Sentences, Books I–II

Peter Lombard

Sentences, Books I–II

Peter Lombard (1100–1160)

Sententiae in IV Libris Distinctae, libri I–II

First published 1971

Books I–II of Peter Lombard’s Sentences, from the 1971 third edition of the Quaracchi text, with English translation.


Book I: Book I — On the Mystery of the Trinity

Distinctio I: Distinction I

Distinctio II: Distinction II

Distinctio III: Distinction III

Distinctio IV: Distinction IV

Distinctio V: Distinction V

Distinctio VI: Distinction VI

Distinctio VII: Distinction VII

Distinctio VIII: Distinction VIII

Distinctio IX: Distinction IX

Distinctio X: Distinction X

Distinctio XI: Distinction XI

Distinctio XII: Distinction XII

Distinctio XIII: Distinction XIII

Distinctio XIV: Distinction XIV

Distinctio XV: Distinction XV

Distinctio XVI: Distinction XVI

Distinctio XVII: Distinction XVII

Distinctio XVIII: Distinction XVIII

Distinctio XIX: Distinction XIX

Distinctio XX: Distinction XX

Distinctio XXI: Distinction XXI

Distinctio XXII: Distinction XXII

Distinctio XXIII: Distinction XXIII

Distinctio XXIV: Distinction XXIV

Distinctio XXV: Distinction XXV

Distinctio XXVI: Distinction XXVI

Distinctio XXVII: Distinction XXVII

Distinctio XXVIII: Distinction XXVIII

Distinctio XXIX: Distinction XXIX

Distinctio XXX: Distinction XXX

Distinctio XXXI: Distinction XXXI

Distinctio XXXII: Distinction XXXII

Distinctio XXXIII: Distinction XXXIII

Distinctio XXXIV: Distinction XXXIV

Distinctio XXXV: Distinction XXXV

Distinctio XXXVI: Distinction XXXVI

Distinctio XXXVII: Distinction XXXVII

Distinctio XXXVIII: Distinction XXXVIII

Distinctio XXXIX: Distinction XXXIX

Distinctio XL: Distinction XL

Distinctio XLI: Distinction XLI

Distinctio XLII: Distinction XLII

Distinctio XLIII: Distinction XLIII

Distinctio XLIV: Distinction XLIV

Distinctio XLV: Distinction XLV

Distinctio XLVI: Distinction XLVI

Distinctio XLVII: Distinction XLVII

Distinctio XLVIII: Distinction XLVIII

Book II: Book II — On the creation and formation of corporeal and spiritual things, and other matters concerning them

On the creation and formation of corporeal and spiritual things, and on many other matters pertaining to them

What pertains to knowledge of the divine unity and Trinity, though only in part, we have diligently treated, as far as we could. Now let us turn to the consideration of creatures.

Distinctio I: Distinction I

Chapter 1.

1. He shows that there is one principle of things, not several, as some have supposed. — Bede. In recounting the creation of things, Scripture shows at its very beginning that God is the Creator and the beginning of time and of all creatures, visible and invisible, saying: “In the beginning God created” heaven and earth.” For by these words Moses, inspired by the Spirit of God, reports that the world was made by God the Creator in one beginning, refuting the error of certain people who supposed there were several principles without a beginning.

“the prologue of Book II begins” is prefixed in T. 4–6 “Which … let us turn” is transposed to the end of Book I in BCNX. 6 “let us turn”] “the prologue ends” is added in T. 10 Beda in BOT, omitted in the others.]

2. Strabo: Plato said there were three principles. — Plato indeed thought there were three beginnings: God, the exemplar, and matter; these were uncreated and without beginning, and God was like a craftsman, not a creator.

Chapter 2.

Why God is properly called Creator, and what it means to create and to make. A creator is one who makes something out of nothing, and properly speaking to create is to make something out of nothing. To make, however, means not only to produce something out of nothing, but also to produce it from matter. Thus a human being or an angel is said to make certain things, but not to create them; such a one is called a maker or craftsman, but not a creator. This name properly belongs to God alone, who makes some things from nothing and others from something. He is therefore Creator, Artificer, and Maker. But he reserved the name “creation” properly for himself, while sharing the others with creatures. In Scripture, however, “creator” is often used to mean “maker,” and “to create” to mean “to make,” without distinction of meaning.

Chapter 3.

1. The words “make,” “act,” and the like are not said of God in the same sense in which they are said of creatures. We should know, however, that the words “make,” “create,” “act,” and other such words cannot be said of God in the same sense in which they are said of creatures. When we say that he makes something, we do not understand that any motion in acting or any suffering in laboring is present in him, as usually happens to us. Rather, we signify a new effect of his eternal will: that something begins to exist anew by his eternal will.

2. In what sense God is said to make something. When he is said to make something, it is as if we said that something comes about or exists anew according to, or through, his will: nothing new happens in him, but something new comes to be as it had been in his eternal will, without any motion or change in him. We, by contrast, are said to be changed through working, because we are moved; for we do nothing without motion. — God is therefore said to make or do something because he is the cause of things that newly exist, as new things that did not exist before begin to be by his will, without any activity of his own. Thus an act cannot properly be predicated of him, since every act consists in motion, and there is no motion in God.

3. He explains by comparison. Just as certain things come to be through the sun’s heat, although no motion or change takes place in the sun or in its heat, so new things receive being through God’s will without any change in the Author, who is the one and only principle of all things.

4. Aristotle’s three principles. — Strabo. Aristotle, however, said there were two principles, matter and form, and a third, called the “operative” principle; he also said the world always exists and has always existed.

5. He teaches what is catholic. — Bede. The Holy Spirit, then, dispelling the error of these and similar views and teaching the discipline of truth, “signifies that God created the world at the beginning of time and existed eternally before time,” commending his eternity and omnipotence, for whom to will to make something is to make it, since, as we said above, new things come to exist through his will and goodness. — Augustine in the Enchiridion.

aestimavit BCLTVWX. 8 The heading is omitted in MRVW. 11 vel] et LNT.]

caro factum BCX. || Beda is omitted in MRVW.]

Let us believe, then, that “the cause of created things, heavenly or earthly, visible or invisible, is none other than the goodness of the Creator, who is the one and true God.” His goodness is so great that, though supremely good and eternally blessed with his own beatitude, he willed others to share in it. He saw that it could be shared and yet not diminished at all. Thus, by goodness alone and not by necessity, he willed to communicate to others the good that he himself was and by which he was blessed, because it belongs to the supremely good to will to benefit others, and the almighty cannot be harmed.

Chapter 4.

1. Why a rational creature was made: so that someone might be understood to share in beatitude, and the fuller this is possessed, the fuller the understanding. Since beatitude is of no avail without understanding, and the more understanding one has, the more fully one would understand the highest good and enjoy it by possessing it, God made a rational creature to understand the highest good, to love it by understanding it, to possess it by loving it, and thus to enjoy it. — 2. How the rational creature was divided. He divided it in this way: one part remained in its own purity and was not united to a body, namely the angels; the other part was joined to a body, namely the human soul. Thus the rational creature was divided into incorporeal and corporeal: the incorporeal is called an angel, the corporeal a human being, subsisting from a rational soul and flesh. The first cause of the rational creature’s condition, then, was God’s goodness.

3. Why a human being or an angel was created. If it is asked why a human being or an angel was created, a brief answer can be given: because of God’s goodness. Hence Augustine in On Christian Doctrine: “Because God is good, we exist; and insofar as we exist, we are good.”

4. For what purpose the rational creature was created. If it is asked for what purpose the rational creature was created, the answer is: to praise God, to serve him, and to enjoy him. In these things the creature makes progress, not God. For God is perfect and full of supreme goodness, and can neither increase nor diminish. The fact, then, that the rational creature was made by God must be referred to the Creator’s goodness and the creature’s benefit.

5. The briefest answer when one asks why or for what purpose the rational creature was made. When, then, it is asked why or for what purpose the rational creature was made, the briefest answer is: because of God’s goodness and for its own benefit. For it is beneficial to serve God and enjoy him. An angel or a human being is therefore said to have been made for God—not because God, the Creator and supremely blessed one, needed the service of either, since he has no need of our goods—but so that the creature might serve and enjoy him, for serving him is to reign. In this the servant benefits, not the one who is served.

