Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (116).

1. How children would have been begotten if the first parents had not sinned, and what sort of children they would have been. After this we must consider how the first parents would have begotten children, had they not sinned, and what sort of children would have been born to them.

2. The opinion of some who say that the first humans could not have intercourse in paradise before sin *. — Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 2 *. Some think that the first humans could not have intercourse in paradise to beget children until after sin, saying that intercourse cannot occur without corruption or stain. But before sin there could be neither corruption nor stain in man, since these followed from sin.

3. A reply against their opinion: had they not sinned, they would have joined without sin or the heat of lust, just as now one hand joins another without irritation *. The answer is that, had the first humans not sinned, they would have joined in carnal union in paradise without any sin or stain; there would have been an undefiled marriage bed 3 and union without concupiscence. They would have commanded their genital members as they did their other members, so that they would have felt no illicit movement there. Just as we bring other parts of the body together—for example, the hand to the mouth—without the heat of lust, so they would have used their genital members without any irritation of the flesh. For this «deadly disease» 1 has clung to human members as a result of sin.

Apparatus: 5–6 Rubrica om. NRV, abbrev. BCX. 9 incrementi] incrementis MOP. 13 Rubrica om. MNVW. 15 habuit] habuerit MNW. 18–19 naturae, quodam] naturae sua inditum quo BCX. 24 addo] add. BCP. 3 ligno vitae trp. BOPVW. 6 contradicant] sed add. OP. 12–13 Rubricae om. VW. 18–20 Rubrica om. MVW.

1 Resp. Gen. 2, 16–17. 2 Strabus, apud Glossam ordin. in Gen. 2, 9 (apud Lyranum, I, 36d; v 17d). Cf. Strabus seu Ps-Remigius Altiss., In Genesim (PL 131, 60 D–61 A, 62 C, 67 D); et etiam Guill. de Campellis, n. 246 (apud Lottin, Psych. et morale, V, 202, n. 1). 3 De Genesi ad litt., VIII, c. 5, n. 11 (PL 34, 377; CSEL 28-I, 238s).

1 In cap. 4, n. 2 (p. 424). 2 Cf. Lib. IX, cc. 8–9 (PL 34, 397s; CSEL 28-I, 276s); et etiam De civit. Dei, XIV, c. 21 (PL 41, 429; CSEL 40-II, 45; CCL 48, 443). 3 Resp. Hebr. 13, 4.

No. 1: Hugh, On the Sacraments I.6.22 (PL 176, 277 A); Summa sententiarum III.4 (PL 171, 1122 B; 176, 95 A). No. 2: Ordinary Gloss on Gen. 2:18 (Lyra I, 38b; v 21c). No. 3: Ordinary Gloss (38a; v 21b); Anselm of Laon, Book of Pancrisis, no. 318 (O. Lottin, Psychology and Morality, V, 252; see also no. 254, p. 207); Augustine, Ordinary Gloss on Gen. 2:18 (Lyra I, 38b, 38a; v 21c, 21b). No. 4: Augustine, Ordinary Gloss on Gen. 2:28 (Lyra I, 36c–d; v 18b).

They would therefore have begotten children in paradise through undefiled intercourse and without corruption. — Hence Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 2: «Why should we not believe that before sin the first humans could command their genital members for procreation, just as in any other task they use the other members without pleasurable irritation? For it is not incredible that God made those bodies such that, had they not sinned, they would have commanded those members as they command their feet, sowing without heat and giving birth without pain; but after sin they deserved that movement, which marriage orders and continence restrains». «For this weakness 3, prone to fall into shameful conduct, is met by the honor of marriage; what would have been a duty for the healthy is a remedy for the sick». «Though they were expelled 4 from paradise, they came together and begot children; yet in paradise they could have had honorable marriage and an undefiled marriage bed 5, without the heat of lust and without the labor of childbirth».

Chapter 2 (117).

Why they did not have intercourse in paradise. — He gives two explanations *. — Augustine, On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 6 *: «Why, then, did they not have intercourse in paradise? Because, once the woman had been created, transgression immediately occurred, and they were expelled from paradise. Or because God had not yet commanded them to have intercourse, and they could await divine authority, since concupiscence did not trouble them. God had not commanded it because he foresaw their fall, from whom the human race was to be propagated». Here you have an explicit account of how children would have been propagated.

Chapter 3 (118).

1. The end of that lower life: whether, once children had been born, people would have been translated successively, or all together. Scripture gives no definite account of the time when they would be translated to spiritual and heavenly life. It is therefore uncertain whether the parents, after begetting children and completing the just duty of human life, would have been translated to a better state—not through death, but through some change—or whether the fathers would have remained in some state of life, using the tree of life, until their children reached that same state, and then, when the number had been completed, all would have been translated together to a better state, to be like the angels of God in heaven 1.

