Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (153).

1. He returns to the consideration of free choice. Let us now return to our subject, namely, the discussion of free choice.¹

2. The philosophers' definition of free choice, which agrees with the definition given above. In defining it, the philosophers² called it “a free judgment of the will,” because the very power and capacity of will and reason, which we said above³ is free choice, is free toward either alternative, since it can freely move toward this or that. Free choice is therefore called free with respect to the will, because it can move voluntarily and be carried by spontaneous desire toward what it judges or can judge to be good or evil.

3. Free choice concerns only the future, and not every future thing. We should know, however, that free choice does not concern the present or the past, but future contingents. What exists in the present is determined; when it exists, it is not in our power that it either exist or not exist. For it can cease to exist or become something else later, but it cannot fail to exist while it exists, or be something else while it is what it is. But whether this or something else will exist in the future falls within the power of free choice. — Yet not all future things fall under the power of free choice, but only those that can be done or not done through free choice. If someone indeed wants and intends to do something of this sort that is in no way within his power, or that would happen just the same without his intention, he has no free choice in that respect.

Apparatus: 5–6 Heading omitted in LRVW. 5 the omitted in OP. 14 that] which BCLVX.

¹ That is, to ch. 3 of the preceding Distinction (pp. 452s). ² Boethius, Second or Longer Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation, III: “But there is free choice, as the very words reveal: a free judgment of the will for us” (PL 64, 492 D). ³ Distinction 24, ch. 3 (p. 452, lines 27–28).

Distinction XXV. J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace of Peter Lombard, 67–88; O. Lottin, “Free Choice and Freedom from Saint Anselm to the End of the Thirteenth Century,” in Psychology and Morals, I, 15–30. — Peter Abelard, Theology of the ‘Scholars’, III, 7 (PL 178, 1110 A–D; 1111 A); Hugh, On the Sacraments, I, 5, 21–22 (PL 176, 255 C–256 A); Summa sententiarum, III, 9 (PL 171, 1130 A; 176, 102 B; 1132 D–1133 A; 176, 104 D–105 A).

4. The foregoing description of free choice does not apply to God or to those who have been glorified. According to the definition just given, free choice seems to belong only to those who can change their will and turn toward opposites, whose power, that is, includes choosing good or evil and doing or leaving either in accordance with their choice. By this account free choice cannot exist in God, nor in all those strengthened by such great grace of beatitude that they can no longer sin.

5. That God has free choice. Augustine teaches that God has free choice in Book XXII of The City of God¹, saying: “Surely, because God himself cannot sin, must we deny that he has free choice?” — Ambrose also says in his book On the Trinity²: “Paul says³ that one and the same Spirit works all things, distributing to each as he wills—that is, according to the choice of a free will, not in obedience to necessity.”

Chapter 2 (154).

How free choice is understood in God. Free choice is understood differently in the Creator than in creatures. God's free choice is his supremely wise and omnipotent will, by which he does all things as he wills, not by necessity but by free will. — Jerome therefore, observing that free choice is not in God as it is in creatures, seems to exclude free choice from God in a homily On the Prodigal Son⁴, saying: “God alone is one into whom sin does not and cannot enter; the rest, since they have free choice, can turn in either direction.” By saying “the rest,” he indicates that free choice as it exists in the rest is not in God.

¹ Ch. 30, no. 3 (PL 41, 802; CSEL 40-II, 667; CCL 48, 864). ² On the Faith, II, ch. 6, no. 48 (PL 16 [1845], 569 C; CSEL 78, 72). ³ 1 Cor. 12:11, no. 40 (PL 22 [1859], 393; CSEL 54, 139s). ⁴ Letter 27 (to Damasus).

Apparatus: 3 does not have choice transposed in OPR. 12 Heading omitted in NVW. 25 exclude transposed after seems in BCLMRY.