6. Just as the human being was made to serve God, so the world was made to serve the human being. Just as the human being was made for God, that is, to serve him, so the world was made for the human being, namely to serve him. The human being was therefore placed in the middle, so that service would be rendered to him and he himself would serve; that he might receive from both sides, and all things might contribute to his good: both the service he receives and the service he renders. God willed the human being to serve him in such a way that this service would help the human servant, not God; and he willed the world to serve the human being, so that the human being might likewise benefit from it.

7. How all things are ours. All the good of the human being consisted both in what was made for him and in the purpose for which he himself was made. — Augustine. For, as the Apostle says, all things are ours: things above, equal to us, and below us. The things above are ours for enjoyment, namely God the Trinity; those equal to us are ours for companionship, namely the angels, who, though now superior to us, will be equal in the future. They are ours even now, because they are for our use, just as the property of masters is said to belong to servants—not as their possession, but because it is for their use. Angels are also said in certain passages of Scripture to serve us, since they are sent out to minister on our behalf.

videt BCX, videri OP, corrected by P. 7 alii] aliis CRTV. 8 noceri] CMOPT, nocere alii transposed in P, posse OP. 13 et²] ac MNRVW. 15 The heading is omitted in MRW. 24 bonitatem eius transposed in OPR. || eius] dei LT.]

ipsius P, illi N, omitted in M. || ipsi est transposed in CLRT. || Factus] est added in MOT, but deleted in MO. 8 dicitur esse is omitted in T. 12 Deo serviret transposed in BCX. || ut² is omitted in OP. 22 scilicet] et added in LRW.]

Chapter 5.

How Scripture sometimes says that the human being was made to repair the fall of the angels. Scripture also sometimes says that the human being was made to repair the angelic fall. This should not be understood as though the human being would not have been made had the angel not sinned; rather, this was one among several chief causes. — The things above and equal to us are therefore ours; the things below are ours as well, because they were made to serve us.

Chapter 6.

1. Why the soul is united to the body. It is also customary to ask why the soul was united to the body, since it would seem to be of greater dignity if it had remained apart from the body.

2. First reason. A first answer is that God willed it, and no cause of his will should be sought.

3. Second reason. A second answer is that God willed it to be united to the body so that, in the human condition, he might show a new example of the blessed union between God and the spirit, in which God is loved “with one’s whole heart” and seen “face to face.” For the creature might think it could not be united to its Creator so closely as to love and know him with its whole mind, unless it saw a spirit—the most excellent creature—joined in such great love to what is lowest, namely flesh from the earth, that it would not be compelled to wish to leave it, as the Apostle shows, saying: “We do not wish to be unclothed, but to be further clothed.” This shows that the created spirit is united to the uncreated Spirit by an ineffable love.

4. As an example, then, of the future fellowship that was to be perfected in the glorification of the rational spirit with God, he joined the soul to bodily clothing and earthly dwelling places, and made the clayey substance quicken with the sense of life. Thus the human being might know that if God could join the very different natures of body and soul in one bond and such friendship, it would certainly not be impossible for him to raise the lowliness of the rational creature, though far inferior, to share in his glory. — Since, then, the rational spirit was humbled in part, as an example, to share in an earthly body, divine providence added that later it should be raised with that same body, now glorified, to the fellowship of those who had remained in their purity. Thus what the created being had received to a lesser degree through the dispensation of its Creator, it would later receive through his grace when glorified. Accordingly, God the Creator, arranging rational spirits by varied lots according to the choice of his will, established a dwelling in heaven above for those he had left in their purity, and a dwelling on earth below for those he had joined to earthly bodies. He set before both the rule of obedience, so that the former would not fall from where they were, and the latter would ascend from where they were to where they were not. God therefore made the human being from a twofold substance, fashioning the body from earth and making the soul from nothing.

5. Third reason. The souls were also united to bodies so that, serving God in them, they might merit a greater crown.

6. After treating the mystery of the Trinity, we must treat the threefold creation, beginning with the nobler part, namely the angelic. From what has been said it is clear that the rational creature was divided into angelic and human: one is wholly spiritual, namely the angelic; the other is partly spiritual and partly corporeal, namely the human. — Since, then, we must treat these things—that is, spiritual and corporeal creation, rational and nonrational—we should first discuss what is rational and spiritual, namely the angels, so that our reason may turn from contemplating the Creator to knowing the noblest creature; then it may descend to consider corporeal creation, both that which is rational and that which is not, so that the mystery of the uncreated Trinity may be followed by instruction about the threefold creation and what is joined to it and contingent.

4. The Glossa ordinaria on Gen. II, question 33 (PL 35, 1348); Glossa ordinaria on this passage (Lyra VI, 20a). De diligendo Deo (possibly by Alcher of Clairvaux), chs. 2–3 (PL 40, 849f.).

Distinctio II: Distinction II

Chapter 1 (7).

1. What should be considered concerning the angels. The following matters should first be considered concerning angelic nature: when it was created, where, and what it was like when first made; then what it became through the turning away of some and the turning toward God of others; and also something should be said about its excellence, orders, differences of gifts, offices, names, and many other matters.

2. He first states when the angels were made, since authorities seem to conflict on this point. Certain authorities seem to imply that the angels were created before every other creature. Hence the statement, “Wisdom was created before all things,” is understood of angelic nature, which Scripture often calls life, wisdom, and light. For the Wisdom who is God was not created: the Son is the begotten Wisdom of the Father, neither made nor created; and the whole Trinity is one Wisdom, neither made nor created, neither begotten nor proceeding. This statement must therefore be understood of angelic life, of which Scripture says when it was made: “before all things.” — But another Scripture says: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth”; and the Prophet says: “At the beginning, O Lord, you founded the earth, and the heavens are the work of your hands.” — These assertions seem to give rise to a contradiction. For if Wisdom was created “before all things,” everything else seems to have been made after it; thus heaven and earth seem to have been made after it, and it before heaven and earth. Again, if “in the beginning God created heaven and earth,” nothing was made before heaven and earth, nor was Wisdom itself made before them. Since these statements therefore seem opposed, and it is not permissible to think that there is any contradiction in divine Scripture, let us seek the true understanding.

3. He teaches what should be held, distinguishing the foregoing authorities. It seems, then, that we should hold that spiritual creation, namely the angelic, and corporeal creation were made at the same time, as we may understand Solomon’s statement: “He who lives forever created all things together,” that is, spiritual and corporeal nature. Thus the angels were not created earlier in time than the corporeal matter of the four elements. Yet “Wisdom was created before all things,” because although it does not precede in time, it does precede in dignity.

4. He confirms by an authority that corporeal and spiritual creation were made together. Augustine plainly shows in On the Literal Meaning of Genesis that spiritual and corporeal creation are understood by “heaven and earth,” and that these were created “in the beginning,” that is, at the beginning of time, or “in the beginning” because they were made first.

Chapter 2 (8).

Nothing was made before heaven and earth, not even time: they were created with time, but not from time. For nothing was made before them. Nor was time made before spiritual—namely angelic—nature, or before corporeal nature, namely the confused matter of the four elements. These were created with time, not from time or within time; just as time itself was not created within time, since there was no time before heaven and earth existed. — Hence Augustine says in On the Trinity that God was Lord before time existed, and did not begin to be Lord in time, because he was Lord of time when time began to exist. Nor did time itself begin to exist in time, since there was no time before time began.

Chapter 3 (9).

1. Corporeal and spiritual creation began together with time and the world. Corporeal and spiritual creation were therefore made together with time and the world; the angelic creature did not exist before the world, since, as Augustine says, “no creature exists before the ages, but from the ages,” with which it began.

