thing sin exists, whether in a good or an evil thing; and it is said that it exists only in a good thing. Having shown the origin of evil, it remains to see in what thing evil exists, namely whether in a good thing or in an evil thing. Whoever understands correctly and perceptively understands that evil exists only in good, that is, in a good nature. For evil is the corruption or privation of good; but where there is no good, there cannot be corruption or privation of good. Sin therefore can exist only in a good thing. — Augustine²: “Just as bodies are corrupted by diseases and wounds, which, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion¹, are privations of the good called health, so whatever vices there are in souls are privations of natural goods. For what else is called evil except the privation of good?” — “For good being diminished is evil; however much it is diminished, something must remain if nature still exists. The good that is nature cannot be consumed unless nature itself is consumed. When it is corrupted, its corruption is evil because it deprives it of good in some degree. (Argument.) For if it deprives it of no good, it does no harm; but it does harm, and therefore removes good. As long, then, as nature is corrupted, there is in it a good of which it is deprived.” — “Accordingly³, there is nothing called evil if there is no good. But good entirely free of evil is complete good; when evil is present, it is a corrupted or vicious good. Nor can there ever be any evil where there is no good. Hence a remarkable conclusion follows: since every nature, insofar as it is a nature, is good, when a ‘vicious nature’ is called a ‘bad nature,’ nothing else seems to be meant than that what is good is evil, and that nothing is evil except what is good.” — This connection clearly intimates that evil can exist only in a good thing; and, although it seems absurd, it plainly says that what is good is evil.

3. What follows from the foregoing, namely that when a bad human being is called bad, a good thing is called evil. From this it is gathered that when a human being is called bad, nothing else is signified than a good thing called evil. Hence Augustine adds in the same work⁵: “What is a bad human being except a bad nature? For a human being is a nature. Moreover, if a human being is some good because he is a nature, what else is a bad human being except a bad good? Yet when we distinguish these two, we find that he is not evil because he is a human being, nor good because he is wicked, but good because he is a human being and evil because he is wicked. Every nature, therefore, even if it is vicious, is good insofar as it is a nature, and evil insofar as it is vicious.”

¹ omitted in LM, interlinear in T. 11 nature] good, R; omitted in OP. 14 when in the manuscripts, to which, Migne. 17 seems] seem, BCOPX, corrected to seems by O, corrected in V. 19 connection repeated in the margin as a rubric in BCLOTX. 22 What] That, COPTX. || when MNRVW, omitted by the others. 24 same work] Enchiridion, OP. 29 is omitted in BOP.]

1 Chapter 11 (PL 40, 236; CCL 46, 53). 2 Augustine, ibid., chap. 12 (236ff.; 54). 3 Ibid., chap. 13 (237; 54ff.). 4 So also Augustine, ibid. 5 Namely, Enchiridion, chap. 13 (237ff.; 55).

Chapters 3–5. Summa of Sentences, III, 14–15 (PL 171, 1139 C–1141 D; 176, 111 A–112 D); Augustine.

1 On Marriage and Concupiscence, II, chap. 28, no. 48 (PL 44, 464; CSEL 42, 303). 2 See Matt. 7:17–18.

Distinction XXXIV. Cf. R. Blomme, The Doctrine of Sin in the Theological Schools of the First Half of the Twelfth Century, Louvain, 1958, 323–332. — Chapter 1. Cf. the Summa of Sentences, III, 14 (PL 171, 1139 C; 176, 110 D–111 A). — Chapter 2, no. 2: From the Master’s Gloss on Rom. 5:19 (PL 191, 1397 C).

Chapter 5 (230).

1. That the dialecticians’ rule about contraries fails in the case of good and evil. — Augustine¹: “Therefore, in these contraries which are called evil and good, that rule of the dialecticians fails according to which they say that two contraries cannot be in any one thing at the same time. No drink or food is at once sweet and bitter; where there is white, there is not also black. This is found in many, indeed almost all, contraries: they cannot be in one thing at the same time. Although no one doubts that good and evil are contraries, they not only can exist together, but evil cannot exist at all without good or except in good.”

2. That evil arises from good and exists only in good. “These two contraries are together in such a way that, if there were no good in which evil existed, evil could not exist at all, because it would have neither a place in which to exist nor a source from which corruption could arise unless there were something to be corrupted; for corruption is nothing other than the destruction of good. Evils therefore arose from goods, and do not exist except in goods.” “Nor was there any source from which any nature of evil could arise except the good nature of an angel and a human being, from which an evil will first arose.”

3. He summarizes, in preparation for passing to other matters. From these points it is clear what we said above must first be investigated: what the origin of evil was and in what thing it exists. The testimonies cited above prove that it arose from a good thing and exists in a good thing.

4. The statement that what is good is evil is opposed by the prophecy that says, “Woe to those who call good evil.” To the statement that what is good is evil, some object as follows²: If we say that what is good is evil, we fall into that prophetic statement where we read³: Woe to those who call good evil, and evil good! Therefore, if we want to avoid this curse, we must in no way say that what is good is evil, or conversely. — Determination according to Augustine. Augustine determines this in the same book⁴, saying that what is said in the prophecy should be understood of the things themselves by which evil people are evil, not of the people. Thus, whoever calls adultery good falls under that prophetic condemnation, as does one who “says that a human being is evil, or that wickedness is good.” For whoever says that a human being is evil insofar as he is a human being, and that iniquity is goodness, “blames God’s work, which is the human being, and praises the human being’s vice, which is iniquity.”

² privation, OPX.]

1 Enchiridion, chap. 14 (PL 40, 238; CCL 46, 55). 2 Augustine himself, Enchiridion, chap. 15 (238; 56). 3 Isa. 5:20. 4 Ibid., chap. 13 (PL 40, 237ff.; CCL 46, 55).

Chapter 1, no. 3. Gloss (no. 386; p. 77C): “For this indeed seems true. For the pagans, being ignorant and unwilling, sin ... Note that it also says that it is in the precepts of truth; ... Whatever we sin, we do against the law of God ... But some [= chap. 2, no. 4].”