Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (130).

1. The origin of that sin. Here it seems that we must investigate carefully what was the origin and root of that sin.

2. The opinion of certain people who say that some elation preceded in the human mind *. Some think that a certain elation preceded in the human mind, from which he consented to the devil's suggestion.

3. Augustine's authority, which seems to support them *. Augustine seems to suggest this in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis, saying: “It is not to be thought that the human being would have been cast down unless some elation had first arisen in him, which needed to be restrained, so that through the humiliation of sin he might learn how falsely he had presumed about himself, and that nature is not rightly ordered if it withdraws from its maker.” — Again, in the same work: “How would the woman have believed the tempter's words, that God had forbidden her something good and useful, unless there had been in her mind that love of her own power and proud presumption about herself, which had to be exposed or destroyed by the temptation? Finally, not content with the serpent's persuasion, she looked at the tree, good for food and pleasing to the eye; and, not believing that she could die from it, perhaps thought that God had said this for some symbolic reason. So she ate and gave it to her husband, perhaps with some persuasion which Scripture has left us to understand; or perhaps persuasion was unnecessary, since the man did not see her dead from eating that food.”

1 Resp. Luc. 20, 26; Matth. 22, 30. 2 Gen. 3, 3. 3 Gen. 2, 17. 4 Lib. VIII, c. 17 (PL 34, 387; CSEL 28-I, 257). 5 I Cor. 14, 35 (PL 34, 386; CSEL 28-I, 256). 6 Lib. VIII, c. 16, n. 35.

Apparatus: 4 et radix om. OP. 5–6 Rubrica om. MVW, abbrev. R. 8 Rubrica om. CMVW. 16 contenta contempta BCLNT. || suasione persuasione BCV.

1. So Bede reads (following Augustine), On Genesis 3.1 (PL 91, 53 B–C; CCL 118A, 59). 2. Book XI, chapter 5, no. 7 (PL 34, 432; CSEL 28-I, 338). 3. Ibid., chapter 30, no. 39 (PL 34, 445; CSEL 28-I, 363s). 4. Compare Genesis 3:6: “The woman saw that the tree was good for food and pleasing to the eyes … and she ate and gave it to her husband.”

Chapter 1, nos. 1–2: Summa sententiarum III.6 (PL 171, 1123 D–1124 A; 176, 96 C). No. 3: Ordinary Gloss on Gen. 3:1 and 3:13 (Lyra I, 40d, 42b; v 24b, 24d). No. 4: Ordinary Gloss on Gen. 3:13, 3:9, 3:13 (Lyra I, 42b, 41d, 42b; v 25c, 27a, 25c–26b). No. 6: Summa sententiarum III.6 (PL 171, 1124 A; 176, 96 D); Augustine’s interpretation at no. 7.

Chapter 8, no. 1: A composite of Hugh, On the Sacraments I.7.1 (PL 176, 288 D–289 A), and the Ordinary Gloss on Genesis 2:17 (in Lyra I, 37c; v 20c). — No. 2 rests on the same Gloss a little below (37d; 20d).

4. Augustine, On Genesis: that the devil spoke differently through the woman than through the serpent *. “Thus, just as the devil was not permitted to tempt the woman except through the serpent, so neither was he permitted to tempt the man except through the woman”: “so that, just as God’s command came to the woman through the man, the devil’s temptation might pass to the man through the woman.” “But he did not himself speak in the woman, who was rational, as he did in the serpent; rather, it was his persuasion, although he inwardly aided by suggestion what he was doing outwardly through the serpent.”

5. The interpretation some draw from the foregoing words *. From what has been said, the manner and course of the temptation are indicated; and what we said earlier also seems to be implied: that a certain pride and presumption in the human mind preceded the temptation.

6. Objection to those who say that pride preceded in the mind. But if this was so, then he did not sin first at another’s prompting, since the authority teaches that the devil’s sin is incurable because he fell not through suggestion but through his own pride, whereas the human being’s is curable because he fell not by himself but through another, and therefore could rise again through another.

7. He defines how those words are to be understood here *. Accordingly, the foregoing words of Augustine call for a pious and careful reader. We can rightly understand them as follows: The human being would not have fallen—that is, into the act of that sin, namely eating the forbidden tree, and into these miseries through the devil’s temptation—unless a pride needing restraint had preceded, not the temptation, to be sure, but the sinful deed.

8. See the order of the temptation. The sequence of events was this: the devil said while tempting, “If you eat, you will be like gods, knowing good and evil.” On hearing this, a certain pride and love of her own power immediately crept into the woman’s mind; from this it pleased her to do what the devil advised—and she did it. She therefore sinned through suggestion, because the temptation came first; from it pride arose in her mind, and this was followed by the sinful deed and the punishment for sin.

Chapter 2 (131).