2. Jerome seems to contradict this, as though angels existed before time. Jerome, however, seems to think otherwise in his commentary on the Epistle to Titus, saying: “Six thousand years of our time have not yet been completed. How many eternities before this, how many times, how many beginnings of ages, should we suppose there were, during which Angels, Thrones, Dominations, and the other orders served God without the changes and measurements of time, and at God’s command subsisted?” Certain people, adhering to these words, said that worldly time began with the world, but that before the world there existed eternal time without mutability; in it, they maintained, the angels subsisted and served God immutably and timelessly, at his command.

3. We, however, approve more readily what was said earlier, as far as our understanding allows, while still revering the mysteries in which nothing should be asserted rashly. We think that Jerome said this not as his own view, but while reporting the opinion of others.

Chapter 4 (10).

1. Where the angels were immediately after their creation: in the empyrean, which was made at once and filled with angels. It has already been shown when angelic nature was created; now we must consider where it was made.

2. The testimony of certain authorities clearly shows that before the fall the angels were in heaven, and that some fell from there through pride, while those who did not sin remained there. Hence the Lord says in the Gospel: “I saw Satan falling from heaven like lightning.” Here “heaven” does not mean the firmament made on the second day, but the bright heaven called the empyrean—that is, fiery—not from heat but from brightness. It was made at once, filled with angels, and is above the firmament.

3. Some interpreters of sacred Scripture also wish the empyrean to be understood by the name “heaven” where Scripture says, “In the beginning God created heaven and earth.” — Strabo. “Here,” Strabo says, “heaven does not mean the visible firmament, but the empyrean, that is, the fiery or intellectual heaven, called so not from burning but from brightness. It was made at once and filled with angels. Hence: ‘When the morning stars praised me’,” and so forth. — Bede. Bede also says of this: “As soon as this heaven above, separated from the revolving world, was created, it was filled with the holy angels, whom the Lord testifies were created in the beginning together with heaven and earth, saying: ‘Where were you when the morning stars praised me and all the sons of God shouted for joy?’ He calls the same angels morning stars and sons of God. For the heaven in which the luminaries were placed” was made not in the beginning but on the second day. — From these statements it is clear that all the angels were in the empyrean before the fall of some of them, and that the angels were created at the same time as the empyrean heaven and the unformed matter of all corporeal things.

Chapter 5 (11).

The matter of visible things and the nature of invisible things were created together; each was unformed in one respect and formed in another. The matter of visible things and the nature of invisible things were created together, and each was unformed in one respect and formed in another. For just as the confused and mixed matter of corporeal things, called “chaos” in Greek, had at that first beginning of creation the form of confusion, but lacked the form of distinction and separation until it was formed later and received distinct kinds, so spiritual and angelic nature at its creation was formed according to its natural state, yet lacked the form it was later to receive through love and turning toward its Creator; without that form it was unformed. — Hence Augustine, explaining the foregoing words of Genesis in various ways, says that “heaven” means “the unformed nature of spiritual life, as it can exist in itself, not turned toward the Creator by whom it is formed; and earth means corporeal matter without any of the qualities that appear in formed matter.”

Chapter 6 (12).

How Lucifer can say according to Isaiah, “I will ascend into heaven,” and so on, when he was already in heaven. It is customary to ask here: if the angels were in the empyrean heaven as soon as they were made, how can Lucifer, as we read in Isaiah, say, “I will ascend into heaven and exalt my throne, and I will be like the Most High”? — Solution. There he calls God’s loftiness “heaven,” to which he wished to make himself equal. “I will ascend into heaven” therefore means, “I will rise to equality with God.”

Distinctio III: Distinction III

Chapter 1 (13).

1. What the angels were like when made: four attributes were assigned to them at the very beginning of their creation. It has now been shown where the angels were immediately after they were created; next we must investigate what they were like at the very beginning of their creation.

2. Four things, it seems, were assigned to the angels at the beginning of their existence: a simple essence, that is, indivisible and immaterial; individual distinction; understanding, memory, and will or love, through reason naturally implanted in them; and free choice, that is, the free ability to incline the will either to good or to evil. For by free choice they could, without violence or compulsion, turn of their own will in either direction.

Chapter 2 (14).

1. Whether all angels were equal in three respects, namely, in essence, wisdom, and freedom of choice. Here it must be considered whether all were equal in spiritual substance, rational wisdom, and freedom of choice, which were present in them all: so that the first consideration concerns substance, the second form, and the third power. For person is substance, wisdom is form, and choice is power; and the subtlety of nature pertains to substance, the clarity of intelligence to form, and the aptitude of rational will to power.

2. He says that they differed in these respects. Those rational essences, then, which were persons and spirits, simple in nature and immortal in life, are rightly understood to have possessed differing subtlety of essence, differing clarity of wisdom, and differing aptitude of choice.

3. He shows by the likeness of bodies that this is so *. Just as bodies differ in essence, form, and weight—for some have a better and worthier essence and form than others, while some are lighter and more agile than others—so we must believe that those spiritual natures, in keeping with their purity and excellence, received differences in essence, form, and capacity at the beginning of their creation. By these, according to God's wisdom, some were constituted higher and others lower, with greater gifts bestowed on some and lesser on others, so that those who then excelled others in natural goods would afterward also preside over them through gifts of grace. For those created more subtle by nature and more clear-sighted in wisdom were also endowed with greater gifts of grace and placed above their inferiors, by the wisdom of God, who orders all things with just moderation.

4. In what respect the difference in the faculty of choice is to be considered *. In the very faculty of choice, difference is to be observed according to the differing strength of nature and the differing force of knowledge and understanding.

5. That neither lesser subtlety of nature entails weakness, nor lesser knowledge of wisdom ignorance, nor inferior freedom necessity *. And just as differing vigor and subtlety of nature do not bring weakness, and lesser knowledge of wisdom does not bring ignorance, so inferior freedom imposes no necessity of willing upon choice.

Chapter 3 (15).

What angels possessed in common and equally. And just as the angels differed in the respects mentioned, so they also possessed certain things in common and equally. That they were spirits, incorruptible and immortal, was common and equal to all. But in subtlety of essence, intelligence of wisdom, and freedom of will they differed. Only he who made all things in weight, number, and measure could comprehend and assess these intelligible distinctions among invisible natures 1.

Chapter 4 (16).

1. Whether angels were created good or evil, just or unjust, and whether there was any interval between creation and the Fall. This too seems worthy of inquiry, and is often asked by many: whether angels were created good or evil, just or unjust, and whether there was any interval between creation and the Fall, or whether they fell without delay at the very beginning of creation.

2. The opinion of some who say that angels were created in evil and fell without any interval *. For some 2 thought that the angels who fell were created evil, and had not turned to evil by free choice but had been made evil by God; they also held that there was no interval between creation and the Fall, but that they apostatized from the beginning, while the others were created fully blessed.

3. Those who support their opinion with the authority of Augustine, On Genesis, 1, who says: «It may rightly be thought that the devil fell at the beginning of time, and never lived at peace and in blessedness with the holy angels, but apostatized at once. Hence the Lord says 2: He was a murderer from the beginning, and did not stand in the truth, so that we may understand that he did not stand in the truth from the moment he was created—though he would have stood had he wished to stand». — The same author says in the same work 3: «It is rightly thought, he says, that the devil fell from the very beginning of time or of his existence, and never stood in the truth. Hence some think that he was not turned to this evil by free choice, but was created in it, though by God, in accordance with the saying of blessed Job 4: This is the beginning of God's handiwork, which God made that he might be mocked by his angels. And the Prophet says 5: This dragon, whom you formed to be mocked by him, as though he had been made evil, envious, and a devil from the first, and had not been corrupted by his own will».

4. Those who say that the angels who fell were created evil and fell without delay use these and other testimonies. — They assert, however, on the authority of Augustine, that those who persevered were created perfect and blessed; for Augustine, On Genesis 6, says that heaven signifies «the spiritual creature, which from the beginning when it was made has always been perfect and blessed».

