Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (162).

1. On operating and cooperating grace. This is operating and cooperating grace. For operating grace prepares a person's will so that he may will the good; cooperating grace assists him lest he will in vain. Hence Augustine says in On Grace and Free Choice¹: “By cooperating, God brings to completion in us what he began by operating; for he who operates so that we may will is the same who cooperates with those willing, bringing the work to completion. Thus, in order that we may will, he operates; but when we will, and will in such a way as to act, he cooperates with us. Nevertheless, without him, whether operating so that we may will or cooperating when we will, we can do nothing toward the good works of piety.”

2. What operating grace is and what cooperating grace is. These words make sufficiently clear what operating grace is and what cooperating grace is. Operating grace is that which precedes a good will: by it a person's will is freed and prepared so as to be good and to will the good effectively. Cooperating grace, however, follows a will that is already good, assisting it.

3. Augustine. Hence Augustine, in Against Julian the Heretic², speaking against those who said that a good will comes only from free choice and asserted that a person can will and do good by free choice without grace, says: “The Apostle made a clear statement in praise of grace when he said³: ‘It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy.’”

If you were to attend to this, Julian, you would not set the merits of the human will against grace. For God does not show mercy to someone because that person willed and ran; rather, that person willed and ran because God showed mercy. “For the will is prepared for a person by God”¹, and “a person's steps are directed by the Lord”²; therefore he rightly says: “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy”³.

— Augustine, On the Perfection of Righteousness⁴: “Not that this happens without our will, but that our will does nothing good unless it is divinely assisted.” — Augustine, To Paulinus⁵. Hence elsewhere the Apostle says⁶: “Not I, but the grace of God with me.” He does not say this because he was doing nothing good, but because he would do nothing good if grace did not assist him. — These testimonies clearly indicate that a person's will is preceded and prepared by God's grace so that it may become good—not so that it may become a will, since the will existed before grace, but it was not a good and upright will.

¹ Ch. 17, no. 33 (PL 44, 901). ² Against Julian, unfinished work, I, ch. 141 (PL 45, 1140). ³ Rom. 9:16.

Apparatus: 7 qui] quod BCOP. 10 ad] a X. 21–1 miserentis Dei transposed earlier (p. 472) BMRXxz.

Chapter 1. J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace, 88–115; R. C. Dhont, Le problème de la préparation à la grâce, Paris 1946, 53–72. — No. 1: The Master's Gloss on Phil. 1:3 (PL 192, 224 C); Summa sententiarum, III, 7 (PL 171, 1127 A–C; 176, 99 C–100 A). — No. 3: Lombard's Gloss on Rom. 9:16 (PL 191, 1460 C–D); manuscripts x (48d, 48c) and z (30a, 29d); Augustine, To Sixtus, Letter 194, ch. 8, no. 35 (PL 33, 887; CSEL 57, 204f.).

Chapter 2 (163).

1. What the will is. Augustine defines the will itself in On Two Souls⁵ as follows: “The will is a movement of the mind, compelled by no one, toward something that is not to be admitted or is to be attained.”

2. He continues to discuss operating and cooperating grace and the human will. But for the will not to admit evil and to attain the good, it is preceded and prepared by God's grace. — Augustine in the Enchiridion⁶: Hence the Apostle, commending prevenient and subsequent grace—that is, operating and cooperating grace—said attentively⁷: “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy”; and not conversely: “It is not of God that showeth mercy, but of man that willeth and runneth.” For if, as some have thought, what was said may thus be understood in this way: “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy,” as though it were said: “The human will alone is not sufficient unless God's mercy is also present”; conversely, it is said: “God's mercy alone is not sufficient unless the human will is also present.” Accordingly, if the former is rightly said because the human will alone does not accomplish this, why is the converse not also rightly said: “It is not of God that sheweth mercy, but of man that willeth,” since God's mercy alone does not accomplish it? For a person cannot believe or hope unless he wills, nor attain the palm unless he runs by willing. It remains, therefore, that the saying is rightly understood so that everything is ascribed to God, who precedes and prepares the human will as good, so that it may be assisted, and assists it once prepared. He precedes the unwilling so that they may will, and follows the willing lest they will in vain.” — These words plainly teach that the human will is prepared and preceded by God's grace so that it may will the good, and is assisted lest it will in vain.

