Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (173).

1. On virtue: what it is and what its act is. We must now see what virtue is and what its act or work is. “Virtue is,” as Augustine says¹, “a good quality of the mind, by which one lives rightly and which no one uses badly, which God alone works in a person.”

2. He gives the example of justice; the same is to be understood of the other virtues. Therefore it is God's work alone, as Augustine teaches concerning the virtue of justice in his exposition of the Psalm², “I have done judgment and justice,” saying³: “Justice is a great virtue of the mind, which no one but God produces in a person. Therefore, when the Prophet speaks in the person of the Church and says, ‘I have done justice,’ he meant not the virtue itself, which a person does not produce, but its work.” Here it is plainly indicated that justice in a person is not the work of a person but of God. The same is to be understood of the other virtues.

3. He says likewise of faith that it comes not from a human being, but from God alone. For when writing to the Ephesians about the grace of faith, the Apostle⁴ likewise asserts that faith comes not from a human being but from God alone, saying: “You are saved by grace, through faith, and this not of yourselves: for it is the gift of God.” The Saints explain this as follows¹: “This, that is, faith, is not from you—that is, from the power of your nature—because it is purely God's gift.” Here too it is plainly taught that faith does not come from freedom of choice or the will's decision. — This accords with what was said above²: prevenient or operating grace is the virtue that frees and heals a person's will. Hence Augustine says in On the Spirit and the Letter³: “We have been justified not by free will but by the grace of Christ—not that this happens without our will, but our will is shown to be weak by the Law, so that grace may heal the will and a healed will may fulfill the Law.”

Chapter 2 (174).

1. On grace that frees the will: if it is a virtue, virtue does not come from free choice and thus is not a movement of the mind. If, then, the grace that heals and frees a person's will is a virtue, whether one or several, and grace itself does not come from the will's choice but instead heals and prepares it to be good, it follows that virtue does not come from free choice and thus is not a movement or affection of the mind, since every movement or affection of the mind comes from free choice: the good from grace and free choice, the evil from free choice alone. — For, as Augustine says in Book I of the Retractations⁴, “A person could fall of his own accord and by free choice, but could not rise again.” Likewise, in On Two Souls⁵: “If souls lack free movement of mind to do or not to do, and if no power to abstain from their own action is granted to them, we cannot hold them guilty of sin.” — This plainly shows that a movement of the mind, whether toward good or evil, comes from free choice. Therefore, if grace or virtue is a movement of the mind, it comes from free choice; but if it comes wholly or partly from free choice, then God alone does not produce it without a human being.

Apparatus (p. 480): 11 Heading omitted by VW, lost in a lacuna in R. 17 is indicated here transposed in MRTV. 19 likewise] therefore in BC, the same in L, and likewise here in M.

¹ Augustine, ch. 10 of the preceding Distinction (p. 479); cf. nos. 2–3. ² Ps. 118:121. ³ Expositions on Ps. 118, Sermon 26, no. 1 (PL 37, 1577; CCL 40, 1753). ⁴ Eph. 2:8.

Apparatus: 2 vobis ... ex is supplied from Lombard's Gloss. 3 vestrae] nostrae NRTVX. 6 Unde] ut BCLMTW. 11 sana] sanata MT (Augustine). 17 The heading is omitted by VW, lost in a lacuna in R. 23 earum] eorum LVW.

¹ Interlinear Gloss on this passage (in Lyra, VI, 91r). ² In Distinction 26, ch. 8 (p. 478). ³ Ch. 9, no. 15 (PL 44, 209; CSEL 60, 1075). ⁴ Ch. 9, no. 6 (PL 32, 598; CSEL 36, 46), where the statements already made in On Free Choice, II, ch. 20, no. 54 (PL 32, 1270; CSEL 74, 88) are quoted. Cf. also On the Gift of Perseverance, ch. 11, no. 27 (PL 45, 1009). ⁵ Ch. 12, no. 17 (PL 42, 107; CSEL 25, 73f.), cited through Retractations, I, ch. 15, no. 6 (PL 32, 610; CSEL 30, 775).

“This distinction,” as William of Vaurouillon says, “has three beginnings according to the different opinions.”

References (p. 480): Distinction XXVII: William of Vaurouillon; Alexander of Hales; Bonaventure (above, ch. 8); Thomas (above, ch. 9); Ignatius Brady, The Distinctions of Lombard’s Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales, Franciscan Studies 25 (1965), 104–106. — No. 1: O. Lottin, Les premières définitions et classifications des vertus au moyen âge, Psychologie et morale, III, 100–102. — No. 2: Gloss on Ps. 118:121 (PL 191, 1105 A). — No. 3: Master’s Gloss on Eph. 2:8 (PL 192, 182 C).