5. The opinion of others is probable: they say that all the angels were created good and were good at the very beginning of creation—that is, without fault—and were just—that is, innocent—but not just in the sense of exercising the virtues. For they had not yet been endowed with the virtues, which were added to those who stood firm in their confirmation through grace; while others grew proud through free choice and therefore fell. — They also say that there was a little interval between creation and the Fall or confirmation. During that brief time all were good, not through the exercise of free choice but by the benefit of creation. They were such as could stand—that is, not fall—by the goods of creation, and could fall by free choice. For they could sin or not sin, but could not advance to the merit of life unless grace were added; and this was added to some in their confirmation.

6. They confirm that this is so by authority *. — Augustine *. To confirm this they use the testimony of Augustine, who, On Genesis 1, says that the angelic nature was first created without form and called heaven, then formed and called light, when it turned toward the Creator, cleaving to him in perfect love. Hence it was first said 2: In the beginning God created heaven and earth; and afterward it was added 3: God said, “Let there be light,” and light was made, because first the creation of the unformed spiritual nature is described, and afterward its formation.

7. They establish the same by reason *. Reason, too, opposes those who say that the angels were created evil. For the best Creator could not be the author of evil. Thus all that was from him in them was wholly good, and all was good because all was from him. In this way it is proved that all the angels were good when they were first made, with the goodness received by a nature at its beginning.

8. He brings forward Augustine's proof against those who say the angels were made evil; he explains the words in Job that they adduced in their own support. Therefore Augustine, refuting the opinion of those who think the angels were created evil, proves by authority and reason that they were created good; and he explains how the preceding words of blessed Job, which they adduced in their own support, are to be understood. He says in this way, On Genesis 1: «God, he says, made all things very good 2»; therefore he made the nature of angels good. And «since it is unjust for God to condemn anyone without merit for what he created, we must believe that it is not the nature but the evil will that is to be punished; nor is his nature signified when it is said 3: This is the beginning of God's handiwork, and so forth, but rather the airy body that God fitted to such a will; or God's own ordering, by which he made him useful to the good even against his will; or the angel's very making, since although God foresaw that he would become evil by his will, he nevertheless made him, foreseeing how much good he would bring about through his own goodness. Thus he is called God's handiwork because, although God knew that he would become evil by his will and harm the good, he nevertheless created him so that he might benefit the good. He did this so that the devil might be mocked. For he is mocked when his temptation advances the saints; just as evil people (whom God foresaw would become evil, yet created for the benefit of the saints) are mocked when the saints make progress through their temptation. But he is the beginning because he precedes others in the antiquity and primacy of evil. This mockery is inflicted on evil angels and human beings by the holy angels, because God subjects evil angels and evil human beings to them, so that they can do not as much as they strive to do, but as much as they are permitted». — See, then, how clearly he shows how the aforesaid words of Job are to be understood, and asserts that the angelic nature was created good.

Number 4. Augustine's authority is found in the prologue of the Ordinary Gloss on Genesis (in Lyra, I, 22d; v 1c). — Numbers 5–7 refer to the opinion of the author of the Summa sententiarum, II, 2–3 (PL 171, 1108 C–1110 C; 176, 82 C–83 C), from which some words are repeated in numbers 5–6; and to Hugh, De sacramentis, I, 5, 19–20 (PL 176, 254 B–255 A), whose argument appears in number 7 (ibid., 254 C). See also Robert Pullus, Sentences, II, 5 (PL 186, 724 B).

9. He explains how the Lord's preceding words are to be understood, plainly teaching that the angels were created good and fell after creation. Next he explains how the Lord's words, which he cited above 4, are to be understood; here he also clarifies his own preceding words, plainly teaching that the angels were created good and fell after creation, following a certain brief interval. He says 6: «The claim that the devil never stood in the truth, never led a blessed life, but fell from the beginning, must not be understood to mean that he was created evil by the good God—for he would be said not to have fallen from the beginning: he did not fall if he was made such, that is, evil. From what, then, would he have fallen? Thus, after first being made, he at once turned away from the truth, taking delight in his own power; he did not taste the sweetness of the blessed life, which he scorned not because he had received it, but because by refusing to receive it he lost it. Therefore he could not have foreknown his own fall, since wisdom is the fruit of piety 1. As soon as he was made, however, he fell—not from what he had received, but from what he would have received had he been willing to be subject to God». Here he plainly declares that the angels were created good and fell after creation.

10. There was therefore some interval, though a very brief one. Origen confirms this when he says in his Commentary on Ezekiel 2: «The serpent, the enemy opposed to truth, was not so from the beginning; nor did he at once walk on his breast and belly 3. Just as Adam and Eve did not sin at once, so the serpent was once not a serpent, while he dwelt in the paradise of delights. For God did not make evil». See how plainly he says that the serpent fell after creation, with an interval in between.

11. Therefore those words 4 seem to be understood in this way 5: He was a murderer from the beginning, or a liar—that is, immediately after the beginning, when he promised himself equality with God 6 and killed himself, who is called a man in the Gospel 7. And he did not stand in the truth because he was not in it, but apostatized at the beginning of time—that is, immediately after the beginning of time. — The saying may also be understood this way: From the beginning he was a murderer or a liar—that is, from the time human beings were created, whom he hurled into death through envy and deceitfully seduced 8. — From what has been said, then, it is clear that all the angels were created good, and that after creation some fell from the good they would have possessed had they persevered.

dampnavit OX, corrected to damneum in the transposition of NRX. 6 esse] esse omitted in M, interlinear in R, in the margin of W. 15 luduntur] luduntur LMX (Gloss), dicitur NR (interlinear) VW. 21 asseruit] asserunt MN.]

Numbers 8–9: Augustine, Ordinary Gloss on Gen. 3:1 (Lyra I, 41a; v 25b–c).

Chapter 5 (17).

That the angels had three kinds of knowledge before the Fall or confirmation. Here it is usually asked what knowledge they had before the Fall or confirmation. — They had three kinds of natural knowledge: they knew what they had been made, by whom they had been made, and with whom they had been made. They also had some knowledge of good and evil, understanding what they ought to seek or reject.

Chapter 6 (18).

Whether they had any love of God or of one another. It is also usually asked whether they had any love of God or of one another. — To this it may be said that they had natural love, as they had memory, understanding, and ingenuity, by which they loved God and themselves to some degree; yet by this they did not merit.

Distinctio IV: Distinction IV

Single chapter (19).

1. Whether God created the angels perfect and blessed, or wretched and imperfect. After this we must consider whether God created the angels perfect and blessed, or wretched and imperfect. — To this it may be said that they were created neither in blessedness nor in wretchedness. They could not have been wretched before sin, for wretchedness comes from sin 1; if there had been no sin, there would have been no wretchedness. Nor were those who fell ever blessed, since they were ignorant of their fate, that is, of their future sin and punishment. For if they had foreknown their fall, either they wished to avoid it but could not, and so were wretched; or they could have avoided it but did not wish to, and so were foolish and malicious 2.

2. That the evil angels did not foreknow their fall, while the good may have foreknown their future good *. Therefore we say that they did not foreknow their fate, and that knowledge of what would befall them was not given to them. The good, however, those who persevered, may have foreknown their future blessedness. — Hence Augustine, On Genesis 1: «How was he blessed among the angels, he says, if he did not foreknow the sin and punishment that were to come? The question is why he did not. Perhaps God did not wish to reveal to the devil what he would do or suffer, but wished to reveal to the others that they would remain in the truth». — By these words Augustine seems to indicate that the angels who fell did not foreknow their fall, and therefore were not blessed; and that the angels who persevered foreknew the blessedness that would be theirs and were confident of it in hope, so that in a certain way they were already blessed. Indeed, if this had been so, they could in some way be called blessed, unlike the others, who did not know their fate.

