Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (13).

1. What the angels were like when made: four attributes were assigned to them at the very beginning of their creation. It has now been shown where the angels were immediately after they were created; next we must investigate what they were like at the very beginning of their creation.

2. Four things, it seems, were assigned to the angels at the beginning of their existence: a simple essence, that is, indivisible and immaterial; individual distinction; understanding, memory, and will or love, through reason naturally implanted in them; and free choice, that is, the free ability to incline the will either to good or to evil. For by free choice they could, without violence or compulsion, turn of their own will in either direction.

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Chapter 2 (14).

1. Whether all angels were equal in three respects, namely, in essence, wisdom, and freedom of choice. Here it must be considered whether all were equal in spiritual substance, rational wisdom, and freedom of choice, which were present in them all: so that the first consideration concerns substance, the second form, and the third power. For person is substance, wisdom is form, and choice is power; and the subtlety of nature pertains to substance, the clarity of intelligence to form, and the aptitude of rational will to power.

2. He says that they differed in these respects. Those rational essences, then, which were persons and spirits, simple in nature and immortal in life, are rightly understood to have possessed differing subtlety of essence, differing clarity of wisdom, and differing aptitude of choice.

3. He shows by the likeness of bodies that this is so *. Just as bodies differ in essence, form, and weight—for some have a better and worthier essence and form than others, while some are lighter and more agile than others—so we must believe that those spiritual natures, in keeping with their purity and excellence, received differences in essence, form, and capacity at the beginning of their creation. By these, according to God's wisdom, some were constituted higher and others lower, with greater gifts bestowed on some and lesser on others, so that those who then excelled others in natural goods would afterward also preside over them through gifts of grace. For those created more subtle by nature and more clear-sighted in wisdom were also endowed with greater gifts of grace and placed above their inferiors, by the wisdom of God, who orders all things with just moderation.

4. In what respect the difference in the faculty of choice is to be considered *. In the very faculty of choice, difference is to be observed according to the differing strength of nature and the differing force of knowledge and understanding.

5. That neither lesser subtlety of nature entails weakness, nor lesser knowledge of wisdom ignorance, nor inferior freedom necessity *. And just as differing vigor and subtlety of nature do not bring weakness, and lesser knowledge of wisdom does not bring ignorance, so inferior freedom imposes no necessity of willing upon choice.

Chapter 3 (15).

What angels possessed in common and equally. And just as the angels differed in the respects mentioned, so they also possessed certain things in common and equally. That they were spirits, incorruptible and immortal, was common and equal to all. But in subtlety of essence, intelligence of wisdom, and freedom of will they differed. Only he who made all things in weight, number, and measure could comprehend and assess these intelligible distinctions among invisible natures 1.

Chapter 4 (16).

1. Whether angels were created good or evil, just or unjust, and whether there was any interval between creation and the Fall. This too seems worthy of inquiry, and is often asked by many: whether angels were created good or evil, just or unjust, and whether there was any interval between creation and the Fall, or whether they fell without delay at the very beginning of creation.

2. The opinion of some who say that angels were created in evil and fell without any interval *. For some 2 thought that the angels who fell were created evil, and had not turned to evil by free choice but had been made evil by God; they also held that there was no interval between creation and the Fall, but that they apostatized from the beginning, while the others were created fully blessed.

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3. Those who support their opinion with the authority of Augustine, On Genesis, 1, who says: «It may rightly be thought that the devil fell at the beginning of time, and never lived at peace and in blessedness with the holy angels, but apostatized at once. Hence the Lord says 2: He was a murderer from the beginning, and did not stand in the truth, so that we may understand that he did not stand in the truth from the moment he was created—though he would have stood had he wished to stand». — The same author says in the same work 3: «It is rightly thought, he says, that the devil fell from the very beginning of time or of his existence, and never stood in the truth. Hence some think that he was not turned to this evil by free choice, but was created in it, though by God, in accordance with the saying of blessed Job 4: This is the beginning of God's handiwork, which God made that he might be mocked by his angels. And the Prophet says 5: This dragon, whom you formed to be mocked by him, as though he had been made evil, envious, and a devil from the first, and had not been corrupted by his own will».

4. Those who say that the angels who fell were created evil and fell without delay use these and other testimonies. — They assert, however, on the authority of Augustine, that those who persevered were created perfect and blessed; for Augustine, On Genesis 6, says that heaven signifies «the spiritual creature, which from the beginning when it was made has always been perfect and blessed».

5. The opinion of others is probable: they say that all the angels were created good and were good at the very beginning of creation—that is, without fault—and were just—that is, innocent—but not just in the sense of exercising the virtues. For they had not yet been endowed with the virtues, which were added to those who stood firm in their confirmation through grace; while others grew proud through free choice and therefore fell. — They also say that there was a little interval between creation and the Fall or confirmation. During that brief time all were good, not through the exercise of free choice but by the benefit of creation. They were such as could stand—that is, not fall—by the goods of creation, and could fall by free choice. For they could sin or not sin, but could not advance to the merit of life unless grace were added; and this was added to some in their confirmation.

6. They confirm that this is so by authority *. — Augustine *. To confirm this they use the testimony of Augustine, who, On Genesis 1, says that the angelic nature was first created without form and called heaven, then formed and called light, when it turned toward the Creator, cleaving to him in perfect love. Hence it was first said 2: In the beginning God created heaven and earth; and afterward it was added 3: God said, “Let there be light,” and light was made, because first the creation of the unformed spiritual nature is described, and afterward its formation.