No. 1. Cf. J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace, 208. — No. 3. On this comparison, see J. Schupp, ibid., 110, note 22; and A. M. Landgraf, “Knowledge of Helping Grace,” in History of Dogma, I-1, 119.

2. Here he explains the aim of the foregoing, namely, to make clear whether virtue is a movement of the mind. For this reason some people¹ teach, not without learning, that virtue is a good quality or form of the mind which informs the soul. It is not itself a movement or affection of the mind; rather, free choice is helped by it so as to be moved and raised toward the good. Thus from virtue and free choice arises a good movement or affection of the mind, and from this an external good work proceeds.

3. He shows this by a comparison, and here there is a clear correspondence between three things and three others. Just as² rain waters the earth so that it may sprout and bear fruit, while the rain is neither the earth, nor the shoot, nor the fruit, and the earth is neither the shoot nor the fruit, and the shoot is not the fruit; (Adaptation of the comparison): so, as it were, the rain of divine blessing is poured into the earth of our mind, that is, the will's free choice; that is, grace is inspired—something God alone does, not a human being with him. By it a person's will is watered so that it may sprout and bear fruit: that is, it is healed and prepared to will the good, insofar as grace is called operating; and it is assisted to do good, insofar as grace is called cooperating. This grace is aptly called “virtue,” because it heals and assists a person's weak will.

Chapter 3 (175).

1. In what sense good merits are said to begin from grace, and which grace is meant. When good merits are said to come from grace, and grace is said to be freely given—that is, God—or rather, when grace freely given is understood as that which precedes a person's will, it would not be much to say that they come from the one from whom all things come. Rather, the grace freely given is understood as that from which good merits begin.

2. How to understand “when they are said to come from grace alone.” When they are said to come from grace alone, free choice is not excluded, since no merit exists in a person that is not through free choice. But in meriting good, primacy of cause is attributed to grace, because grace itself is the principal cause of good merits: it stirs free choice and heals and assists a person's will so that it may be good.

Apparatus: 8–9 The heading is omitted by MVW. 11 et tria is omitted after tria by BCNX. 10 nec ... fructus is in the margin in VW and omitted by X. 11 The heading is omitted by BCMRVWX. 12 est magnum transposed by TVX. 23 esset] est OP. 26 intelligantur] intelligatur BCP, dicuntur LMCR.

¹ The Master has Bernard's teaching in view, On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 14, nos. 46–47 (PL 182, 1026f.; Roman edition, III, 199f.). ² Cf. Pseudo-Chrysostom, Imperfect Work on Matthew, homily 20 (PG 56, 744). ³ Cf. above, Distinction 26, ch. 4, no. 3 (p. 474f.).

Chapter 3. Cf. Lombard's Gloss on Rom. 4:5 and 12:3, and on 1 Cor. 15:10 (PL 191, 1367 C–D, 1498 C, 1676 A–C); and J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace, 110, no. 26, and 255–266. — Chapter 4, no. 1: Augustine's authority is from the Gloss on Rom. 6:23 (PL 191, 1412 C); cf. also on Eph. 2:8–9 (PL 192, 182 C–D). — Chapter 5: Cf. the Gloss on Rom. 12:3 (PL 191, 1498 B–C). — Chapter 6, no. 1: Augustine's authority is taken from the Gloss on Rom. 6:23 (PL 191, 1412 C); cf. also on Eph. 1:4 (PL 192, 171 C).

Chapter 4 (176).

1. That the good will is principally from grace and is itself grace, as is every good merit. This will itself is also God's gift and a human merit—or rather, a merit of grace, because it comes principally from grace and is itself grace. Hence Augustine, To the Priest Sixtus¹: “What is a person's merit before grace, when grace alone produces every good merit of ours in us?”

2. He partly shows how a person is made good through a good merit, and what the first good merit is. For from grace, as was said², which precedes and heals a person's free choice, and from that free choice itself, a good affection or movement of the mind is brought forth in the soul; this is a person's first good merit. For example, from the virtue of faith and a person's free choice a certain good and rewardable movement arises in the mind, namely, the act of believing itself; likewise, from charity and free choice another movement arises, namely, loving, which is very good. The same is to be understood of the other virtues. These good movements or affections are merits and gifts of God, by which we merit both their increase and the other things subsequently bestowed on us in this life and the next.