3. That he said this as an opinion, not as an assertion—namely, that the angels who persevered foreknew their future good. Augustine says this more as an opinion and question than as an assertion. Hence, opposing this opinion, he goes on to say 2: «But why were those distinguished from the others, so that God would not reveal what concerned them to these, but would reveal it to the others, when he is not an avenger before anyone is a sinner? For he does not condemn the innocent». Here he seems to suggest that God revealed neither the future evil to those who would sin nor the future good to those who would persevere. — Therefore neither those who fell nor those who persevered to the end were ever blessed; for they could not be blessed if they were not certain of their blessedness, or if they were uncertain of their damnation. Hence Augustine says in the same work 3: «To say of angels that they can be blessed in their own kind while uncertain of damnation or salvation, with no hope that they might be changed for the better, is excessive presumption. “For how can those be blessed whose blessedness is uncertain?”»

quaeri LMTV. 11–12 memoriam] «Did they have memory?» 16 creaverit] creavit CMV. 4 forte suae transposed in LMNR. 12 praescierunt] praesciverunt L, praescierint NOPW, corrected in P. 13 illos dici transposed in BCLNTVW. 18 subdit] dicit MX. 21 non] nec MNVW.]

4. He gathers the foregoing points, confirming that all the angels were not blessed before confirmation or the Fall, unless blessedness means the state of innocence in which they were before the Fall. From what has been said it follows that the angels who fell were never blessed, unless one takes blessedness to mean the state of innocence in which they were before sin. Those who persevered, however, either foreknew, by God's revelation, their future blessedness and were in some way blessed by the certainty of hope; or they were uncertain of their blessedness, and so were no more blessed than the rest who fell. In my judgment, what was said later is more probable.

5. Response to the question whether the angels were created perfect or imperfect; it is said that they were perfect in one respect and imperfect in another. In answer to the question whether they were created perfect or imperfect, it may be said that they were perfect in one way and imperfect in another. For something is not called perfect in only one way, but in several.

6. “Perfect” is said in three ways: according to time, according to nature, and universally. Something is said to be perfect in three ways: it is perfect according to time, perfect according to nature, or universally perfect. That is perfect according to time which has whatever a given time requires and is fitting to have at that time; in this way the angels were perfect before their confirmation or the Fall. That is perfect according to nature which has whatever is due or advantageous to its nature for glorification; in this way the angels were perfect after their confirmation, and the saints will be perfect after the resurrection. That is universally and supremely perfect which never lacks anything and from which all good things proceed; this is God alone. The first perfection, then, belongs to created nature, the second to glorified nature, and the third to uncreated nature.

7. He briefly touches on the foregoing, adding what the angels were like in their turning and turning away. It has been shown what the angels were like at creation: good, not evil; just, that is, innocent; and perfect in one way, but imperfect in another. They were not blessed until their confirmation, unless blessedness is understood, as has already been said¹, as the state of innocence and goodness in which they were created.

Distinctio V: Distinction V

Chapter 1 (20).

On the turning and confirmation of those who stood firm, and the turning away and fall of those who fell. After this the inquiry turns to what they became when they were divided by turning away and turning toward God. For after creation some at once turned toward their Creator, while others turned away. To turn toward God was to cleave to him in charity; to turn away was to hate or envy him—for pride is the mother of envy, through which they wished to make themselves equal to God. In those who turned, God's wisdom began to shine as in a mirror, and they were enlightened by it; those who turned away were blinded. The former were turned and enlightened by God through grace added to them; the latter were blinded not by the infusion of evil but by the abandonment of grace. They were abandoned by grace not in the sense that something previously given was withdrawn, but because grace had never been added to turn them toward God. This, then, is the turning and turning away by which those who were good by nature were divided: some became good beyond that good through justice, others became evil through guilt, that good having been corrupted. Turning made them just, and turning away made them unjust. Each was an act of the will, and in either case the will acted freely.

fuerint OPW. || 13 sint] sunt LNV. || 16 adhaerere] inhaerere BCL.]

qui MW. || accipiat] accipiant BCX; supply quis or aliquis (l. 7). || fuerunt] fuerint RTV. || quia] quod BCLTW. || 5 fuerunt] fuerint OPW. || 13 sint] sunt LNV. || 16 adhaerere] inhaerere BCL.]

Chapter 2 (21).

He briefly touches on free choice, teaching what it is. For all possessed free choice, which is the free power and capacity of a rational will. For by will they could choose anything, and by reason judge, that is, discern; in these things free choice consists. They were not created willing to turn away or to turn toward God, but capable of willing this or that; and after their creation, by spontaneous will some chose evil, others good. And thus God divided the light from the darkness, as Scripture says¹, that is, the good angels from the evil; and he called the light day, but the darkness night, because he illuminated the good angels with his grace, but blinded the evil.

Chapter 3 (22).

After creation something was given to those who stood, by which they might turn, and not through any merit, namely, cooperating grace. If it is asked whether after creation something was bestowed on those who turned, by which they might turn, that is, love God, we say that cooperating grace was bestowed on them, without which a rational creature cannot advance toward the merit of life. It can fall by itself, but cannot advance without grace to aid it.

Chapter 4 (23).

What grace the angel needed and what he did not. The angel did not need the grace by which he would be justified, since he was not evil, but the grace by which he would be helped to love God perfectly and obey him. — What grace is operative and what cooperative*. Operative grace is that by which the ungodly is justified, that is, from ungodly becomes godly, from evil becomes good; cooperative grace is that by which one is helped effectively to will the good, to love God above all, to do good, to persevere in good, and the like, about which we shall speak more fully later². Therefore cooperating grace was given to the angels who stood firm, by which they turned so as to love God perfectly. They thus turned from the good they possessed and had not lost toward a greater good they did not possess; and this turning was effected by cooperating grace together with free choice. This grace was not added to the others who fell.

Chapter 5 (24).

  1. Whether it should be imputed to them that they turned away. Therefore some are accustomed to object that it should not be imputed to those who turned away and did not turn toward God, since they could not turn without grace. But grace was not given to them; nor was it their fault that it was not given, since no fault had yet preceded in them.

  2. To this one may say that those to whom that grace was added did not receive it through their merits: otherwise it would no longer be grace³, if it were given on account of a merit that existed before grace.

  3. By what fault grace was not given to those who fell. That it was not given to the others, however, was their fault, because although they could stand, they were unwilling to do so until grace should be added; whereas the others stood firm until, when those fell through pride, grace was added to them. The fault of those who fell can therefore clearly be detected in this: although without grace, which they had not yet received, they could not advance, nevertheless by what had been bestowed on them in creation they could avoid falling, that is, stand firm, since nothing compelled them to fall; rather, they turned aside by their own spontaneous will. Had they not done so, what was given to the others would certainly have been given to them as well.

Chapter 6 (25).

  1. That the angels were blessed at the very moment of confirmation, but whether they merited it through the grace then given them is uncertain: for different people hold different opinions about this. Here it is customary to ask whether the angels were blessed at the very moment of confirmation, and whether they somehow merited that blessedness. — That they were blessed at the very moment of confirmation is affirmed by many authorities⁴, and therefore must be held as certain.

touching on MNORTV, is touched on L. || teaching] teaches N, omitted BC. || 13 by some alone BCX. || namely…cooperating] but…cooperating LM. || 21–22 Heading omitted LVW.]

to them RTX. || 9 object] say LMNT. || who] which LN, corrected to which V. || 13 if] but MN. || 14 would be] if added BCM, added between the lines N. || 25 were] were LMRVWX. || 26 merited] merited BLM. || 28 were] were LMR.]

  1. Whether, however, they merited blessedness itself through the grace then given them is uncertain. For some² hold that they merited it through the grace they received at confirmation; they say that merit and reward were present in them simultaneously, and that merit did not precede reward in time, but in cause. — Others, however, think that they did not merit the blessedness they received at confirmation through the grace then added, saying that grace was not then bestowed on them for meriting, but for living in blessedness; that what was given them then was not a good by which they might merit, but one which they might enjoy happily. They say that what they then received as reward was merited through the services they rendered to us in obedience and reverence toward God; and thus reward preceded merits. I confess that this view pleases me more.

Distinctio VI: Distinction VI

Chapter 1 (26).

  1. Some fell from both the higher and lower ranks; among them one was highest, namely, Lucifer. Furthermore, it must be known that just as some from both the higher and lower ranks stood firm, so some from each rank fell; among them one was more excellent than all the others who fell, and none among those who stood was more worthy than he, as the testimonies of authorities show.

