Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (140).

1. On man's grace and power before the Fall. We must now carefully investigate what grace or power man had before the Fall, and whether by it he could stand firm or not.

2. That he was created in grace, by which he could stand firm but not advance, as the angels. We must know, then, that at creation man was given help through grace, as we said of the angels,³ and was granted a power by which he could stand firm—that is, not depart from what he had received—but could not advance so far as to merit salvation by the grace of creation without another grace. By that help of the grace of creation he could indeed resist evil, but not accomplish good. — How by that grace of creation he could in a certain way live well. Yet by it he could live well in a certain way, because he could live without sin; but without another help of grace he could not live spiritually so as to merit eternal life.

3. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion¹ says: “Man was made upright² so that he could remain in that uprightness, though not without divine help, and could become perverse by his own will: whichever of these he chose, God's will would be done, either by him or concerning him. And because he preferred to do his own will rather than God's, God's will was done concerning him.” — Again, in the same work:³ “Man first had to be made such that he could will both well and ill; if well, not without fruit, and if ill, not without punishment.”

4. Augustine. In his book On Correction and Grace⁴ he likewise says: “If this help had been lacking to either an angel or a man when they were first made—since their nature was not made such that it could remain without divine help, if it wished—he would certainly not have fallen through his own fault; for the help without which he could not remain would have been lacking.” — Again:⁵ “God had given man a good will, for in it he had made him upright; he had given help without which he could not remain in it if he wished, and through which he could; but whether he would wish this he left to his own choice.” — In the same work:⁶ “He had received the ability, if he wished, but he did not have the will by which he could; for if he had had it, he would have persevered.” These testimonies clearly show that at creation man received uprightness and a good will, together with the help by which he could stand firm; otherwise he would not seem to have fallen through his own fault.

5. What the uprightness and goodness of the will in which he was created consisted in. But how did man have an upright and good will if by it he could neither merit life nor choose to stand firm? — Because at that time he willed nothing evil by it, and he chose to stand firm for a time, though not perseveringly; therefore man's will was then upright and good.

¹ Book XI, chs. 17–19 (PL 34, 438s; CSEL 28-I, 349s). ² On Distinction 4, nos. 2–4. ³ On Distinction 5, ch. 5 (p. 353). ⁴ On Correction and Grace, ch. 11, no. 32 (PL 44, 935s). ⁵ Ibid. (935). ⁶ Ibid. (936).

Apparatus: 4 had foreseen] foresaw OPV. 5 had foreseen] had foreknown BCLMRW (Hugh). 17 could have] could BCN. 18–19 Heading omitted in LMRVWX.

Chapter 4: Hugh, On the Sacraments, I, 6, ch. 15 (PL 176, 272 B–C).

Distinction XXIV. J. Schupp, The Doctrine of Grace of Peter Lombard, 57–66. — Summa sententiarum, III, 7 (PL 171, 1126 B; 176, 98 D); Augustine, On Correction and Grace; O. Lottin, Psychology and Morals, V, 123s; Lombard's Gloss on Ps. 33:15 (PL 191, 343 A); The Sentences of Anselm of Laon and His School, no. 169.

Apparatus: 16 correction] correptione L. 18 aid] adiutorio TX (Aug., Summa Sent.). 26 received] accepit CTVX. 29 had] habuerit MNT.

6. Objection to the statement that man could not advance. To what we said, that man could not advance or merit by the grace of creation, this objection is commonly made: By that help of the grace of creation he could stand firm in the good he had received; therefore he could resist temptation. But resisting temptations and evil suggestions is merit and a good worthy of reward; every meritorious good is an advance. Therefore by the grace of creation he could advance, without the addition of another grace.

7. Response. To this we say that resisting evil and not consenting to temptation would not have earned him merit, even if he had not consented, because there was nothing in him impelling him to evil; just as it was no merit for the angels who did not fall to stand firm—that is, not to fall.

8. When resisting evil is merit, and when it is not. For us, however, it is sometimes meritorious not to do evil but to resist it, namely when there is some cause moving us to do it, since through the corruption of sin our steps are prone to fall.¹ But when no cause intervenes to impel us to evil, we do not merit by turning away from it. Turning away from evil always avoids punishment, but does not always merit the crown.

Chapter 2 (141).