7. They establish the same by reason *. Reason, too, opposes those who say that the angels were created evil. For the best Creator could not be the author of evil. Thus all that was from him in them was wholly good, and all was good because all was from him. In this way it is proved that all the angels were good when they were first made, with the goodness received by a nature at its beginning.

8. He brings forward Augustine's proof against those who say the angels were made evil; he explains the words in Job that they adduced in their own support. Therefore Augustine, refuting the opinion of those who think the angels were created evil, proves by authority and reason that they were created good; and he explains how the preceding words of blessed Job, which they adduced in their own support, are to be understood. He says in this way, On Genesis 1: «God, he says, made all things very good 2»; therefore he made the nature of angels good. And «since it is unjust for God to condemn anyone without merit for what he created, we must believe that it is not the nature but the evil will that is to be punished; nor is his nature signified when it is said 3: This is the beginning of God's handiwork, and so forth, but rather the airy body that God fitted to such a will; or God's own ordering, by which he made him useful to the good even against his will; or the angel's very making, since although God foresaw that he would become evil by his will, he nevertheless made him, foreseeing how much good he would bring about through his own goodness. Thus he is called God's handiwork because, although God knew that he would become evil by his will and harm the good, he nevertheless created him so that he might benefit the good. He did this so that the devil might be mocked. For he is mocked when his temptation advances the saints; just as evil people (whom God foresaw would become evil, yet created for the benefit of the saints) are mocked when the saints make progress through their temptation. But he is the beginning because he precedes others in the antiquity and primacy of evil. This mockery is inflicted on evil angels and human beings by the holy angels, because God subjects evil angels and evil human beings to them, so that they can do not as much as they strive to do, but as much as they are permitted». — See, then, how clearly he shows how the aforesaid words of Job are to be understood, and asserts that the angelic nature was created good.

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Number 4. Augustine's authority is found in the prologue of the Ordinary Gloss on Genesis (in Lyra, I, 22d; v 1c). — Numbers 5–7 refer to the opinion of the author of the Summa sententiarum, II, 2–3 (PL 171, 1108 C–1110 C; 176, 82 C–83 C), from which some words are repeated in numbers 5–6; and to Hugh, De sacramentis, I, 5, 19–20 (PL 176, 254 B–255 A), whose argument appears in number 7 (ibid., 254 C). See also Robert Pullus, Sentences, II, 5 (PL 186, 724 B).

9. He explains how the Lord's preceding words are to be understood, plainly teaching that the angels were created good and fell after creation. Next he explains how the Lord's words, which he cited above 4, are to be understood; here he also clarifies his own preceding words, plainly teaching that the angels were created good and fell after creation, following a certain brief interval. He says 6: «The claim that the devil never stood in the truth, never led a blessed life, but fell from the beginning, must not be understood to mean that he was created evil by the good God—for he would be said not to have fallen from the beginning: he did not fall if he was made such, that is, evil. From what, then, would he have fallen? Thus, after first being made, he at once turned away from the truth, taking delight in his own power; he did not taste the sweetness of the blessed life, which he scorned not because he had received it, but because by refusing to receive it he lost it. Therefore he could not have foreknown his own fall, since wisdom is the fruit of piety 1. As soon as he was made, however, he fell—not from what he had received, but from what he would have received had he been willing to be subject to God». Here he plainly declares that the angels were created good and fell after creation.

10. There was therefore some interval, though a very brief one. Origen confirms this when he says in his Commentary on Ezekiel 2: «The serpent, the enemy opposed to truth, was not so from the beginning; nor did he at once walk on his breast and belly 3. Just as Adam and Eve did not sin at once, so the serpent was once not a serpent, while he dwelt in the paradise of delights. For God did not make evil». See how plainly he says that the serpent fell after creation, with an interval in between.

11. Therefore those words 4 seem to be understood in this way 5: He was a murderer from the beginning, or a liar—that is, immediately after the beginning, when he promised himself equality with God 6 and killed himself, who is called a man in the Gospel 7. And he did not stand in the truth because he was not in it, but apostatized at the beginning of time—that is, immediately after the beginning of time. — The saying may also be understood this way: From the beginning he was a murderer or a liar—that is, from the time human beings were created, whom he hurled into death through envy and deceitfully seduced 8. — From what has been said, then, it is clear that all the angels were created good, and that after creation some fell from the good they would have possessed had they persevered.

⁷ dampnavit OX, corrected to damneum in the transposition of NRX. 6 esse] esse omitted in M, interlinear in R, in the margin of W. 15 luduntur] luduntur LMX (Gloss), dicitur NR (interlinear) VW. 21 asseruit] asserunt MN.]

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Numbers 8–9: Augustine, Ordinary Gloss on Gen. 3:1 (Lyra I, 41a; v 25b–c).

Chapter 5 (17).

That the angels had three kinds of knowledge before the Fall or confirmation. Here it is usually asked what knowledge they had before the Fall or confirmation. — They had three kinds of natural knowledge: they knew what they had been made, by whom they had been made, and with whom they had been made. They also had some knowledge of good and evil, understanding what they ought to seek or reject.

Chapter 6 (18).

Whether they had any love of God or of one another. It is also usually asked whether they had any love of God or of one another. — To this it may be said that they had natural love, as they had memory, understanding, and ingenuity, by which they loved God and themselves to some degree; yet by this they did not merit.