Chapter 2: Summa sententiarum, III, 9 (PL 171, 1132 D–1133 A; 176, 104 D–105 A); Peter Abelard, Theology of the “Scholars”, III, 7 (PL 178, 1110 C): “in a homily on the Prodigal Son.” Cf. also his Gloss on Ps. 142:2 (PL 191, 2249 A).

Chapter 3 (155).

That angels and saints who are already blessed have free choice. Angels and saints who now live happily with the Lord and have been so confirmed by the grace of beatitude that they can neither be turned toward evil nor wish to be turned toward it do not lack free choice. — Hence Augustine says in Book XXII of The City of God¹: “Just as the first immortality, which Adam lost by sinning, was the ability not to die, so the first free choice was the ability not to sin; the final one will be the inability to sin.” — The same author in the Enchiridion² says: “Man first had to be made such that he could will well and ill; afterward he will be such that he cannot will evil, and yet will not lack free choice.”

Chapter 4 (156).

1. That free choice will be freer when it cannot sin. — Augustine³: “For free choice will be much freer when it cannot serve sin at all. Nor is it not a will, or not to be called free, when we so wish to be blessed that we not only do not wish to be wretched, but cannot possibly wish to be so. Just as our soul even now has an aversion to unhappiness, so it will always have an aversion to iniquity. But the order had to be observed by which God wished to show how good a rational creature is when it can even sin, though it is better when it cannot sin.”

These words clearly establish that after being confirmed in beatitude, man will have free choice by which he cannot sin, as angels and saints who are with the Lord now have; and it will be freer to the extent that it is more free of sin and more inclined to good. For the farther anyone is from that slavery to sin of which Scripture says,⁴ “Whoever commits sin is a slave of sin,” the freer is his judgment in choosing the good.

¹ Ch. 30, no. 3 (PL 41, 802; CSEL 40-II, 667; CCL 48, 864). ² Ch. 105 (PL 40, 281; CCL 46, 106). ³ In the Enchiridion, cited above. ⁴ John 8:34.

Apparatus: 3 Lord] God BCM. 8 the last … to sin omitted in B, in the margin of N. 13 cannot] cannot BX, could not C. 17 even omitted in BCOPVX.

Chapter 3. Summa sententiarum, III, 9: “The good angels too do not lack free choice” (PL 171, 1132 C; 176, 104 C); Abelard, Theology of the “Scholars”, III, 7 (PL 178, 1111 A); Enchiridion. — Chapter 4. Abelard, ibid. (PL 178, 1110 D–1111 A).

2. A clear and sufficient reason why it is called free choice. Thus, if examined carefully, choice seems to be called “free” because without coercion or necessity it can desire or choose what reason has determined.

Chapter 5 (157).

The difference among the freedoms of choice according to different times. From what has been said it is clear that the first freedom of choice was greater than the second, and the third is far greater than either the second or the first. The first freedom of choice was the ability to sin or not to sin; the final one will be the ability not to sin and the inability to sin; the intermediate one is the ability to sin and the inability not to sin: before restoration, even mortally; after restoration, at least venially¹.

Chapter 6 (158).

The four states of free choice. Four states of free choice can be distinguished in man. Before sin, nothing impeded him from good and nothing impelled him toward evil. He had no weakness toward evil, and he had help toward good. Then reason could judge without error and the will could desire good without difficulty. — After sin, before the restoration of grace, he is pressed and overcome by concupiscence; he has weakness in evil but no grace in good; therefore he can sin and cannot refrain from sinning, even to his condemnation. — After restoration, but before confirmation, he is pressed by concupiscence but not overcome. He has weakness toward evil but grace toward good: through freedom and weakness he can sin, and through freedom and assisting grace he can refrain from sinning. Yet he does not have the ability not to sin or the inability to sin, because weakness has not yet been perfectly consumed and grace has not yet been perfectly completed. — After confirmation, however, weakness will be entirely consumed and grace completed; he can neither be overcome nor pressed, and then he will have the inability to sin.

¹ On this chapter and the following one, see Augustine, On Correction and Grace, ch. 12, no. 33 (PL 44, 936); On the Letter to the Romans, 3, 20 (PL 35, 2065s).