3. That a good will accompanies grace. Therefore a good will accompanies grace; grace does not accompany the will. Hence Augustine, writing against the Pelagians in To Pope Boniface¹, says: “When faith obtains justification, as God has allotted to each the measure of faith², no human merit precedes God's grace; rather, faith itself merits increase, so that when increased it may merit completion: the will accompanying, not leading; following, not going before.” Here you have it expressly that grace precedes the merit of a good will, and that the good will itself follows grace rather than going before it.

¹ Prov. 8:35, according to the Septuagint: “And the will is prepared by the Lord.” ² Ps. 36:23, according to another version (CSEL 12, 333, 15). ³ Ch. 19, no. 40 (PL 44, 314; CSEL 42, 43). ⁴ 1 Cor. 15:10; the words of Letter 186 (to Paulinus), ch. 10, no. 36 (PL 33, 830; CSEL 57, 76) follow; this is in fact Alypius's letter. ⁵ Ch. 10, no. 14: “The will is a movement of the mind, compelled by no one, toward something that is not to be admitted or is to be attained” (PL 42, 104; CSEL 25, 68). ⁶ Ch. 32 (PL 40, 247f.; CCL 46, 67). ⁷ Rom. 9:16.

Apparatus: 18 The heading is omitted in RVW.

Chapter 2, no. 1. Augustine, Retractations, I, ch. 15, no. 3 (PL 32, 609; CSEL 36, 74f.). — No. 2. Lombard’s Gloss on Rom. 9:16 (PL 191, 1460 D–1461 A). — No. 3. Lombard’s Gloss on Rom. 5:1 (PL 191, 1378 D); heading To Pope Boniface in the manuscripts; Florus of Lyon (in Bede, Opera, VI, Cologne 1688, p. 82); J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace, 110, note 21.

Chapter 3 (164).

1. What grace precedes the will, namely faith working through love. If you consider carefully, it is no less shown to you what that grace is which precedes and prepares the will: namely, faith working through love³. — Therefore Augustine, in the same work⁴, explaining how we are justified by faith and yet freely (for the Apostle says both), says: “The Apostle who says⁵, ‘Being justified by faith,’ elsewhere says⁶, ‘Being justified freely by his grace.’ He said this lest faith itself become proud, lest it say to itself: ‘If we are justified by faith, how is it freely? For what faith merits, why is it not rather repaid than bestowed?’ (Pay attention!*) Let the believer not say this, because when he says, ‘I have faith so that I may merit justification,’ he is answered⁷: ‘What hast thou that thou didst not receive?’ For the faith by which you were justified was freely given to you.” Here it is clearly shown that faith is the cause of justification.

2. On the benefit by which the will is freed. This is itself the grace and benefit by which a person's will is preceded and prepared. Hence Augustine in Book I of the Retractations⁸: “The will is that by which one sins and lives rightly. But unless the will itself is freed by God's grace from the bondage in which it was made a slave to sin, and is assisted so as to overcome its vices, mortals cannot live rightly and piously. And unless this benefit by which it is freed preceded it, it would already be given in return for merits and would not be grace, which is surely given freely.” A person's good will, then, is preceded by that benefit of grace by which it is freed and prepared.

3. That benefit is rightly understood as the faith of Christ. Augustine clearly shows this in the Enchiridion⁹, saying: “Free choice must be freed from the bondage of sin after that ruin. It is not freed at all by itself, but only by God's grace, which is placed in the faith of Christ, so that the will itself may be prepared.” Behold, he says plainly that the grace by which free choice is freed and the will prepared is placed in the faith of Christ. “For the faith of Christ,” he says in the same work¹⁰, “obtains what the Law commands.”