On the help given to man at creation, by which he could stand firm. Here we must consider what help was given to man at creation, by which he could remain firm if he wished. — It was the freedom of choice, free from every stain and corruption, uprightness of will, and the integrity and vigor of all the soul's natural powers.

Chapter 3 (142).

1. On free choice. Free choice is the faculty of reason and will, by which good is chosen with grace assisting, or evil when that same grace is absent.

¹ Cf. Gen. 8:21: The sense and thought of the human heart are prone to evil.

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Chapter 2. Cf. The Sentences of Anselm of Laon and His School, no. 172 (in O. Lottin, Psychology and Morals, V, 124s).

Chapter 3. Summa sententiarum, III, 8 (PL 171, 1129 B; 176, 100 C): “the capacity of rational will”; Hugh, Miscellanies, I, no. 175 (PL 177, 574 A). O. Lottin, “Free Choice and Freedom from Saint Anselm to the End of the Thirteenth Century,” in Psychology and Morals, I, 28s. “Freedom of choice is a free judgment of the will. Judgment is the discernment and deliberation of reason as to whether this or that should or should not be done. It is free because reason can turn either way without coercion: by itself toward evil, but toward good with the help of grace, so that, just as all evils are attributed to our corruption, all goods are attributed to grace,” Summa ‘The Will of God’ (in O. Lottin, Psychology and Morals, V, 345, lines 128–133). — No. 2: Summa sententiarum, III, 8.

Chapter 4 (143).

On sensuality. Sensuality is a certain lower power of the soul, from which arises a movement directed toward the bodily senses, and a desire for things pertaining to the body.

Chapter 5 (144).

1. On reason, which has two parts with respect to their functions. Reason is the soul's higher power, which, so to speak, has two parts or divisions, higher and lower. In its higher part it is directed toward contemplating or consulting eternal things; in its lower part it looks to the ordering of temporal things.

2. What pertains to reason. Whatever we find in our soul, upon consideration, that we do not share with beasts pertains to reason; whatever we find there that we share with animals pertains to sensuality.

3. Where reason begins in the soul. As we advance step by step in considering the parts of the soul, reason begins wherever we first encounter something that we do not share with beasts.

4. Augustine teaches this in Book XII of On the Trinity¹, saying: “Let us see where there is, as it were, a boundary between the outer and inner man. Whatever we have in the soul in common with beasts is rightly said to pertain to the outer man. For the outer man is not reckoned as the body alone, but with a certain life joined to it, by which the body's structure and all the senses are active, equipped as they are to perceive outward things.” “As we ascend inwardly² by certain steps of consideration through the parts of the soul, where something begins to appear that we do not share with beasts, there reason begins, where the inner man can now be recognized.”

5. On the parts of reason. — Augustine: “The higher part of reason³ cleaves to contemplating or consulting eternal truths; the lower part turns toward governing temporal things. And that exercise of reason⁴ by which we contemplate eternal things is assigned to wisdom, while that by which we make good use of temporal things is assigned to knowledge.” “When⁵ we discuss the nature of the human mind, we discuss one thing, and divide it into these two I have mentioned only according to its functions.” — “The carnal or sensual movement⁶ of the soul, directed toward bodily senses, is shared by us and beasts; it is set apart from the reason of wisdom, but is close to the reason of knowledge.”

Apparatus: 4 Heading omitted in NVW. 6 beasts] animals LNVW, corrected by W. 8 Heading omitted in NVW. 12–13 and inner] and of the inner LOPWX. 21 Heading omitted in MNRW. 24–25 that exercise … assigned omitted in C, in the margin of OV.

¹ On the Trinity, XII, ch. 1, no. 1 (PL 42, 997; CCL 50, 356). ² Ibid., ch. 7, no. 12 (1005; 368). ³ Ibid., ch. 8, no. 13 (PL 42, 1005; 369). ⁴ Ibid., ch. 14, no. 22 (1009; 375). ⁵ Ibid., ch. 4, no. 4 (1000; 358). ⁶ Ibid., ch. 12, no. 17 (1007; 371).

Apparatus: 10 will omitted in MNX. 12–13 Heading omitted in NRW.

Chapter 4. O. Lottin, “The First Movements of the Sensitive Appetite from Peter Lombard to Thomas Aquinas,” in Psychology and Morals, II, 494ff.; “The Sentences of William of Champeaux,” no. 244, in Psychology and Morals, V, 201. — Chapter 5, nos. 1–3: Augustine, nos. 4–5.

