Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (33).

The good angels have been so confirmed by grace that they cannot sin, while the evil have been so hardened in evil that they cannot live well. It was said above¹ that the angels who stood firm were confirmed by grace, while those who fell were abandoned by God’s grace. The good were so greatly confirmed by grace that they cannot sin; the evil, however, have been so obstinate in wickedness that they cannot have a good will or will well, even if what they sometimes will is good. For sometimes they will something to happen that God wills to happen; and that thing is certainly good and just to happen. Yet they do not will it with a good will, nor do they will it well.

Chapter 2 (34).

1. Both have free choice, yet neither can be turned in either direction. But since the good cannot sin and the evil cannot will or do good, it seems that they no longer have free choice, because they cannot be turned in either direction, although free choice is directed to both. — Hence Jerome says in his treatise On the Prodigal Son²: «God alone is such that sin cannot befall him; all other beings, since they have free choice, can be turned in either direction.» Here he seems to say that every creature endowed with free choice can be turned toward good and evil. If so, then the good angels and the evil can each be turned in either direction; therefore the good can become evil, and the evil good.

¹ because MNR. || 17 nor] lest BCMNOP. || 18 who] because BCOX. || 21 again] thereafter LNT.]

²

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⁴ can sin BCMOPT, corrected by T. || 15 because] although NOP, because M, if X, omitted BC.]

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2. To this we say that the good were so confirmed by grace that they cannot become evil, and the evil were so hardened in wickedness that they cannot become good; nevertheless, both have free choice, because the good choose good and reject evil not under the compulsion of any necessity, but by their own spontaneous will, aided indeed by grace; and the evil likewise, by spontaneous will deprived of grace, avoid good and follow evil. The evil have free choice, but it is weighed down and corrupted, so that they cannot rise to the good.

Chapter 3 (35).

1. After confirmation the good have freer choice than before. The good, however, have much freer choice after confirmation than before. For, as Augustine teaches in the Enchiridion¹, «they are not without free choice because they cannot will evil. That choice is much freer which cannot serve sin². Nor is the will to be blamed, or denied to be a will, or said to be unfree, by which they so will to be blessed that they not only do not wish to be wretched, but cannot possibly even wish it.»

2. Therefore the good angels cannot will evil or will to be wretched; they have this not from nature, but by the benefit of grace. For before their confirmation by grace the angels could sin, and some did sin and became demons. Hence Augustine says in Against Maximinus³: «The nature of the heavenly creatures could die, because it could sin. For angels sinned and became demons, whose prince is the devil; and those who did not sin could have sinned. Whenever it is granted to a rational creature that it cannot sin, this is not of its own nature, but of God’s grace. Therefore God alone is such that, not by anyone’s grace but by his own nature, he neither could, nor can, nor will be able to sin.» See, then, that it is intimated here that angels could sin before their confirmation, but cannot after it; and that what they then had came from free choice, which is natural to them. But their present inability to sin is not from nature, that is, from free choice, but from grace; and by this grace it is also the case that free choice itself can no longer serve sin⁴.

Chapter 4 (36).

1. After confirmation the angels cannot sin by nature as they could before: their choice was not weakened, but confirmed. Therefore after confirmation the angels could not sin by nature as before; not because their free choice was weakened by grace, but rather because it was so confirmed that a good angel can no longer sin through it. This, of course, comes not from free choice itself, but from God’s grace.

2. He explains how Jerome’s words above are to be understood². What Jerome says³, then, «All other beings, since they have free choice, can be turned in either direction», must be understood according to the state in which they were created. For man and angel were created such that each could be turned in either direction; but afterward the good angels were so confirmed by grace that they cannot sin, and the evil were so hardened by vice that they cannot live well.

3. This other statement must be understood in the same way*. Isidore’s statement⁴ must likewise be understood in this way: «Angels are changeable by nature, immutable by grace.» For at the beginning of their creation they could be changed by nature toward good or evil; but afterward they were so bound to good by grace that they cannot be changed from it: grace, not nature, resists this.

Chapter 5 (37).

The evil angels have not lost their keen perception, and the ways in which they know. Although the evil angels are so obstinate through wickedness, they have not been entirely deprived of keen perception. For, as Isidore teaches⁵, «in three ways do the demons abound in acuity of knowledge, namely through the subtlety of their nature, experience of times, and revelation by spirits above.» — On this Augustine also says¹: «Evil spirits are permitted to know certain truths about temporal things, partly through subtlety of perception, partly because they are made more shrewd by experience of times, owing to such great length of life, and partly because holy angels reveal to them, at God’s command, what they themselves learn from almighty God. Sometimes those same wicked spirits also foretell, as if by divination, what they themselves are going to do.»

⁷ cannot NTX. || become evil transposed BCV. || 5 to sin transposed after angels BCX. || 15 confirmed transposed BCPT. || 18 Heading omitted MV. || 21 by omitted BCW.]

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¹⁰ transposed after angels BCX. || 15 confirmed transposed BCPT. || 18 Heading omitted MV. || 21 by omitted BCW.]

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¹²

Chapter 6 (38).