¹ Alypius in Letter 186 (to Paulinus), ch. 3, no. 10 (PL 33, 819; CSEL 57, 53). ² Rom. 12:3. ³ Gal. 5:6. ⁴ In the same letter, nos. 9–10. ⁵ Rom. 5:1. ⁶ Rom. 3:24. ⁷ 1 Cor. 4:7. ⁸ Ch. 9, no. 4 (PL 32, 596f.; CSEL 36, 41f.). ⁹ Ch. 106 (PL 40, 282; CCL 46, 107). ¹⁰ Ch. 117 (PL 40, 287; CCL 46, 112).

Apparatus: 10 praevenit is omitted by BMRXxz (Augustine), added in the margin by L. 15 bona is omitted by OP. 1 simus] sumus PTW, corrected by T. 10 The heading is omitted by MRVW. 13 Dei gratia transposed by LMNV. 23 ipsa is omitted by BCOPT, written between the lines by V. 27 Dei dona transposed by OP.

Chapter 3. J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace, 206–215; A. M. Landgraf, “Knowledge of Helping Grace,” in History of Dogma, I-1, 51–140. — No. 1: Gloss on Rom. 5:1 (PL 191, 1378 D). — Nos. 2–3: Augustine.

Chapter 4 (165).

1. That the good will which is preceded by grace precedes certain gifts of God. Nevertheless, that same good will precedes certain gifts of grace. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion¹: “A person's good will precedes many gifts of God, but not all. The gifts it does not precede include the will itself and it also assists. For both are read in the sacred utterances: his mercy shall go before me¹ and his mercy shall follow me². For he goes before the unwilling so that he may will, and follows the willing lest he will in vain. Why, indeed, are we admonished to pray for our enemies³, who are unwilling to live piously, unless so that God may work in them both willing? Likewise, why are we admonished to ask so that we may receive⁴, unless so that what we will may be done by him through whom it came about that we should will? Hence the Apostle says⁵: It is not of him who wills, nor of him who runs, but of God who shows mercy. — From these things it is clear that a person's good will both precedes certain gifts of God, because the grace that assists accompanies it, and is preceded by certain gifts, because the grace that works precedes it—namely, faith with charity.

2. What may seem contrary to the foregoing, namely, that faith seems to be said to arise from the will. Nevertheless, we must not overlook that elsewhere Augustine seems to indicate that faith arises from the will, when treating the Apostle's saying⁶, With the heart one believes unto righteousness, in his Homilies on John⁷: “For this reason the Apostle did not simply say believes, but with the heart one believes, because a person can do other things unwillingly, but can believe only willingly; one can enter a church and approach the altar unwillingly, but not believe.” — Likewise, on the passage in Genesis where Laban and Bathuel said⁸, Let us call the young woman and ask her will, the expositor⁹ says: “For faith is a matter of will, not necessity.”

3. Reply with a determination. In answer to these things, we say that they are not to be understood as though faith were held to proceed from the human will, since faith itself is properly a gift of God, as the Apostle says¹⁰, and human merits begin from it. “For through this faith,” as Augustine says on Psalm 67¹¹, “the ungodly is justified—that is, from ungodly he becomes godly—so that thereafter faith itself begins to work through love”; hence all good merits begin. — Rather, these things were said in this way because there is no faith except in one who wills to believe; faith precedes that person's good will not in time, but in cause and nature. Hence Augustine fittingly said above¹ that “good will is among those gifts which it does not precede, and it itself assists”: for it assists those gifts by which it is preceded, since it consents to them toward the effect of the good; and it is among them because in time it is not preceded by them.

Apparatus (p. 474): 1–2 et²... me¹] NVX (Augustine), in the margin TW², omitted by the others. 2 subsequetur] subsequatur BCOP. 5 Deus in eis transposed by RTX. 6 ut¹ omitted by MN, interlinear in V. 7–8 miserentis Dei transposed by OPW. 20 quae] quod OPV, quod corrected by V. 23 ait omitted by O, interlinear in P. 24 67] lxvi in the manuscripts, but corrected by V².