Chapter 6 (145).

That the order and progression of sin or falling in us is like that among the first human beings. We must also not omit that the order and progression of temptation in a single person today is like that which formerly occurred among our first parents.

Chapter 7 (146).

That in us there are a woman, a man, and a serpent, and how. Just as then the serpent urged evil upon the woman, and she consented, and afterward gave it to her husband, and so the sin was completed, so now in us the soul's sensual movement stands for the serpent, the lower part of reason for the woman, and the higher part of reason for the man. This is the man who, according to the Apostle,¹ is called the image and glory of God; that is the woman who, according to the same Apostle, is called the glory of man.

Chapter 8 (147).

1. On the spiritual marriage of the man and woman within us. Between this man and this woman there is, as it were, a spiritual marriage and natural bond, by which the higher part of reason, like a man, ought to preside and rule, while the lower part, like a woman, ought to be subject and obey. Therefore, according to the Apostle,² the man ought not to have a veil, but the woman.

Apparatus: 2 is omitted in LOPV. || such as added by NRW. 4 one] each one BCTV. 7 Heading omitted in NRW.

¹ Cf. 1 Cor. 11:7; Augustine, On the Trinity, XII, ch. 7, no. 10 (PL 42, 1003s; CCL 50, 364s). ² Cf. 1 Cor. 11:7–10.

Chapters 6–12. Augustine, On Genesis against the Manichaeans, II, ch. 11, no. 15 (PL 34, 204) and ch. 14, no. 21 (PL 34, 207); the Master's Gloss on 1 Cor. 11:8–10 (PL 191, 1633 B–1634 D); Sentences of the School of Anselm of Laon, nos. 452–453 (in O. Lottin, Psychology and Morals, V, 304); Peter Abelard, Ethics, ch. 3 (PL 178, 645 D); Hugh, On the Sacraments, I, 8, 13 (PL 176, 315 C–316 A). — Chapter 7. Lombard's Gloss on 1 Cor. 11:8–10.

2. On a corresponding help. And just as among all the animals a help like man was not found for him,¹ but one was taken from him to be formed as his spouse, so among the parts of the soul that we share with beasts there is no help like our mind.

3. He shows this to be so by Augustine's testimony. Hence Augustine in the same work² says: “That part of us which is occupied with the activity of handling temporal matters, so that we do not share it with beasts, is indeed rational; yet it is, as it were, drawn from that rational mind by which we cling to intelligible and unchangeable truth, and assigned to the handling and governing of lower things. For just as among all beasts no help like the man was found for him, unless something taken from him were formed as his spouse, so for our mind, by which we consult heavenly truth, there is no similar help for using temporal things, as far as human nature requires, among the parts of the soul we share with beasts. Therefore our rational faculty, not separated in a divorce from unity but, as it were, derived to aid their fellowship, is divided among its functions. And just as the two are one flesh in male and female, so one nature of mind embraces our understanding and action, or reason and rational appetite—or, if they can be named more aptly, these two—so that, as it was said of them,³ the two shall be one flesh, so it can be said of these: two in one mind.” — From this we can understand how the image of that marriage exists in the human soul, and how those three—man, woman, serpent—are spiritually present in each of us.

¹ Cf. Gen. 2:18. ² On the Trinity, XII, ch. 3, no. 3 (PL 42, 999s; CCL 50, 357s). ³ Gen. 2:24.

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Chapter 9 (148).

1. How temptation is completed in us through those three. It remains to show how sin is completed in us through these three; if we attend carefully, we can recognize what mortal and venial sin are in the soul.

2. Just as the serpent there persuaded the woman, and the woman the man, so in us the sensual movement, when it conceives the enticement of sin, suggests it like a serpent to the woman—that is, the lower part of reason, or the reason of knowledge. If she consents to the enticement, the woman eats the forbidden food. Then it suggests the same enticement to the man, the higher part of reason, or the reason of wisdom; if it consents, then the man too, together with the woman, tastes the forbidden food.

3. When sin is venial. If, then, the enticement of sin is held only in the sensual movement, the sin is venial and very slight.

Chapter 10 (149).

When the woman alone eats the forbidden food. But if the lower part of reason consents, so that it is held only by the pleasure of thought, without a will to carry it out, the woman alone has eaten, not the man, whose authority restrains the will from proceeding to action.

Chapter 11 (150).