  2. For Job says³: He is the beginning of the ways of God. And in Ezekiel we read⁴: You are the seal of likeness, full of wisdom and perfect in beauty; you were in the delights of God’s paradise. Gregory⁵ explains this, saying: «The more subtle his nature, the more clearly the likeness of God is shown to have been impressed upon him.» — Again, in Ezekiel we read¹⁰: Every precious stone was your covering, that is, every angel was as it were his covering, because, as Gregory¹¹ says, «in comparison with the others he was brighter than the rest». Hence he was also called Lucifer, as Isaiah¹² testifies: How, he says, have you fallen, Lucifer, who used to rise in the morning, etc.

  3. Not one rank, but one spirit is to be understood; according to Isidore¹³, after he was created he considered the excellence of his nature and the depth of his knowledge, and grew proud against his Creator, to such an extent that he even wished to make himself equal to God, as Isaiah¹² says: I will ascend into heaven; above the stars of heaven I will set my throne, and I will be like the Most High. He wished to be like God, not by imitation, but by equality of power.

Chapter 2 (27).

  1. Where he was cast down from and to, on account of his pride. On account of such great pride he was cast down from heaven, that is, from the empyrean heaven, where he had been with the others, into this murky air, together with all the companions of his wickedness. For, as John says in the Apocalypse¹⁴, the dragon, falling from heaven, dragged with him a third part of the stars; because that Lucifer, greater than the others, did not fall alone, but many others who agreed with him in evil fell with him, and this murky air received them as they fell, to be their dwelling place.

  2. This was done for our testing, so that it might be a cause of exercise for us. Hence the Apostle¹⁵ says: Our struggle is against the principalities and powers of this world, against the rulers of this darkness, against spiritual forces of wickedness in the heavens. For demons, who are spiritual and wicked, dwell in this turbulent air near us, which is called heaven¹; hence the devil is also called the prince of the air².

merited BLM. || 8 merited] merited LMVX. || 10 not] nor BCRTV. || 18 and] from added LNW.]

may they be BCV (Sum of Sentences). || 24 of this darkness] of these added LT, added between the lines OV, added in the margin R.]

Chapter 3 (28).

They were not permitted to dwell in heaven or on earth. For they were not permitted to dwell in heaven, because it is a bright and pleasant place, nor on earth with us, lest they harass human beings too much; but, according to the teaching of the apostle Peter handed down in his canonical Epistle³, in this murky air, which has been assigned to them as a kind of prison until the time of judgment. Then they will be thrust down into the abyss of hell, in accordance with this⁴: Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels.

Chapter 4 (29).

Some demons rule over others and also hold other dominions. And just as some of the good angels rule over others, so among the evil some are set over others, and some are subject to others. As long as the world endures, angels rule angels, human beings human beings, and demons demons; but in the future every dominion will be abolished, as the Apostle teaches⁵. — They also have greater or lesser dominions according to their greater or lesser knowledge. Some rule over a province⁶, others over one person, and some over one vice⁷. Hence one speaks of a spirit of pride, a spirit of lust, and the like, because the spirit can tempt people especially in the vice from which it is named. Hence also riches are called by the name of a demon, namely, Mammon¹. For Mammon is the name of a demon, and riches are called by this name in the Syriac language. This is not because the devil has the power to give or take away riches from whomever he wishes, but because he uses them to tempt and deceive human beings.

Chapter 5 (30).

Whether all demons are in this murky air or some are in hell. It is customary to ask whether all of them are in this murky air, or whether some are already in hell. — It is plausible that some demons descend into hell every day, leading souls there to be tormented. And it is not far from the truth that some are always there, perhaps in alternating turns, detaining and tormenting souls there. That the souls of the wicked descend there and are punished there is clear from the fact that Christ descended to the underworld in order to lead out the righteous who were held there: if the righteous descended there, much more so the unrighteous; and, as an authority reports², when he led out the righteous he left the wicked there. For he bit hell; he did not swallow it up.

Chapter 6 (31).

  1. Some think that Lucifer has been bound in hell ever since he tempted Christ and was defeated; they say that he first tempted and overcame the first man. Concerning Lucifer, some think³ that he has been bound there and now has no access to tempt us, because we read in the Apocalypse⁴: When the thousand years are completed, Satan will be released from his prison, and he will go out and deceive the nations; this will happen at the final time of Antichrist, when there will be such great tribulation that even the elect, if possible, will be shaken⁵. They say that he was bound there… they say he was bound from the time when he tempted Christ in the desert¹ or during the Passion and was defeated by him. They think that he first tempted and overcame the first man², and then God as well, but was overcome by him and therefore bound in hell. — Others think he was plunged there from the time he fell³. Still others think⁴ that from the time he fell he was plunged there on account of the magnitude of his sin.

and BCL. || 11 prepared] made ready LT. || 15 for omitted BCOPRVW.]

underworld MNTV. || 19 defeated] bound MOP, corrected by P.]

  1. Lucifer does not have the power he will have at the time of Antichrist. But whether he has been plunged into hell or not, it is credible that he does not have the ability to approach us that he will have at the time of Antichrist, when he will act deceitfully and violently; and therefore it is perhaps said⁵ that he will then be released, because God will then grant him the power to tempt human beings that he does not have now.

Chapter 7 (32).

Demons once defeated by saints do not approach others again. The power of those demons who are defeated by saints living justly and chastely also seems to be taken away, so that they cannot tempt others. Hence Origen⁶ says: «I think, indeed, that the saints, when they resist these tempters and conquer them, diminish the army of demons, as if killing very many of them; nor is it thereafter permitted to that spirit, which has been conquered by someone holy through chaste and modest living, to attack another person again.» — Some⁷ think this should be understood only of the vice in which it was overcome: for example, if it tempts a holy man with pride and is defeated, it is thereafter not permitted to tempt him or another person with pride.

Distinctio VII: Distinction VII

Chapter 1 (33).

The good angels have been so confirmed by grace that they cannot sin, while the evil have been so hardened in evil that they cannot live well. It was said above¹ that the angels who stood firm were confirmed by grace, while those who fell were abandoned by God’s grace. The good were so greatly confirmed by grace that they cannot sin; the evil, however, have been so obstinate in wickedness that they cannot have a good will or will well, even if what they sometimes will is good. For sometimes they will something to happen that God wills to happen; and that thing is certainly good and just to happen. Yet they do not will it with a good will, nor do they will it well.

Chapter 2 (34).

  1. Both have free choice, yet neither can be turned in either direction. But since the good cannot sin and the evil cannot will or do good, it seems that they no longer have free choice, because they cannot be turned in either direction, although free choice is directed to both. — Hence Jerome says in his treatise On the Prodigal Son²: «God alone is such that sin cannot befall him; all other beings, since they have free choice, can be turned in either direction.» Here he seems to say that every creature endowed with free choice can be turned toward good and evil. If so, then the good angels and the evil can each be turned in either direction; therefore the good can become evil, and the evil good.

because MNR. || 17 nor] lest BCMNOP. || 18 who] because BCOX. || 21 again] thereafter LNT.]

can sin BCMOPT, corrected by T. || 15 because] although NOP, because M, if X, omitted BC.]

  1. To this we say that the good were so confirmed by grace that they cannot become evil, and the evil were so hardened in wickedness that they cannot become good; nevertheless, both have free choice, because the good choose good and reject evil not under the compulsion of any necessity, but by their own spontaneous will, aided indeed by grace; and the evil likewise, by spontaneous will deprived of grace, avoid good and follow evil. The evil have free choice, but it is weighed down and corrupted, so that they cannot rise to the good.

Chapter 3 (35).

  1. After confirmation the good have freer choice than before. The good, however, have much freer choice after confirmation than before. For, as Augustine teaches in the Enchiridion¹, «they are not without free choice because they cannot will evil. That choice is much freer which cannot serve sin². Nor is the will to be blamed, or denied to be a will, or said to be unfree, by which they so will to be blessed that they not only do not wish to be wretched, but cannot possibly even wish it.»