¹ Ps. 58:11. ² Ps. 22:6. ³ Cf. Matt. 5:44: And pray for those who persecute and slander you. ⁴ Cf. Matt. 7:7–8; Luke 11:9. ⁵ Rom. 9:16. ⁶ Rom. 10:10. ⁷ Tractate 26, no. 2 (PL 35, 1607; CCL 36, 260). ⁸ Gen. 24:57. ⁹ Interlinear Gloss on this passage (in Lyra, I, 82r), from Ambrosiaster on 2 Cor. 1:23 (PL 17 [1845], 281 A; CSEL 81-II, 204); cf. also the Master's Gloss on 2 Cor. 1:23 (PL 192, 17 A). ¹⁰ Cf. Eph. 2:8: For by grace you have been saved through faith ... it is the gift of God. ¹¹ Expositions on the Psalms 67, 32–33, no. 41 (PL 36, 838; CCL 39, 898).

No. 2. Augustine, Gloss on Rom. 10:10 (PL 191, 1476 B). — No. 3. Gloss on Rom. 4:5 (PL 191, 1367 C).

4. He adds certain further points that make the question more difficult, namely, that the thought of the good precedes faith. Moreover, Augustine's words in On the Predestination of the Saints² sharpen and press this question further. There he treats the Apostle's saying³, Not that we are sufficient to think anything as of ourselves. “Let those,” he says, “who think that the beginning of faith comes from us, and the completion of faith from God, attend here and weigh these words. For, commending this grace, which is not given according to any merits but produces all good merits, he says: Not that we are sufficient to think anything good, that is, as of ourselves⁴. Who does not see that thinking comes before believing? For no one believes anything unless he has first thought that it is to be believed. (What it is to believe.) If, therefore, thinking the good does not come from us, as the Apostle teaches here, neither does believing; although believing itself is nothing other than thinking with the mind's assent.” — Here he seems to suggest that good thought precedes faith, and thus that good will goes before faith rather than being preceded by it; this seems contrary to what was said above.

5. Determination *. To this we say that sometimes a good thought or will precedes faith, but it is not that good will or thought by which one lives rightly. For that will does not exist without faith and charity. For, as Augustine says in To Anastasius⁵, “Without the Spirit the human will is not free, since it is overcome by its desires.” It is not free for the good unless it has been freed; and it is not freed unless charity is poured into hearts through the Spirit⁶. — Augustine, On the Baptism of Infants⁷: The will is not free “unless grace frees it through the law of faith⁸,” that is, it is not free without faith working through love¹; and it is sufficiently and truly good. «For there is no good fruit that does not spring from the root of charity; but if faith working through love is present, delight in the good comes about».

Apparatus: 10 aliquid] ex nobis added by NTVWX, added interlinearly by R. 16 Rubrica omitted by RVW. 28 Rubrica omitted by RVW.

¹ At the beginning of no. 1. ² Ch. 2, no. 5 (PL 44, 962). ³ 2 Cor. 3:5. ⁴ Ordinary Gloss on this passage (in Lyra, VI, 64c). ⁵ Letter 145, nos. 2–3 (PL 33, 593; CSEL 44, 267f.). ⁶ Cf. Rom. 5:5. ⁷ Despite the heading, rather On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 14, nos. 25–26 (PL 44, 216f.; CSEL 60, 179f.), where also what follows to the end of this number is found. Cf. also On the Merits of Sins and the Baptism of Infants, II, chs. 18–19 (PL 44, 168f.; CSEL 60, 100–105). ⁸ Rom. 3:27.

No. 4. Gloss on 2 Cor. 3:5 (PL 192, 23 B–C). — No. 5. Gloss on 2 Cor. 3:6 (PL 192, 24 D and A–B); the second item is headed as here.