When the man also eats: when sin is mortal. But if there is a complete will to carry it out, so that it would be brought to completion if the ability were present, the man too eats, because the higher part of reason has consented to the enticement; then the sin is damnable and grave.

Chapter 12 (151).

1. Discern in the woman's tasting: sometimes it is mortal, sometimes venial. When the woman tastes without the man, the sin is sometimes mortal, sometimes venial. As was said,¹ the woman tastes without the man when sin is held through the pleasure of thought, but is not resolved upon as something to be done; or when the man imposes a certain limit and measure on sin, so that the woman is not permitted to advance into sin with unrestrained freedom. — He repeats when the woman tastes without the man, showing when it is venial and when mortal. If the sin is not held long in the pleasure of thought, but is rejected by the man's authority as soon as it touches the woman, it is venial. But if it is held long in the pleasure of thought, even without a will to carry it out, it is mortal; and both man and woman—that is, the whole person—will be condemned for it, because then too the man did not restrain the woman as he ought; hence he can be said to have consented.

¹ Cf. Gen. 2:18. ² On the Trinity, XII, ch. 3, no. 3 (PL 42, 999s; CCL 50, 357s). ³ Gen. 2:24.

Apparatus: 5 Heading omitted in NVW. 8 Heading omitted in NVW. || alone omitted in BCX. 13 Heading omitted in NVW. 16 consented] consents LMNRVW. 24–25 Heading omitted in MNRV. 25 therefore] but BCTX. 26 be rejected] is rejected LMNTVW. 28 both] likewise BCOPW, corrected by W. 29 and omitted in BCWX.

Chapters 9–12. Cf. A. Landgraf, “Parts of the Soul, the Measure of the Gravity of Sin,” in Bohoslavia 2 (1924), 97–117, 269–295. — Chapters 10–11: some material is related to words in the same Lombard Gloss (PL 191, 1634 C).

1. Under Chapter 10.

2. A brief recapitulation of the whole. Thus, to sum up briefly: when sin is so conceived in the soul that one resolves to do it or even carries it out—whether a particular sin is committed often, another once, or even when one remains long in the pleasure of thought—it is mortal. But when it exists only in the sensual movement, as we said above,¹ it is very slight, because reason then takes no pleasure in it.

3. Why he said “often” or “once.” Above I said “one often, another once”² because some things, if done or resolved upon just once, bring condemnation, whereas others do so only if they are done or resolved upon repeatedly, as with an idle word and the like.

4. Augustine confirms this in a testimony. Augustine teaches this in Book XII of On the Trinity³, as follows: “Just as in the marriage of the first human beings the serpent persuaded them to eat, while the woman did not eat alone but gave the food to her husband and they ate together, so too in a certain hidden marriage that takes place and is discerned within one person: when the animal sense presents some enticement to the reason of knowledge, which is occupied with reasoning keenly about temporal actions, the woman has eaten alone; but she gives it to her husband if he too consents, and thus sin is completed. For sin cannot fail to exist when, even if what was thought is not done, it is nevertheless resolved upon as though it were done and the mind is prepared to carry it out. If the will to carry it out is also present, the man too eats, and then it is mortal sin.” — When the woman eats alone. “But if this consent is content with the pleasure of thought alone, I judge that, with respect to the former sin⁴, it should be regarded as though the woman alone had eaten from the forbidden tree.” — When the woman eats with her husband. “But if, in that consent, a sin is so resolved upon that it is also carried out in deed, then the woman is to be understood as having given her husband the forbidden food to eat with her. For sin cannot be resolved upon by the mind not only as something to be thought of pleasantly but also as something to be effectively carried out, unless that intention of the mind—which has supreme power to move the members to action or restrain them from action—yields to an evil deed.” — Whether what is held in the pleasure of thought alone is mortal. “Nor should it be denied that there is sin when the mind takes pleasure in illicit things by thought alone, without resolving that they should be done, yet gladly retaining and turning over things which ought to have been rejected as soon as they touched the mind; but it is far less than if one also resolves to fulfill them in action.”