  2. Therefore the good angels cannot will evil or will to be wretched; they have this not from nature, but by the benefit of grace. For before their confirmation by grace the angels could sin, and some did sin and became demons. Hence Augustine says in Against Maximinus³: «The nature of the heavenly creatures could die, because it could sin. For angels sinned and became demons, whose prince is the devil; and those who did not sin could have sinned. Whenever it is granted to a rational creature that it cannot sin, this is not of its own nature, but of God’s grace. Therefore God alone is such that, not by anyone’s grace but by his own nature, he neither could, nor can, nor will be able to sin.» See, then, that it is intimated here that angels could sin before their confirmation, but cannot after it; and that what they then had came from free choice, which is natural to them. But their present inability to sin is not from nature, that is, from free choice, but from grace; and by this grace it is also the case that free choice itself can no longer serve sin⁴.

Chapter 4 (36).

  1. After confirmation the angels cannot sin by nature as they could before: their choice was not weakened, but confirmed. Therefore after confirmation the angels could not sin by nature as before; not because their free choice was weakened by grace, but rather because it was so confirmed that a good angel can no longer sin through it. This, of course, comes not from free choice itself, but from God’s grace.

  2. He explains how Jerome’s words above are to be understood². What Jerome says³, then, «All other beings, since they have free choice, can be turned in either direction», must be understood according to the state in which they were created. For man and angel were created such that each could be turned in either direction; but afterward the good angels were so confirmed by grace that they cannot sin, and the evil were so hardened by vice that they cannot live well.

  3. This other statement must be understood in the same way*. Isidore’s statement⁴ must likewise be understood in this way: «Angels are changeable by nature, immutable by grace.» For at the beginning of their creation they could be changed by nature toward good or evil; but afterward they were so bound to good by grace that they cannot be changed from it: grace, not nature, resists this.

Chapter 5 (37).

The evil angels have not lost their keen perception, and the ways in which they know. Although the evil angels are so obstinate through wickedness, they have not been entirely deprived of keen perception. For, as Isidore teaches⁵, «in three ways do the demons abound in acuity of knowledge, namely through the subtlety of their nature, experience of times, and revelation by spirits above.» — On this Augustine also says¹: «Evil spirits are permitted to know certain truths about temporal things, partly through subtlety of perception, partly because they are made more shrewd by experience of times, owing to such great length of life, and partly because holy angels reveal to them, at God’s command, what they themselves learn from almighty God. Sometimes those same wicked spirits also foretell, as if by divination, what they themselves are going to do.»

cannot NTX. || become evil transposed BCV. || 5 to sin transposed after angels BCX. || 15 confirmed transposed BCPT. || 18 Heading omitted MV. || 21 by omitted BCW.]

transposed after angels BCX. || 15 confirmed transposed BCPT. || 18 Heading omitted MV. || 21 by omitted BCW.]

Chapter 6 (38).

That magical arts avail by the power and knowledge of the devil, which power and knowledge were given him by God either to deceive the wicked, warn the good, or exercise them. Magical arts too are practiced by his knowledge and power. Yet both knowledge and power were given to them by God², either to deceive the deceitful, warn the faithful, or exercise and test the patience of the righteous. — Hence Augustine in Book III of On the Trinity³: "I see," he says, "what may occur to a feeble mind: why, namely, these marvels are also performed by magical arts. For Pharaoh's magicians made serpents and other things. But this is still more astonishing: how the power of the magicians, which could make serpents, failed altogether when it came to the tiniest flies, namely gnats, by which Egypt was struck with its third plague. There the magicians certainly failed, saying⁴: ‘This is the finger of God.’ From this it is understood that not even the transgressing angels themselves and airy powers, thrust from the dwelling of that lofty, ethereal purity into this deepest darkness as into a prison of their own kind, through whom magical arts can do whatever they can, have any power unless power is given from above. It is given either to deceive the deceitful, as among the Egyptians—and it was given even to the magicians themselves, so that they seemed wondrous in the operation of those spirits by whom they were being condemned—or to warn the faithful, lest they greatly desire to do anything of the kind; for this reason these things have also been reported to us in Scripture; or to exercise, test, and manifest the patience of the righteous."

Chapter 7 (39).

The matter of visible things does not obey transgressing angels at their nod. "Nor¹ should it be thought that the matter of visible things obeys these transgressing angels at their nod; rather, it obeys God, from whom this power is given, to the extent that the immutable Judge determines."

Chapter 8 (40).

  1. That they are not creators, although magicians made frogs and other things through them; God alone is Creator. "Nor indeed should those evil angels be called creators because magicians made frogs and serpents through them: they did not create them themselves."

  2. On the seeds of all bodies, whose creator is God alone. "For in the bodily elements of this world lie hidden certain seeds of all things that are born corporeally and visibly, which God implanted in them originally. He, therefore, is the creator of all things who is creator of the invisible seeds. For whatever comes forth before our eyes by birth receives from hidden seeds its beginnings for emerging here, while growth to due size and distinctions of form are taken from original rules, so to speak."

  3. Just as parents are not called creators of children, nor farmers creators of crops, so neither good nor evil angels are creators, even when creatures come to be through their ministry. "Therefore, just as we do not call parents creators of human beings, nor farmers creators of crops, although, when their outward motions are applied, God's power works inwardly to bring these things into being, so it is not right to consider either evil or good angels creators. (Note: here he implies that they have bodies.*) But, owing to the subtlety of their perception and body, they know seeds of these things that are more hidden from us, and secretly scatter them through suitable mixtures of the elements; thus they provide occasions both for things to be generated and for their growth to be accelerated. Yet the good do these things only insofar as God commands, and the evil do them unjustly only insofar as he justly permits."

  4. The wicked man has an evil will from himself, but receives power justly from God. "For by his wickedness the unjust man has an unjust will, but receives power only justly, whether for his own punishment or that of others—either the punishment of the wicked or the praise of the good."

‘to be warned’ NW, ‘to admonish’ T.]

‘These’ O, ‘If’ P (Augustine); Augustine has ‘if,’ added between the lines in V². || ‘of itself’ omitted in OP, added between the lines in R. || 30 The heading is omitted in LRVW. || 31 ‘has’] ‘have’ LMTVX.]

Chapter 9 (41).

Just as God alone works the mind's justification, so too he alone works the creation of things, although a creature serves outwardly. "Therefore, just as no one but God can shape our mind by justifying it, though human beings too can outwardly preach the Gospel—not only the good through truth, but also the wicked through occasion²—so God inwardly works the creation of visible things, while outward operations and mixtures, or occasions, are supplied by angels, both good and evil, or even by human beings. — "But³ human beings supply these things with so much greater difficulty as they lack subtle senses and bodily mobility in their earthly, sluggish limbs. Hence angels of whatever kind can draw together proximate causes from the elements much more easily, and their speed in such works is all the more marvelous. Yet only the one who forms these things principally is Creator, and no one can do this but the one Creator, God." — "For it is one thing to establish and administer a creature from the innermost and highest hinge of causes, which only God the Creator does; another to apply outwardly some operation according to the powers and abilities distributed by him, so that what is created may emerge then or then, in this way or that. For all these things were already created originally and primitively in a certain interweaving of the elements, but they emerge when the right opportunities are received."

Chapter 10 (42).

  1. That evil angels can do many things by the strength of their nature, but cannot do them because God or good angels forbid them—that is, because they are not permitted. This too should be known: evil angels can do certain things through the subtlety of their nature, but cannot do them because God or good angels forbid them—that is, because God or good angels do not permit them to do so. They could indeed have made gnats, they who made frogs and serpents. Other things they cannot do even if superior angels permit them, because God does not permit it.

  2. Why those who made frogs and serpents could not produce gnats. Hence Augustine in Book III of On the Trinity¹: "By God's ineffable power it comes about that what evil angels could do if permitted, they cannot do precisely because they are not permitted. No other reason suggests itself why those who made frogs and serpents could not make gnats except that God's greater dominion was present, forbidding them through the Holy Spirit; the magicians also confessed this, saying²: ‘This is the finger of God.’ But what they can do by nature yet cannot do because of a prohibition, and what they are unable to do by the condition of their very nature, is difficult for a human being to investigate—indeed, impossible. (He makes this clear by an analogy.³) We know that a human being can walk, and cannot do even this if not permitted; yet cannot fly even if permitted. So those angels can do certain things if permitted by more powerful angels under God's command, but cannot do other things even if those angels permit them, because he does not permit them, he from whom they have this measure of nature; he also often does not permit through his angels those things he has granted them the ability to do."