That magical arts avail by the power and knowledge of the devil, which power and knowledge were given him by God either to deceive the wicked, warn the good, or exercise them. Magical arts too are practiced by his knowledge and power. Yet both knowledge and power were given to them by God², either to deceive the deceitful, warn the faithful, or exercise and test the patience of the righteous. — Hence Augustine in Book III of On the Trinity³: "I see," he says, "what may occur to a feeble mind: why, namely, these marvels are also performed by magical arts. For Pharaoh's magicians made serpents and other things. But this is still more astonishing: how the power of the magicians, which could make serpents, failed altogether when it came to the tiniest flies, namely gnats, by which Egypt was struck with its third plague. There the magicians certainly failed, saying⁴: ‘This is the finger of God.’ From this it is understood that not even the transgressing angels themselves and airy powers, thrust from the dwelling of that lofty, ethereal purity into this deepest darkness as into a prison of their own kind, through whom magical arts can do whatever they can, have any power unless power is given from above. It is given either to deceive the deceitful, as among the Egyptians—and it was given even to the magicians themselves, so that they seemed wondrous in the operation of those spirits by whom they were being condemned—or to warn the faithful, lest they greatly desire to do anything of the kind; for this reason these things have also been reported to us in Scripture; or to exercise, test, and manifest the patience of the righteous."

Chapter 7 (39).

The matter of visible things does not obey transgressing angels at their nod. "Nor¹ should it be thought that the matter of visible things obeys these transgressing angels at their nod; rather, it obeys God, from whom this power is given, to the extent that the immutable Judge determines."

Chapter 8 (40).

1. That they are not creators, although magicians made frogs and other things through them; God alone is Creator. "Nor indeed should those evil angels be called creators because magicians made frogs and serpents through them: they did not create them themselves."

2. On the seeds of all bodies, whose creator is God alone. "For in the bodily elements of this world lie hidden certain seeds of all things that are born corporeally and visibly, which God implanted in them originally. He, therefore, is the creator of all things who is creator of the invisible seeds. For whatever comes forth before our eyes by birth receives from hidden seeds its beginnings for emerging here, while growth to due size and distinctions of form are taken from original rules, so to speak."

3. Just as parents are not called creators of children, nor farmers creators of crops, so neither good nor evil angels are creators, even when creatures come to be through their ministry. "Therefore, just as we do not call parents creators of human beings, nor farmers creators of crops, although, when their outward motions are applied, God's power works inwardly to bring these things into being, so it is not right to consider either evil or good angels creators. (Note: here he implies that they have bodies.*) But, owing to the subtlety of their perception and body, they know seeds of these things that are more hidden from us, and secretly scatter them through suitable mixtures of the elements; thus they provide occasions both for things to be generated and for their growth to be accelerated. Yet the good do these things only insofar as God commands, and the evil do them unjustly only insofar as he justly permits."

4. The wicked man has an evil will from himself, but receives power justly from God. "For by his wickedness the unjust man has an unjust will, but receives power only justly, whether for his own punishment or that of others—either the punishment of the wicked or the praise of the good."

¹³ ‘to be warned’ NW, ‘to admonish’ T.]

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¹⁵ ‘These’ O, ‘If’ P (Augustine); Augustine has ‘if,’ added between the lines in V². || ‘of itself’ omitted in OP, added between the lines in R. || 30 The heading is omitted in LRVW. || 31 ‘has’] ‘have’ LMTVX.]

¹⁶

Chapter 9 (41).

Just as God alone works the mind's justification, so too he alone works the creation of things, although a creature serves outwardly. "Therefore, just as no one but God can shape our mind by justifying it, though human beings too can outwardly preach the Gospel—not only the good through truth, but also the wicked through occasion²—so God inwardly works the creation of visible things, while outward operations and mixtures, or occasions, are supplied by angels, both good and evil, or even by human beings. — "But³ human beings supply these things with so much greater difficulty as they lack subtle senses and bodily mobility in their earthly, sluggish limbs. Hence angels of whatever kind can draw together proximate causes from the elements much more easily, and their speed in such works is all the more marvelous. Yet only the one who forms these things principally is Creator, and no one can do this but the one Creator, God." — "For it is one thing to establish and administer a creature from the innermost and highest hinge of causes, which only God the Creator does; another to apply outwardly some operation according to the powers and abilities distributed by him, so that what is created may emerge then or then, in this way or that. For all these things were already created originally and primitively in a certain interweaving of the elements, but they emerge when the right opportunities are received."

Chapter 10 (42).

1. That evil angels can do many things by the strength of their nature, but cannot do them because God or good angels forbid them—that is, because they are not permitted. This too should be known: evil angels can do certain things through the subtlety of their nature, but cannot do them because God or good angels forbid them—that is, because God or good angels do not permit them to do so. They could indeed have made gnats, they who made frogs and serpents. Other things they cannot do even if superior angels permit them, because God does not permit it.

2. Why those who made frogs and serpents could not produce gnats. Hence Augustine in Book III of On the Trinity¹: "By God's ineffable power it comes about that what evil angels could do if permitted, they cannot do precisely because they are not permitted. No other reason suggests itself why those who made frogs and serpents could not make gnats except that God's greater dominion was present, forbidding them through the Holy Spirit; the magicians also confessed this, saying²: ‘This is the finger of God.’ But what they can do by nature yet cannot do because of a prohibition, and what they are unable to do by the condition of their very nature, is difficult for a human being to investigate—indeed, impossible. (He makes this clear by an analogy.³) We know that a human being can walk, and cannot do even this if not permitted; yet cannot fly even if permitted. So those angels can do certain things if permitted by more powerful angels under God's command, but cannot do other things even if those angels permit them, because he does not permit them, he from whom they have this measure of nature; he also often does not permit through his angels those things he has granted them the ability to do."