Chapter 5 (177).

For what reason faith is said to merit justification and other things. When faith is said to merit justification and eternal life, this is understood in the sense that it merits them through the act of faith. The same is understood of charity, justice, and the others. For if faith, the prevenient virtue itself, were said to be the act of the mind which is a merit, it would then derive its origin from free choice. Since that is not so, faith is said to be a merit because its act is a merit—provided charity is present, without which neither believing nor hoping is a merit of life. Hence it truly appears that charity is the Holy Spirit¹, who forms and sanctifies the soul's qualities, so that the soul may be formed and sanctified by them. Without charity, a quality of the soul is not called a virtue, because it cannot heal the soul.

Apparatus: 3 iuvatur] adiuvatur LMRTVW. 11 per is omitted by LNOPRT. 11 bonum² is omitted by LNT.

¹ Letter 194, ch. 5, no. 19 (PL 33, 880; CSEL 57, 190). ² Above, ch. 2, nos. 1–2 (p. 481f.). ³ Above, Distinction 26, ch. 2, no. 3, and ch. 3, no. 1 (p. 472f.).

Chapter 6 (178).

1. On the gifts of the virtues and on grace, which is not merit but produces merit. Therefore we are good and live justly through the gifts of the virtues; and our merits come from grace, which is not merit but produces it—not, however, without free choice. These merits are good affections, their progress, and good works, which God rewards in us. — These too are God's gifts. Hence Augustine, To the Priest Sixtus²: “When he crowns our merits, he crowns nothing other than his own gifts. There is one eternal life, which at the end God grants in return for preceding merits; since the merits by which it is granted do not come from us but have been brought about in us through grace, eternal life itself is rightly called ‘grace,’ because it is given freely. It is not freely given to those who receive it because it is not given for merits, but because the merits for which it is given were themselves given through grace.”

2. Epilogue, where he adds other points. From what has been set out, we can now understand to some extent how prevenient grace merits increase and other things, and what grace itself is, whether it is a virtue or something else, and, if it is a virtue, whether it is an act³. For it was shown above⁴, on the view of some, that grace itself is a virtue, and that virtue is not an act but its cause, though not without free choice. Otherwise he would seem to contradict himself: above⁵ he also said that the work of virtue is virtue, identifying the good use of free choice as virtue. But since the good use of free choice is the work of virtue, it is not itself virtue.

Apparatus: 4 est vitae transposed by OP. 10 muneribus] actibus (and et muneribus in the margin) L; actibus vel muneribus V; actibus X, with vel actibus added between the lines by OT²; vel actionibus added in the margin by W. 18 vita transposed by Op. 21 addat] Sed repeated in the margin by O, in the margin by L. 28 accipi potest] accipitur OP. 29 videtur is added by OP.

¹ As shown above, Book II, Distinction 17 (pp. 141–152). ² Letter 194, ch. 5, no. 19 (PL 33, 880; CSEL 57, 190). ³ Cf. also On Correction and Grace, ch. 13, no. 41 (PL 44, 942; CCL 36, 24f.). ⁴ Ch. 2, no. 2 (p. 482). ⁵ Distinction 26, ch. 11, no. 1 (p. 479). ⁶ Distinction 26, ch. 10 (p. 479).

Chapter 7 (179).

1. The same good use belongs to virtue and free choice, but principally to virtue. The same good use comes from virtue and from free choice, but principally from virtue; and that good use is to be counted among the great goods².

2. Prevenient grace, understood as virtue, is not the use of free choice; rather, the good use of free choice and all good merits come from it. That prevenient grace, which is also virtue, is not the use of free choice; rather, the good use of free choice comes from it. Grace comes to us from God, not from ourselves. The good use of free choice, however, comes both from God and from us; and for this reason it is a good merit. For in the former God alone acts; in the latter God and the human being act. — This merit comes from that most pure grace. The Apostle noted this when he said³: “By the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace in me hath not been void.” — Augustine, On Grace and Free Choice⁴. On this passage Augustine⁴ says: “He rightly calls it grace. At first God gives grace alone, and nothing but grace, since only evil merits precede; but afterward good merits begin through grace. And to show free choice as well, he adds: ‘And his grace in me hath not been void.’” — The same author⁵ says: “And lest the will itself be thought capable of any good without God's grace, he adds: ‘Yet not I alone,’ that is, not without grace, ‘but the grace of God with me,’ that is, with free choice. Clearly, once grace has been given, our good merits begin to exist; yet they exist through grace, for if grace is absent, a person falls.”