2. Augustine discusses this ambiguously in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis 2, saying: «The first humans could have begotten children in paradise, not so that sons would succeed their dying fathers, but while their fathers remained in some state of maturity, drawing strength from the tree of life; and the sons would be brought to that same state until, their number being complete, their animal bodies would pass without death into another condition, in which they would serve the ruling spirit completely and live by the spirit alone, without bodily nourishment». Or «the parents could have yielded their place to their children, so that the number would be completed by succession; after begetting children and completing the just duty of human life, they would be translated to a better state, not through death but through some change». — Here we learn of man’s passage to a better state, but we are left uncertain whether they would all be translated together or in succession.

Chapter 4 (119).

1. What sort of children they would have begotten: whether they would have had full stature and use of their limbs, as the first man was created. If it is asked what sort of children man would have begotten had he not sinned—whether, just as the first man was created at once complete in bodily stature and use of his limbs, his children too would have been complete from the very beginning of birth, able to walk, speak, and do everything—the answer may be that they would have had to be born as infants, because of the constraints of the mother’s womb.

2. A reply that first states one point without ambiguity, then introduces a threefold distinction *. But whether immediately after birth they would have had full stature and use of their limbs

Apparatus: 4–5 Unde ... Genesim om. BCLOPX, interl. T; sed Aug. add. mg. ad I, 13 O. 17 Duobus modis solvit om. NRVW. 7 angeli Dei] sancti angeli MNRWX. 18 habemus] habes MNT. 21 staturae] naturae BCOP.

1 Resp. Gen. 2, 10, n. 17 (PL 34, 399; CSEL 28-I, 279). 2 Lib. IX, c. 10, n. 18 (PL 34, 399s; CSEL 28-I, 279s). 3 Ibid., c. 7, n. 2 (PL 34, 395; CSEL 28-I, 272s). 4 Ibid., c. 3, n. 6 (PL 34, 395; CSEL 28-I, 272s). 5 Resp. Hebr. 13, 4: Honorabile connubium ... et thorus immaculatus. 6 Ibid., c. 10, n. 17.

Chapter 2: Gloss on Gen. 2:18 (38a; 21b). Chapter 3, no. 1 (see no. 2); compare Hugh, On the Sacraments I.6.25 (PL 176, 278 C–D).

— No. 2: From the Gloss on Genesis 2:18 (38a; 21b).

Chapter 4: Almost entirely from Summa sententiarum III.4 (PL 171, 1122 B–D; 176, 96 A–C); some material (in nos. 1 and 4, and the conclusion in no. 7) is from Hugh, On the Sacraments I.6.26 (PL 176, 278 D–279 B). The Master added only a little. whether they would have been able to use their limbs while still infants and at an earlier age, or whether they would have received full stature and use of their limbs over time, as happens now: we have no authoritative determination.

3. He sets out Augustine’s ambiguous words, in which he seems nevertheless to suggest that children, even as infants, could have used their limbs. On this point Augustine speaks ambiguously: «It troubles us, he says, whether the first humans, had they not sinned, would have had children who could use neither tongue nor hands. For because of the constraints of the womb they may have had to be born as infants. Yet, although a rib is a small part of the body, he did not for that reason make the man’s wife small; so the Creator’s omnipotence could also have made his children large as soon as they were born. But setting this aside, he could certainly have granted them what he granted many animals: although their young are small, they run and follow their mothers as soon as they are born. By contrast, a human infant’s feet are not fit for walking, nor are its hands capable even of scratching; though the breasts are placed beside it, newborns can more readily cry from hunger than suck, and this weakness of the flesh is suited to the weakness of the mind». These words seem to imply that children, even as infants, would have been able to use their limbs.

4. Some have reasonably held that children would have been born small and then, as time passed, would have grown in stature and other respects as they do now, and that this should not be attributed to a fault. But since Augustine states nothing definite on this point, some have reasonably held that the first parents’ children would have been born small and then, over time, would have received an increase in stature and use of their limbs according to the same law by which human birth is ordered now. They would have awaited the age for walking and speaking, as we do today. This, of course, would not have been counted a fault, but a condition of nature; just as they could not abstain entirely from food, yet this was due not to a fault but to the condition of nature.

5. An objection by some who wish to prove that they could have lived without nourishment *. An objection is raised as follows: If they had not sinned, they would not have died; but they would not have sinned if they had not eaten; therefore they could have lived without nourishment. — Reply *. However, as we said above, they would have sinned not only by eating from the forbidden tree, but also by failing to use what was permitted; for just as they were commanded not to eat from that tree, so they were commanded to eat from the others. Why they would have sinned if they had not used the other permitted trees *. Moreover, they would have acted against natural reason, by which they understood that they were to eat from those trees; and they naturally desired to do so.