What the woman’s pride was. Certainly, there was such pride in the woman’s mind: she believed and wished to have a likeness to God with a kind of equality, thinking that what the devil said was true. For this reason Augustine specifically mentions the woman, saying: “How would the woman have believed the devil, unless a proud presumption about herself were in her mind?” What follows there, namely, “who was to be convicted or destroyed through temptation,” refers to the woman; it is to be understood as “the woman who was to be [convicted or destroyed] through temptation,” not “the pride.”

Chapter 3 (132).

1. What the man’s pride was: whether he believed and wished what the woman did. It is commonly asked whether that same pride and love of his own power existed in the man as in the woman.

2. That Adam was not deceived as the woman was—that is, into believing the devil’s persuasion true—and yet was deceived in some respect, namely in thinking the sin venial *. We answer that Adam was not deceived in the same way as the woman: he did not think what the devil suggested was true. Yet he may be considered to have been deceived in that he thought the act committed was venial, though it was deadly. Nor was he deceived first, or in the respect in which the woman was: he did not believe that God had forbidden them to touch that tree because, if they touched it, they would become like gods. Nevertheless Adam was a transgressor, as the Apostle testifies. Some deception may therefore have entered his mind immediately after the temptation, from which he wished to try the forbidden tree, since he did not see the woman dead after eating from it.

Apparatus: 1 Augustinus om. BRVW. 5 virum] nisi per feminam exp. P. 8 Rubrica om. BCVWX. 16 resurgere] resurgere trp. OP. 19 processus] processio N, progressus TX. 23 Rubrica om. AGI. 3 pro certo fuit trp. BCLRWX. 4 putans id add. LTV, illud add. N. 5 Augustinus om. LMRVWX. 10 Rubrica om. VW, abbrev. NR. 16 seductus] seductum M.

1 Ibid., c. 27, n. 34 (PL 34, 443; CSEL 28-I, 360). 2 Ibid., c. 27, n. 34 (448; 368). 3 Gen. 3, 5. 4 Rom. 5, 14: In similitudinem praevaricationis Adae.

Chapter 2: Hugh, On the Sacraments I.7.10 (PL 176, 290 D); Augustine. Chapter 3: Summa sententiarum III.6 (PL 171, 1125 A–B; 176, 97 D–98 A); Augustine, authority cited below. Nos. 3–4: Lombard’s Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:14 (PL 192, 341 A–B).

3. He confirms what he had said by an authority *. Hence Augustine, On Genesis: “Although the Apostle shows that Adam was a transgressor, saying, ‘In the likeness of Adam’s transgression,’ he nevertheless denies that he was deceived when he says, ‘Adam was not deceived, but the woman.’ Accordingly, when questioned he did not say, ‘The woman deceived me,’ but, ‘She gave it to me, and I ate’; whereas the woman said, ‘The serpent deceived me.’”

4. What the Apostle called the deception by which the woman, but not the man, was deceived *. — Augustine: “The Apostle called that deception proper by which what was being suggested, though false, was thought true: namely, that God had forbidden them to touch that tree because he knew that, if they touched it, they would become like gods—as though he envied them divinity, though he had made them human. Even if some desire to try something stirred the man, on account of a certain pride of mind that could not be hidden from God, when he saw that the woman had eaten that food and was not dead, I nevertheless think that, if he already possessed a spiritual mind, he in no way believed what the devil suggested.”

Chapter 4 (133).

1. Who sinned more, Adam or Eve. From this it can plainly be discerned which of them sinned more, Adam or Eve. The woman sinned more: she wished to usurp equality with divinity and, raised up by excessive presumption, believed that this would come to pass. Adam, however, yielded to her persuasion—not wishing to sadden her and leave her estranged from him, lest she perish—thinking the offense venial rather than deadly.

2. Hence Augustine says: “The Apostle says: Adam was not deceived. This can certainly be taken to mean that he was not deceived first; or that he was not deceived in the way the woman was, namely into believing the statement ‘You will be like gods’ true. Rather, he thought both things could happen: that he could accommodate his wife and obtain forgiveness through repentance. He therefore sinned less, since he thought of repentance and God’s mercy.”

3. Augustine, On Genesis: “For after the woman had been deceived and eaten, and had given him some so that they might eat together, he did not wish to sadden her, whom he believed would pine away without his consolation and, estranged from him, perish altogether—not overcome by bodily desire, which he had not yet experienced, but by a certain friendly goodwill, through which it often happens that God is offended so that a friend may not be offended. The just outcome of the divine sentence showed that he ought not to have done this.”

4. In what respect Adam was deceived and in what respect he was not *. “Therefore he too was deceived in another way.” “For, inexperienced in divine severity, he could have been mistaken in thinking that what had been committed was venial.” “But I do not think that he could in any way have been deceived by that serpentine trick by which the woman was deceived.”