Chapter 5 (166).

The discussion is completed on that thought of the good which precedes faith. That thought or will which precedes faith, charity, and the other justifications is not sufficient for salvation, nor does one live rightly by it. By this will one desires that good will which is a great good, but this will itself is not that good will. Therefore one will or thought is distinct from the other.

Chapter 6 (167).

1. That understanding precedes both the thought of the good and the good will. And just as the former will precedes the latter, so understanding precedes the former. Hence Augustine, distinguishing these things in his exposition of the Psalm², “My soul hath desired to long for thy justifications,” says³: “‘It hath desired to long,’ he says, not ‘I have longed.’ For we sometimes see by reason how useful God's justifications are, yet, hindered by weakness, we sometimes do not desire them. Understanding therefore flies ahead, while affection follows slowly or not at all. We know the good, but take no delight in doing it; and we desire to take delight in it. Thus this person formerly desired to long for what he saw to be good, wishing to delight in what he had been able to see as reasonable. He thus shows the steps by which one reaches them, as it were: first, one must see that they are useful and honorable; then, desire for them must be longed for; finally, through grace, the practice of them must delight us, though reason alone had delighted us before.”

2. He expounds the order of graces according to Augustine's words. Observe the order of graces that Augustine sets out distinctly here: understanding of good things precedes desire for them; desire precedes delight, which comes about through faith and charity. Once this is received, the will by which one lives rightly is truly good and accompanies faith rather than preceding it.

¹ Response on Gal. 5:6. ² Ps. 118:20. ³ Expositions on the Psalms, 118:20, sermon 8, nos. 4–5 (PL 37, 1522f.; CCL 40, 1688f.).

Apparatus: 3 delectatio] dilectio (or delectatio between the lines) TV; or dilectio added between the lines by N, corrected to dilectionem in P. 9 ergo est transposed by CMNRTWX. 28 delectationem] delectatio est BC.

Chapter 6, no. 1: The Master's Gloss on Ps. 118:20 (PL 191, 1055 A–B).

Chapter 7 (168).

1. That before the grace of justification many good things precede in a person: some from grace and free choice, others from free choice alone. Whoever considers Augustine's preceding words according to this distinction will see that there is no contradiction in them, while also recognizing that before prevenient and operating grace—which prepares a good will in a person—some good things may precede from God's grace and free choice, and others from free choice alone. Yet by these a person merits neither life nor the grace by which he is justified. — Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter¹; To Sixtus²: “No merits precede the reception of that grace which heals the human will so that, once healed, it may fulfill the Law. For it is the grace by which the ungodly are justified, that is, by which one who was formerly ungodly is made just; the merits of the ungodly deserve punishment, not grace. Nor would this be grace if it were not given freely.” It is given freely because we had done nothing good beforehand by which we might merit it.

2. That a person does good things by free choice alone. Nevertheless, we do not deny that a person does many good things by free choice before and apart from this grace, as Augustine teaches in his Replies against the Pelagians³, where he says that people can cultivate fields, build houses, and do many other good things by free choice without cooperating grace.

Apparatus: 17 hoc] haec R, hanc V, corrected to hanc in N; quod corrected in W. 18 The heading is omitted by TVW, abbreviated by R. 23 cooperante] operante NRVW.

¹ In ch. 4, no. 1 (pp. 473f.). ² Letter 194 (to Sixtus), ch. 3, no. 7 (PL 33, 877; CSEL 57, 182); On the Spirit and the Letter, ch. 9, no. 15 (PL 44, 209; CSEL 60, 167f.). ³ Hypognosticon, III, ch. 4, no. 5 (among Augustine's works, PL 45, 1623).

Chapter 7. Cf. J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace, 88–91, 160; L. Ott, Studies in the Theological Epistolary Literature, 322ff. — No. 1: Lombard's Gloss on Rom. 3:24 (PL 191, 1361 C).

Chapter 8 (169).