Apparatus: 7 bonus] et is added by MVW. 10–11 The heading is omitted by RVW. 13 est bonus usus is omitted by BCOPRWX. 20 sola gratia] solam gratiam NTV. 21 merita bona transposed by OP.

¹ Distinction 26, ch. 11, no. 1 (p. 479). ² Ibid. ³ 1 Cor. 15:10. ⁴ Ch. 5, no. 12 (PL 44, 888f.). ⁵ Ibid., ch. 5, no. 2 (889).

Chapter 7, no. 2. The Master's Gloss on 1 Cor. 15:10 (PL 191, 1676 A–C); the Ordinary Gloss on this passage: “At first grace alone, since only evil merits preceded. But afterward merits begin through grace” (in Lyra, VI, 58c).

Chapter 8 (180).

1. Here he presents the opinion of others, who say that virtues are good uses of free choice, that is, acts of the mind. Others say¹ that virtues are good uses of the natural powers, though not all of them, only the interior powers that are in the mind. The exterior uses, performed through the body, are not called virtues but works of virtues.

2. How they make the preceding words of Augustine agree with this opinion. For this reason they take Augustine's statement² that “the work of virtue is the good use of the natural powers” to refer to exterior use; but his statement³ that “the good use of free choice is a virtue and is counted among the great goods” they understand of interior use. They assert that virtues are nothing other than good affections or movements of the mind, which God produces in a person, not the person; for although those movements belong to free choice, they cannot exist unless God frees the person and assists him by his operating and cooperating grace. They understand this as God's gratuitous will, since it is God who works in us both the willing and the doing of good⁴.

3. The authorities by which they support their claim. They establish by the testimony of the Saints that virtues are movements of the mind. For Augustine says in his Homilies on John⁵: “What is faith? To believe what you do not see.” But to believe is a movement of the mind. — The same author in Book III of On Christian Doctrine⁶: “I call charity a movement of the soul.” If charity and faith are movements of the soul, then virtues are movements of the soul.

4. How others answer them by determining the preceding words. Others answer them by saying that Augustine's preceding words should be understood in this way: “Faith is to believe what you do not see,” that is, faith is the virtue by which one believes what is not seen. Likewise, “charity is a movement of the soul,” that is, grace by which the soul is moved to love. Thus virtues are not movements of the soul; rather, virtues produce movements of the soul.

Apparatus: 7 The heading is omitted by MVW, abbreviated by R. 15 et is omitted by MNRTVX. 17 muniunt] muniant LRVW.

¹ According to J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace in Peter Lombard, 210, this concerns the school of Gilbert of Poitiers. The school of Abelard may also be added; cf. Sentences of Hermann, ch. 32 (PL 178, 1749 D–1750 B). ² Above, Distinction 26, ch. 10 (p. 479). ³ Ibid., ch. 11 (p. 479). ⁴ Phil. 2:13: “For it is God who worketh in you both to will and to accomplish.” ⁵ Tractate 40, no. 9 (PL 35, 1690; CCL 36, 355). ⁶ Ch. 10, no. 16 (PL 34, 72; CSEL 80, 89; CCL 32, 87).

5. They confirm their determination by authorities. — Augustine. That this and similar statements should be understood in this way may be inferred from what Augustine says elsewhere. In Book I of the Questions on the Gospels¹ he says: “There is a faith by which things not seen are believed, and this is properly called faith.” — Likewise, in Book XIII of On the Trinity²: “The things that are believed are one thing; the faith by which they are believed is another.”

6. They proceed from these words by the following argument. Believing is one thing, and that by which one believes is another; but it was said above that faith is that by which one believes. Therefore believing is not faith, because believing is not that by which one believes. — They also add: Virtue is solely God's work, which he alone produces in us; therefore it is not the use or act of free choice. But believing is an act of free choice; therefore it is not a virtue.

7. He leaves the judgment between these opinions to the reader. Both sides rely on the foregoing and other reasons and testimonies. I leave their judgment to the examination of the diligent reader, as I hasten to other matters.

¹ Book II, question 39, on Luke 17:5, “Increase our faith” (PL 35, 1352). ² Ch. 2, no. 5 (PL 42, 1016; CCL 50A, 386). ³ Ch. 9, no. 3 (PL 32, 595; CSEL 36, 38).