Chapter 5: Hugh, On the Sacraments, I, 6, 16 (PL 176, 272 D–273 A); Augustine, On Correction and Grace, ch. 12, no. 33. — Chapter 6: Summa sententiarum, III, 9 (PL 171, 1130 A; 176, 102 B–C); Hugh, On the Sacraments, I, 6, 16 (PL 176, 272 C–273 B); H. Weisweiler, “The Summa Sententiarum as Source…,” in Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 6 (1934), 159s; L. Ott, Studies on Theological Epistolary Literature, 463ff.

Chapter 7 (159).

1. The corruption of free choice through sin. It is therefore clear that, besides other penalties, man incurred through that sin the penalty of corruption and subjection of free choice. Through that sin, natural goods in man were corrupted and gratuitous goods taken away. He is the one who was wounded and stripped by robbers:¹ wounded in natural goods, of which he was not deprived—for otherwise restoration could not take place—and stripped of gratuitous gifts, which had been added by grace to natural goods. These are the best gifts and perfect gifts;² some were corrupted by sin, namely natural goods such as intelligence, memory, and understanding; others were taken away, namely gratuitous gifts. Natural goods too come from grace, since they belong to God's general grace; nevertheless, this distinction is often made when the word “grace” refers to a species rather than a genus.

2. Free choice was therefore corrupted by sin and partly lost. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion³ says: “By using free choice badly, man lost both himself and it. For when sin was committed by free choice, and sin prevailed, free choice too was lost: for whoever is overcome is made the slave of the one who overcame him.”⁴ Behold, he says man lost free choice—not because he had no free choice after sin, but because he lost the freedom of choice: not all of it, but freedom from misery and sin.

¹ Cf. Luke 10:30: “He fell among robbers, who also stripped him, inflicted wounds, and went away, leaving him half dead.” ² Cf. Jas. 1:17: “Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above.” ³ Ch. 30 (PL 40, 246s; CCL 46, 65). ⁴ 2 Pet. 2:19.

Apparatus: 2 completed] confirmed L, corrected from confirmed in O, or confirmed added between the lines in T. 22 had] has had MNTWX.

Chapter 7. Cf. J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace of Peter Lombard, 67–88; Summa sententiarum, III, 8 (PL 171, 1129 A–B; 176, 101 C); Bernard of Cluny, Instruction of a Priest, I, ch. 1 (PL 184, 773 D–774 C, 775 A).

Lombard I. 30

Chapter 8 (160).

1. On the three kinds of freedom of choice. There are three kinds of freedom: from necessity, from sin, and from misery.

2. Freedom from necessity. Before and after sin, free choice is equally free from necessity. Just as it could not then be compelled, so it cannot be compelled now. Therefore the will is rightly judged by God, since it is always free from necessity and can never be compelled. Where there is necessity, there is no freedom; where there is no freedom, there is no will, and therefore no merit. This freedom belongs to everyone, both wicked and good.

3. Freedom from sin. There is also another freedom, namely from sin, of which the Apostle says:¹ “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom”; and Truth says in the Gospel:² “If the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed.” — This freedom liberates from slavery to sin and makes people slaves of righteousness, just as, conversely, slavery to sin makes people free from righteousness. Hence the Apostle says:³ “Having been freed from sin, you became slaves of righteousness”; and again:⁴ “When you were slaves of sin, you were free from righteousness.” — By sinning man lost this freedom; therefore Augustine says⁵ that “by using free choice badly, man lost both himself and it,” because the freedom lost through sin was not freedom from necessity but freedom from sin: “Whoever commits sin is a slave of sin.”⁶

4. Who has this freedom, namely from sin, and through what. At present only those whom the Son liberates and restores through grace have this freedom from sin—not in the sense that they are entirely without sin in this mortal flesh, but that sin does not dominate or rule in them. — This is the true and good freedom, which gives birth to a good servitude, namely servitude to righteousness. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion⁷ says: “No one will be free to do righteousness unless, freed from sin, he begins to be a slave of righteousness. This is true freedom because of the joy of right action, and at the same time a devout servitude because of obedience to the commandment.”