Therefore forgiveness must also be sought for such thoughts, and the breast must be struck while one says:¹ Forgive us our debts, as we also forgive our debtors. For, just as among those first two human beings each bore his own person, so that if the woman alone had eaten the forbidden food she alone would have suffered the punishment of death, it cannot be said of one person that, if thought alone gladly feeds on illicit pleasures from which it ought immediately to turn away, and evil is not resolved upon but is merely held sweetly in memory, the woman can be condemned without the man. Far be it from us to believe this! For this is one person, one human being, and the whole will be condemned unless these things—sins of thought alone, felt without a will to act but with a will to delight the mind in such things—are forgiven through the Mediator's grace.”

5. Augustine. In Book II of Against the Manichaeans² he also says of this same matter: “The Apostle says³: According to the prince of the power of the air, the spirit now at work in the children of distrust. Does he then appear to them visibly, or approach them in bodily places and work in them? [Certainly not.] Rather, in wondrous ways he suggests by thought whatever he can. We must resist these suggestions: for we are not ignorant of his schemes.⁴ How did he approach Judas when he persuaded him to hand over the Lord? Did he appear to him in some place or through these eyes? Rather, as it is said,⁵ he entered into his heart. A man repels him if he keeps watch over paradise. For God placed man in paradise to work it and keep it,⁶ since the Church is called in the Song of Songs⁷ a locked garden, a sealed spring, to which that persuader of perversity is surely not admitted. Yet he deceived her through the woman. For our reason cannot be led to consent to sin unless pleasure has been stirred in that part of the mind which ought to obey reason as its ruling husband. — In each of us, too, when someone falls into sin, nothing other than what then happened among those three—the serpent, the woman, and the man—is at work. First comes suggestion, whether through thought or through bodily senses of the body: by seeing, touching, hearing, tasting, or smelling. When this suggestion has been made, if our desire is not stirred toward sin, the serpent's craft is driven away. But if it is stirred, the woman has, as it were, already been persuaded. Sometimes, however, reason acts manfully and restrains and checks desire once stirred; when this happens, we do not fall into sin, but are crowned after some struggle. But if reason consents and decides that what lust has stirred up should be done, the man is expelled from all blessed life as from paradise. For sin is already imputed, even if the deed does not follow, when conscience is held guilty in its consent.”

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¹ In ch. 9, no. 3. ² A little above, in the preceding number (PL 42, 1007s; CCL 50, 371ss), whence the whole of no. 4. ³ Ch. 12, nos. 17–18. ⁴ Cf. Rom. 6:13.

Apparatus (p. 459): 4 our omitted in OP. 8 gladly alone transposed in CLNT. 15 He also] therefore BOP, and therefore C. 19 Certainly not supplied from Augustine. 25 keep it] it added in T, between the lines in V, in the margin of W. 27 deceived] deceives NT (Augustine). 30 is at work] now added in BC, between the lines in V.

¹ Matt. 6:12. ² On Genesis against the Manichaeans, II, ch. 14, nos. 20–21 (PL 34, 206s). ³ Eph. 2:2. ⁴ 2 Cor. 2:11. ⁵ Cf. Luke 22:3; John 13:2. ⁶ Gen. 2:15. ⁷ Song 4:12.

6. Why he spoke of these parts of the soul. We have discussed these parts of the soul so that the nature of the soul itself might be known more fully, and so that it might be understood according to which of its parts free choice exists in it: namely, reason. Every mortal sin is committed through reason, but not every venial sin—specifically, not the sin that exists in the movement of sensuality alone.

Chapter 13 (152).

That in Scripture “sensuality” is often understood differently from the foregoing, so that the lower part of reason is also understood by that name. We must not pass over in silence that often in Scripture¹ the name “sensuality” refers not only to that in the soul which we share with beasts, but also to the lower part of reason, which is directed toward ordering temporal things.² Let the attentive reader note this carefully wherever Scripture speaks of it.

¹ That is, in sacred writing or theology. Cf. Augustine, On the Trinity, XII, ch. 13, no. 20: “I am not unaware that some outstanding defenders of the Catholic faith and interpreters of the divine word before us, when seeking these two things in one human being, whose whole soul they regarded as a kind of good paradise, held that the man should be the mind and the woman the bodily sense... I did not think that bodily sense, which we see to be shared by us and beasts, should be put in the place of the woman; rather, I wanted something that beasts would not have, and thought that bodily sense should instead be considered the serpent” (PL 42, 1008s; CCL 50, 373s). ² See above, chapters 4–5 (pp. 453s).

Apparatus: 3 is driven away] is driven away BCOPX. 11 these things] this TV, omitted in OP. 11 he spoke] he may have spoken NWX.