6. Another objection on the same point *. Again, the objection is raised: Since hunger is a punishment for sin, had they not sinned they would not have felt hunger; but eating without hunger would seem pointless. Hence some think that before sin they had no need of food, because they could not be hungry if they had not sinned. — Reply *. One may answer that hunger truly is a deficiency and a punishment for sin: it is an immoderate appetite for eating, to which man would not have been subject had he not sinned. But beyond doubt he would sin if he did not forestall this deficiency with food. For he had a natural and moderate appetite, which had to be satisfied so that he would not feel the deficiency of hunger.

7. Just as his need for food before sin was not a fault, neither would it have been a fault if children born with incomplete stature grew in stature and other respects *. Therefore, just as before sin man’s need for food was due not to a fault but to the condition of nature, so it would not have been a fault but a natural condition if, although human life began in perfection in its first parent, in subsequent generations it progressed from a lesser to a greater state—namely, if over time it acquired bodily growth in stature and use of the limbs.

Chapter 5 (120).

1. Whether, just as in bodily stature, infants would be born with an incomplete mental sense and would progress over time in sense and knowledge of truth, or whether they would be perfect in these respects as soon as they were born. Since it is not absurd or inappropriate to think this about the human body, people commonly ask whether the same should be thought about the soul’s sense and knowledge of truth: that those born without sin would be incomplete in mental sense and understanding, and would progress in these over time until they reached perfection; or whether, as soon as they were created, they would receive perfect sense and knowledge.

Apparatus (p. 430): 3–4 auctoritatibus] auctoritatibus TX, corr. in auctoritatibus V. 9 uterentur] nec pedibus add. T (Aug.), add. interl. V. 12 hoc] haec LMTVW. 24 parvos] parvulos NRT.

Apparatus (p. 431): 1 Responsio LNV, om. alii. 7 circa idem om. MOP. 9 putant quidam trp. OPR. 10 peccassent] peccarent MNV. 15 peccaret] peccarent BCX. 17 proficerent] proficeret BCX. 18 igitur] ergo BCV. 21 scilicet om. LNV. 27 parvos] parvulos NRT.

1 In Dist. 19, c. 4, n. 3 (p. 424).

2 De peccat. meritis et bapt. parvulorum, I, cc. 37–38 (PL 44, 150; CSEL 60, 69s).

3 Resp. Hugo, De sacram., I, 6, 26 (PL 176, 279 A).

Chapter 5: Hugh, On the Sacraments I, 6, 26 (PL 176, 279 B–C). would be complete, and whether they would progress in these over time until they reached perfection, or whether they would receive perfect sense and knowledge as soon as they were created.

2. A reply saying that some think they would progress in these respects as in others *. Those who believe¹ that children would be born with incomplete bodily stature and use of their limbs, and would progress over time, do not deny that they would likewise be incomplete in sense at the beginning of their lives, and would progress in sense and knowledge over time until they reached perfection.

3. Some object against their opinion *. Some object², saying: If they did not possess perfect sense and understanding as soon as they were born, they would have ignorance; but ignorance is a punishment for sin. — Those who say this do not consider carefully enough that not everyone who is ignorant of something, or knows something less perfectly, should immediately be said to have ignorance or to be in a state of ignorance.

4. How ignorance is said to be present in someone *. Ignorance is spoken of only when one does not know what one ought to know rather than be ignorant of. Such ignorance is a punishment for sin when the mind is darkened by vice, so that it cannot know what it ought to know.

Chapter 6 (121).

1. Man’s translation to a better state, and the two goods: one given here, the other promised. Such was man’s constitution before sin in respect of the condition of his body. From this state he was to be translated, together with all his posterity, to a better and more worthy state, where he would enjoy the heavenly and eternal good prepared for him in heaven. — For just as man is composed of two natures, so the Creator prepared two goods for him from the beginning: one temporal, the other eternal; one visible, the other invisible; one for the flesh, the other for the spirit. And because the animal comes first, then the spiritual³, he first gave temporal good; but he promised invisible and eternal good and set it before man to be sought through merit.

2. God gave man natural reason and a precept so that he might preserve the good he had received and merit what had been promised. To preserve what he had given and merit what he had promised, God added a precept of obedience to the natural reason implanted in the human soul at its creation, by which man could distinguish good from evil. Through observance of this precept, he would not lose what had been given and would obtain what had been promised, so that through merit he might attain the reward.

Apparatus: 1 Responsio LNV, om. alii. 3–4 Rubrica om. RVW. 11 peccati est poena] poena peccati est CNV. 14 ignorantia] ignorans BCPX. 15 Rubrica om. RTW. 16 sciri et add. MNV, vel add. W. 16 debet] deberet T. 18 enim om. OPX. 25 illi duo reparata Aug., debuerat add. X.

1 Scil. Hugo, De sacram., I, 6, 26.

2 Hugh himself objects to himself in this way and replies: “But those who say this,” etc.

3 I Cor. 15, 46.

2 Chapter 6: Summa sententiarum III.4 (PL 171, 1123 A–B; 176, 95 D–96 A); Hugh, On the Sacraments I.6.6, 7, 28–29 (PL 176, 267s, 281 A–B, 282 D).