Apparatus: 4 Heading omitted in MVW. 8 where … freedom omitted in C, in the margin of N. 10 Heading omitted in MVW. 13–14 just as … makes in the margin of OW. 18 through] because of OP. 23 in them omitted in BCOPT, added between the lines in V.

¹ 2 Cor. 3:17. ² John 8:36. ³ Above, ch. 7, no. 2 (p. 465, 18–19). ⁴ Rom. 6:18. ⁵ Above, ch. 7, no. 2. ⁶ John 8:34. ⁷ Ch. 30 (PL 40, 247; CCL 46, 66).

Chapter 8, nos. 1–5. With a few exceptions (for example, Augustine's authorities), the text is composed from Summa sententiarum, III, 8–9 (PL 171, 1129 D–1130 D; 176, 102 A–D); some ideas are indirectly from Anselm of Laon or his school, for example no. 109 (in O. Lottin, Psychology and Morals, V, 87), and in part from Bernard of Clairvaux, On Grace and Free Choice, chs. 2–3 (PL 182, 1004s; Roman edition, III, 1963, 170–173). Cf. J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace, 108, note 9.

5. There is another, unreal freedom, joined to evil servitude, namely the freedom to do evil: reason disagrees with the will, judging that what the will desires ought not be done. But to do good, reason agrees with the will; there true and devout freedom exists. — Augustine speaks of freedom toward evil and evil servitude in the Enchiridion¹: “What freedom can there be for one given over as a slave, except when he takes pleasure in sinning? For he serves freely who willingly does his master's will; and thus the slave of sin is free to sin.”

6. Whether freedom toward evil is the freedom of free choice itself or another freedom. Here one may ask whether this freedom by which someone is free toward evil is freedom of choice. For if it is freedom of choice, it is good, since freedom of choice is a natural good. — A response according to some. Some think it is freedom of choice itself, which is always good; but because of slavery to sin, it becomes freer and more inclined toward evil, and so is called not true freedom because it is directed toward evil. — According to others. Others think this freedom toward evil, which Augustine mentioned above, is not freedom of choice itself, but a certain inclination to sin and perversity arising from sin, and is evil.

7. Another question: whether freedom toward good is itself freedom of choice. It is also often asked whether that true freedom which is directed toward doing righteousness is itself freedom of choice. — A response according to some. — Augustine. Some say it is the same freedom, restored by grace, with whose help it is free toward good; without grace it is not free toward good. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion²: “This freedom to do good—where will it come from for a man given over and sold, unless the one who says,¹ ‘If the Son sets you free, you will be free indeed,’ redeems him? Before this begins to happen in a man, how can anyone boast of free choice, when he is not yet free to do good?” Behold, he clearly shows that free choice is freed through grace, so that a person may act well through it. Therefore they say that the true freedom toward doing good, which Augustine mentioned above, is free choice itself, freed and helped by God's grace. — According to others. Others think it is not freedom of choice itself, but another freedom that begins to exist in a man's mind, through grace and free choice working under God, when he is restored.

8. Given over] to sin added in X, between the lines in V, in the margin of W. 12 or another] or not OP, omitted in L. 20 and is evil omitted in OP. 21 or] whether LNX. 23–24 Headings omitted in MVW. 25 restored transposed after grace in MRV.

¹ Ibid. ² On Correction and Grace, I, ch. 1, no. 2 (PL 44, 917); Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 4, nos. 9–11 (PL 182, 1006s; Roman ed., III, 172ff.). ³ Anselm of Canterbury, On Free Choice, ch. 1 (PL 158, 489ff.); Hugh of Amiens, Dialogues or Theological Questions, III, 5 (PL 192, 1168 C–1169 A). ⁴ In no. 5. ⁵ Ch. 30 (PL 40, 247; CCL 46, 66).