5. From this it can be understood that the woman sinned more, since she had a greater presumption of swelling pride. Therefore she sinned against herself, her neighbor, and God, whereas the man sinned only against himself and God. — It is also shown from the punishment that the woman sinned more *. It is likewise inferred that the woman sinned more because she was punished more severely, being told: “In sorrow you shall bear children,” and so forth.

Apparatus: 1 Rubrica om. LMRVW. 4 ubi] ut BCOPRX. 7 Quam! Quod LT, Quare N. 15 nec] non MWX (Glossa in I Tim.). 19 enim om. OP.

Apparatus (p. 443): 3 pro certo fuit trp. BCLRWX. 4 putans] dicens C. 5 August. inquiens om. C. 14–16 Rubrica om. MW, del. V. || et om. BCX. 16–17 Rubrica om. RVW. 19 quod] quia BCX.

1 Lib. XI, c. 42, n. 58 (PL 34, 453; CSEL 28-I, 377). 2 Rom. 5, 14. 3 Gen. 3, 12. 4 Gen. 3, 12–13. 5 Gen. 3, 13. 6 Ibid., n. 60 (PL 34, 454; CSEL 28-I, 378). 7 August., De civit. Dei, XIV, c. 11, n. 2 (PL 41, 420; CSEL 40-II, 378). 8 Gen. 3, 16.

Chapter 4, no. 1: Summa sententiarum III.6 (PL 171, 1125 A; 176, 97 D). Nos. 2–4: Lombard’s Gloss on 1 Timothy 2:14 (PL 192, 341 C–D); Ordinary Gloss ad loc. No. 5: Summa sententiarum III.6 (PL 171, 1125 B–C; 176, 98 A). No. 6: Ordinary Gloss on Gen. 3:12–13 (Lyra I, 42a, 42b; v 28a).

6. What seems contrary to the foregoing judgment. But what Augustine says in On Genesis about the man and woman excusing their sin seems contrary to this: “Adam said, ‘The woman whom you gave me gave it to me, and I ate.’ He does not say, ‘I have sinned.’ For pride has the ugliness of confusion, not the humility of confession.” “Nor does the woman confess her sin, but she refers it to another, saying, ‘The serpent deceived me, and I ate’—unequal in sex, but equal in arrogance.” See, Augustine says here that the woman had arrogance equal to the man’s; therefore they were equally proud and sinned equally.

7. Resolution of the foregoing authority *. This can be resolved by saying that the two had equal arrogance in excusing their sin, and also in eating the forbidden tree; but the arrogance was unequal, and much greater in the woman, in that she believed and wished to be like God, which the man did not.

8. It is also read of the man that he wished to be like God *. Nevertheless, it is also read of the man that he wished to be like God. For Augustine says, on the Psalm verse “What I did not steal, I then restored”: “Adam stole, and Eve presumed, like the devil, upon divinity; they wished to steal divinity and lost happiness.” — Again, on the verse “O God, who is like you?”: “Whoever wishes to be like God by his own power perversely wishes to be like God—like the devil, who did not wish to be beneath him, and like the human being, who did not wish to be held as a servant by a command, but wished to be as God, with no one ruling him.” — Again, on the Epistle verse “He did not consider it robbery to be equal to God”: “Because he did not usurp what was not his, as the devil and the first man did.”

9. The view of some: Adam aspired to be like God but did not believe it possible. For this reason some think that Adam too aspired to be like God, but did not believe this could happen; and therefore he knew that what the devil promised was false. Although he desired equality with divinity, he did not burn with such ardor or feel such ambition as the woman, who thought it could happen and therefore sinned more proudly in aspiring to it. Some impulse of ambition may have stirred the man, but not so far as to make him think it true or possible.

10. The view of others, who think it was said of the man because Eve was taken from him *. — They show this by analogy *. Others think instead that it was said that Adam wished this because the woman, taken from him, wished it. They say that sin is likewise said to have entered the world through one man—that is, into human nature—even though the woman sinned before the man, because sin entered through the woman, who was made from the man. Or, rather, it is said to have entered through the man because, even though the woman sinned, if the man had not sinned the human race would not have perished, corrupted by sins. The man therefore sinned less than the woman.

11. Objection to the statement that the man sinned less. This is commonly challenged as follows: “As Isidore says, sin is committed in three ways: through ignorance, weakness, or deliberate action; and it is more serious to sin through weakness than through ignorance, and more serious to sin deliberately than through weakness. But Eve seems to have sinned through ignorance, because she was deceived; Adam, however, sinned deliberately, because he was not deceived,” as the Apostle says.

12. Answer distinguishing Eve’s ignorance: in what respect she sinned ignorantly and in what respect she did not *. We answer that, although Eve sinned through ignorance in thinking what the devil suggested was true, she nevertheless knew that it was God’s command and that to act against it was a sin. Therefore she could not be excused from sin on account of ignorance.