1. Whether the same grace is called operating and cooperating. Since it was said above¹ that through operating and prevenient grace a person's will is freed and prepared so that he may will the good, and through cooperating and subsequent grace it is assisted lest he will in vain, we must consider whether the grace is one and the same—that is, one gift freely given which operates and cooperates—or whether they are distinct: one operating, the other cooperating.

2. Here he says that it is one, but receives different names on account of its different effects. Some think, not unreasonably, that the grace, gift, and power which operate and cooperate are one and the same, but are called operating and cooperating on account of their different effects. Grace is called operating² insofar as it “frees and prepares a person's will so that he may will the good”; it is called cooperating insofar as it “assists that same will lest it will in vain,” namely, so that it may perform a good work. For grace itself is not idle, “but merits increase, so that when increased it may merit completion.”

Chapter 9 (170).

What grace itself is, and how it merits increase, is asked. If it is asked how prevenient grace itself merits increase, since there is no merit without free choice, and what grace itself is—whether it is a virtue or not—then, to make this clear, we must first set out that there are three kinds of goods.

Apparatus: 8–9 The heading is omitted by MVW. 11 et om.] is omitted by MRTVWX, deleted by N. 19–20 an non ... vel non] antequam ... bonorum (the heading below) BCOP, but deleted by O.

¹ In Distinction 25, ch. 9, and Distinction 26, chs. 2–4 (pp. 469, 471–476). ² Above, chs. 1–2 of this Distinction. ³ From Augustine's statements.

Chapter 8. Distinction XXVII; J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace of Peter Lombard, 206–215, 207; Hugh, On the Sacraments, I, 6, 17 (PL 176, 274 B); ms. Paris, Mazarin, lat. 758, f. 78v; A. Landgraf, Investigations into Gilbert of Poitiers’s Own Doctrines, in Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 54 (1930), 192.

Chapter 10 (171).

Before resolving the question, he first sets out the three kinds of goods. Some goods are great, some small, and some intermediate, as Augustine says in Book I of the Retractations¹: “Virtues, by which one lives rightly, are great goods; the appearance of any bodies, without which one can live rightly, are small goods; and the powers of the mind, without which one cannot live rightly, are intermediate goods.” — He also says²: “No one uses virtues badly; but one can use other goods, that is, intermediate and small goods, both well and badly. No one uses virtue badly, because the work of virtue is the good use of those things that we can also use badly; but no one uses something badly by using it well. God's goodness has granted not only great goods, but also intermediate and small goods.” Behold, you have the three kinds of goods distinguished.

Chapter 11 (172).

1. Among which goods free choice is found. It is asked among which goods free choice is included. — Augustine speaks of this in Book I of the Retractations³: “Free choice of the will is found among intermediate goods, because we can also use it badly; yet it is such that we cannot live rightly without it. Its good use, however, is already a virtue, which is found among the great goods that no one can use badly. And since both great and intermediate and small goods come from God, it follows that the good use of free will also comes from God; it is a virtue and is counted among the great goods.”

2. He directs the reader to consider and compare the preceding authorities so that the question may be resolved. Attend carefully to what has been said and bring it together; thus what was asked above becomes clear. He said that the work of virtue is the good use of those goods that we can also use badly, that is, intermediate goods; among these he placed free choice, whose good use he also said is a virtue. If so, then it is not the work of virtue that he mentioned above, for virtue is one thing and its work another.

¹ Ch. 9, no. 4 (PL 32, 597; CSEL 36, 42). ² From Augustine's statements above, chs. 1–2 of this Distinction. ³ Ch. 9, no. 6 (PL 32, 598; CSEL 36, 46). ⁴ In ch. 9 (p. 478). ⁵ A little above, lines 9–10.

Apparatus: 2 The heading is omitted by MRTVWX. 17 ita ait transposed by BCLMX.

Chapters 10–11. Summa of Sentences, III, 9 (PL 171, 1132 A–B; 176, 104 A–B).