8. The certain resolution of both questions: freedom toward good and toward evil is said to be freedom of choice. We prefer, however, to say that freedom of choice itself is both the freedom by which one is free toward evil and the freedom by which one is free to do good. It receives different names from different causes. Before it is restored by grace, it is called freedom to do evil; when it has been restored by grace, it is called freedom to do good. Before grace the will is free toward evil, but through grace it becomes free toward good. The human will, then, is always free in some way, but it is not always good: it is good only when freed from sin, yet it is free from necessity. Hence Augustine in his book On Grace and Free Choice³ says: “The will in us is always free, but not always good. For it is either free for righteousness when it serves sin, and then is evil; or free from sin when it serves righteousness, and then is good.”

9. Freedom from misery. There is also freedom from misery, of which the Apostle says:⁴ “Creation itself will be freed from slavery to corruption into the freedom of the glory of the children of God.” Man had this freedom before sin, since he lacked every misery and suffered no distress; he will have it more fully in future blessedness, where he cannot be wretched. But in this life, between the first sin and final confirmation, no one is free from misery, because no one is without sin's punishment.

Apparatus: 4 good] good thing BCLRY. 8 Heading omitted in RVW.

¹ John 8:36. ² In no. 4. ³ Ch. 15, no. 31 (PL 44, 899). ⁴ Rom. 8:21.

Numbers 8–10. Summa sententiarum, III, 9 (PL 171, 1130 D–1131 A; 176, 103 A); St. Bernard (PL 182, 1005 B; Roman edition, III, 171).

10. He returns to the corruption of free choice to add further points. What has been said already shows how free choice was diminished or corrupted through sin: before sin man had no difficulty or impediment from the law of the members in doing good, and no impulse or incitement toward evil. Now, however, he is impeded from good by the law of the flesh and incited toward evil, so that he cannot will and accomplish good unless he is freed and helped by grace, because, as the Apostle says,¹ sin dwells in the flesh.

11. Free choice is not equally free among the good and the wicked, nor toward good and evil. Although free choice is always free in everyone, it is not equally free among the good and the wicked, or toward good and evil. It is freer toward good when it has been freed than toward evil when it has not been freed; and it is freer toward evil, which it can do by itself, than toward good, which it cannot do unless freed and helped by grace.

¹ Rom. 7:17–18: “Sin dwells in me. For I know that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh.” ² Rom. 7:18. ³ Rom. 9:16. ⁴ Phil. 2:13: “For it is God who works in you both to will and to accomplish.”

Apparatus: 20 however omitted in BCLMNX. 22 Heading omitted in NVW.

Chapter 9. Cf. Summa sententiarum, III, 9 (PL 171, 1131 B; 176, 103 B–C); Bernard, On Grace and Free Choice, ch. 6, no. 18 (PL 182, 1011 D; Roman edition, III, 179s); and Lombard's Gloss on Rom. 9:16 (PL 191, 1460 D–1461 A), discussed below, Distinction 26, ch. 2, no. 2.

Chapter 9 (161).

1. On freedom: what comes from grace and what from nature. Freedom from sin and misery comes through grace, but freedom from necessity comes through nature. The Apostle indicates both kinds of freedom, from nature and from grace, when he speaks in the person of an unredeemed man and says:² “To will is present with me, but I do not find how to accomplish it”; as if he said: I have the freedom of nature, but not the freedom of grace; therefore the perfection of good is not within me.

2. What the human will cannot do by itself and what it can do through grace. For the human will, which it has by nature, cannot be raised to will good effectively or fulfill it in action unless freed and helped by grace: freed so that it may will, and helped so that it may accomplish; because, as the Apostle says,³ it is not a matter of the one who wills willing, nor of the one who runs running—that is, acting—but of God who has mercy, who works in us the willing and doing of good.⁴ The human will or action does not summon this grace; rather, grace itself goes before the will, preparing it to will good, and helps the prepared will to accomplish it.

² Rom. 7:18. ³ Rom. 9:16. ⁴ Phil. 2:13.