1 Lib. XI, c. 35, nn. 47–48 (PL 34, 449; CSEL 28-I, 369s). 2 Gen. 3, 12. 3 Gen. 3, 13. 4 Enarr. in Ps., 68, 5, serm. 2, n. 7 (PL 36, 545; CCL 39, 910). 5 Enarr. in Ps., 70, 19, serm. 2, n. 7 (PL 36, 589; CCL 39, 910). 6 Scil. Phil. 2, 6; sed auctoritas legitur in August., Enarr. in Ps., 68, 5. 7 Cf. Hugo, De sacram., I, 7, 10 (PL 176, 290 D–291 A).

Apparatus: 7 comedi] in add. VW, add. interl. T. 8 quia quod NORT. 10 Rubrica om. CMVW. 19 per se] perverse M, corr. interl. 23 esse se trp. BOPW. 27 credidit] credere CMX. 6–7 Rubricae om. MVW. 22–23 Rubrica om. VW, abbrev. R. 22 scilicet om. BCLX. 23 et om. BCPX.

No. 8: The Master’s Glosses on Ps. 68:5, Ps. 70:19, and Phil. 2:6 (PL 192, 233 C; 655 A); Ordinary Glosses ad loc. No. 11: Summa sententiarum III.6 (PL 171, 1125 C; 176, 98 A–B).

Chapter 5 (134).

1. That some ignorance excuses and some does not. There is an ignorance that excuses the sinner, and an ignorance that does not excuse. There is vincible ignorance and invincible ignorance. Every excuse is removed where the commandment is not unknown.

2. On the three kinds of ignorance: which excuses and which does not. There are three kinds of ignorance: that of those who refuse to know although they can, which does not excuse because it too is a sin; that of those who wish to know but cannot, which excuses and is the punishment of sin, not sin; and that of those who simply do not know, without refusing or intending to know, which does not wholly excuse anyone, though perhaps it makes the punishment lighter. — Augustine: Where there is no excuse. Hence Augustine, To Valentinus¹: “Those who know God’s commandments are deprived of the excuse that people usually have on account of ignorance. Although it is more serious to sin knowingly than unknowingly, one must not therefore take refuge in the darkness of ignorance in order to seek an excuse there. For not knowing is one thing, and refusing to know is another.” “For² among those who refused to understand, ignorance itself is a sin; among those who could not, it is the punishment of sin. But ignorance³ belonging neither to those who refuse to know nor to those who simply do not know excuses no one so completely that he will not burn in eternal fire, though perhaps it makes him burn more mildly.” The woman therefore had no excuse on account of ignorance, since she knew the commandment and was not unaware that acting otherwise was a sin.

3. From where the consent to that sin arose, since human nature was uncorrupted. It is also commonly asked: since human nature was without defect, from where did consent to evil arise? — Answer. We can answer that it came from the free choice of the will. For in him and in another there was a cause that made him worse: in another, because the devil persuaded him; in himself, because he consented by the free choice of his will. Although free choice is good, that evil consent therefore came from something good, and thus evil flowed from good. We shall discuss this more fully in what follows¹, when we investigate the origin of evil and the thing in which it takes shape.

¹ De gratia et lib. arbitrio, c. 3, n. 5 (PL 44, 884s); c. 6, n. 27 (PL 33, 883; CSEL 57, 197). ² Epist. 194 (ad Sixtum). ³ De gratia et lib. arbitrio, c. 3, n. 5 (PL 44, 885).

Apparatus: 3 autem om. LMNX. 12 excusatio] excusabile BCX. 15 confugiendum] fugiendum om. LNW, mg. R. 19 nolunt CNY (Glossa), 20 mg. R. 21 mitius] minus BCLP. 26 Responsio om. LMRVWX.

Chapter 5. Compare L. Ott, Studies on the Theological Letter Literature of Early Scholasticism, 539–547; S. Kuttner, The Canonistic Doctrine of Guilt from Gratian to the Decretals of Gregory IX, Studi e testi 64, Vatican City, 1935, 138–148. — No. 2: The Master’s Gloss on Romans 2:12 (PL 191, 1343 C–D).

Chapter 6 (135).

Whether the will preceded that sin. If it is asked whether the will preceded that sin, we say that the sin consisted both in the will and in the act, and that the will preceded the act. But no other evil human will preceded that will; rather, through the devil’s persuasion and the human being’s free choice that evil will arose, by which he abandoned justice and began iniquity; and that will itself was iniquity.

¹ In Dist. 34 (p. 525ss). ² Lib. XI, c. 4, n. 6 (PL 34, 431; CSEL 28-I, 337). ³ Ibid., c. 6, n. 8 (432; 339). ⁴ Ibid., c. 9, n. 12 (434; 342).