Distinctio VIII: Distinction VIII

Chapter 1 (43).

  1. Whether all angels are corporeal: some have thought so, and Augustine seems to agree, saying that before the Fall all angels had subtle, spiritual bodies, but that the bodies of the wicked were changed for the worse in the Fall so that they could suffer in them. Among the learned, the question is also often debated whether all angels, good and evil, are corporeal—that is, whether they have bodies united to them. — Some think so⁴, relying on Augustine's words. Augustine, who seems to say that all angels had airy bodies before their confirmation or fall, formed from the purer and higher part of the air, suited to acting, not suffering. Such bodies were preserved for the good angels who remained, so that they could act in them and not suffer; they are so subtle that mortals cannot see them unless they are clothed in some denser form, assumed when they appear and laid aside when they cease to be seen. The bodies of the evil angels, however, were changed in the Fall into a worse quality, denser air. For just as they were cast from a more dignified place to a lower one, that is, into murky air, so those subtle bodies were transformed into worse and denser bodies, in which they could suffer from the higher element, fire.

‘receive’ TVX. || 12 ‘as much as’] ‘how much’ BCNRT (Augustine).]

‘might have’ LM (Augustine). || 10 The heading is omitted in MNVW. || ‘analogy’] ‘similitude’ OP. || 19 ‘all angels’ transposed in LMVX. || 20 ‘all angels’ transposed in BCLMNTW.]

2. Augustine seems to have held this view, saying in On Genesis 2: "Demons are called airy animals because they thrive by the nature of airy bodies; they are not dissolved by death, because in them the element more apt for acting than suffering prevails. Moisture and earth provide the aptitude for suffering; air and fire for acting. The transgressing angels, with their prince (now the devil, then an archangel), were not surprisingly thrust after their sin into this darkness. Nor is it surprising if, as punishment, they were changed into an airy quality in which they could suffer from fire. They are permitted to occupy only the murky air, which is like a prison for them until the time of judgment." Behold, in these words Augustine seems to hand down the view some hold concerning the bodies of angels.

3. Some think Augustine said this without holding it himself, but merely reporting an opinion. Others assert that he said it in this way, reporting the opinion of others. They wish to judge this from his words: he says "demons are called airy animals," not "they are"; for some people spoke in that way. They say that he speaks not as reporting an opinion but as asserting the truth of the matter when he describes their dwelling in the murky air into which they were thrust; the distinction in his wording shows this. They also say that many Catholic commentators have agreed on this point and taught in harmony that angels are incorporeal and have no bodies united to them; sometimes, however, they assume bodies, prepared by God to fulfill a ministry assigned to them by God, and lay them aside when it is complete. In these bodies they appeared and spoke to human beings: sometimes speaking as God's person without distinguishing a person, sometimes as the person of the Father, Son, or Holy Spirit.

Chapter 2 (44).

1. That God appeared in those ancient bodily forms. There is no doubt that God appeared to human beings in bodily forms, as Augustine shows in Book II of On the Trinity 3, comparing various testimonies of Scripture from which he proves that God appeared to people in bodily figures, and that speech was addressed to them sometimes as God's person without distinction, sometimes with distinction of persons.

2. On the perplexing question Augustine raises: whether a new creature was formed to display these bodily appearances, or angels already in existence were sent; and, if they were sent, whether they preserved the quality of their spiritual body while assuming a bodily appearance from denser matter, or changed their own body into a form suited to their action. But when he asserts that God appeared to human beings in bodily images, he raises a perplexing question 4 which he does not resolve. He asks "whether in those bodily appearances some creature was created just for that work, in which God might appear to human beings, or whether angels who already existed were sent in such a way that, while remaining in their spiritual bodies, they assumed from the corporeal matter of the lower elements some bodily appearance, fitted to them like a garment, and changed it into whatever bodily forms they wished, real forms indeed; or whether they changed their own body into forms suited to their actions by the power given them by God." "...changed into whatever bodily forms they wished, real forms indeed; or whether they changed their own body into forms suited to their actions by the power given them by God."

‘may have’ MNW. 18–23 The heading is abbreviated in RX.]

3. For Augustine says this in Book III of On the Trinity¹: We must ask, "in those ancient bodily forms and appearances, whether a creature was formed just for this work, in which God, as he judged appropriate at the time, might be shown to human sight; or whether angels who already existed were sent in such a way that they spoke as God's person, assuming a bodily appearance from corporeal creation for the use of their ministry; or whether they changed and transformed their own body, which they do not serve but govern as a subject, into whatever forms they wished, adapted and suited to their actions according to the power assigned to them by the Creator."

4. He grants that angels are sent, but cannot resolve the rest: "But I confess that this exceeds the capacity of my inquiry: whether angels, while the spiritual quality of their body remains, work secretly through it and assume from the lower, more corporeal elements something which, fitted to them like a garment, they change and transform into whatever bodily forms they wish, real forms themselves, just as true water was changed by the Lord into true wine 3; or whether they transform their own bodies into what they wish, suited to what they are doing. Which of these is the case I cannot understand by any experience, being a human being, unlike the angels who do these things."

5. Observe, reader, that he does not solve the question he raised, but leaves undecided whether the angels who were sent, retaining their own spiritual bodies, were clothed with some more corporeal form in which they could be seen, or changed and transformed their own body into whatever form they wished in which they could be perceived. In these words Augustine seems to affirm 4 that angels are corporeal and have bodies of their own, spiritual bodies.

Chapter 3 (45).

That God has never appeared to mortals in the form in which he is God. Setting these matters aside as too profound and obscure, let us hold without doubt that God has never appeared to mortals in the form of his essence, as he says to his servant Moses 1: No one shall see me and live. And in John's Gospel we read 2: No one has ever seen God. "For nothing visible is unchangeable." Therefore "the substance or essence of God, since it is in no way changeable, cannot in any way be visible in itself. Consequently, it is clear that all those things seen by the fathers when God presented himself to them were made through a creature. Although how God made them through angelic ministers is hidden from us, we nevertheless say that they were made through angels." "Therefore I dare to say confidently that neither God the Father, nor his Word, nor his Spirit, who is the one God, is in any way changeable in what he is and in his very self, and therefore much less visible."

Chapter 4 (46).

1. Whether demons enter human bodies substantially and slip into human minds. It also seems worth considering whether demons, corporeal or incorporeal, substantially enter human bodies and slip into their souls, or whether they are said to enter because they exercise the effect of their malice there, by God's permission oppressing and tormenting them or drawing them into sin as they will. — The Gospel plainly declares 5 that they enter human beings and are driven out, recounting that demons entered some people and were cast out by Christ; but it is not so clear whether they entered in substance or are said to have entered on account of the effect of evil.

2. That demons do not slip substantially into human souls, but are said to enter because of the effect of their malice. On this Gennadius says in Definitions of Ecclesiastical Dogmas 6: "We do not believe demons, through energy (operation), to slip substantially into the soul, but to be joined to it by application and oppression. It is possible to slip into the mind only for the one who created it, who, subsisting incorporeally by nature, can enter his own creature." Behold, here it seems to be implied that demons do not slip substantially into or enter human hearts.

‘corporeal’ E. 20 ‘undecided’] ‘undecided matter’ BCTV. ‘their own’ omitted in OEUS. 22 ‘had’] ‘dec.’ C. 29 ‘whatever’ omitted in CCL. 9. 2 Ibid., no. 5 (PL 42, 870s; CCL 50, 150); 3 ibid., places cited above, p. 366, note 3; especially City of God, XXI, ch. 10 (PL 41, 724s; CSEL 40-II, 537s; CCL 48, 775s).]

3. Bede too, commenting on that passage in the Acts of the Apostles 1 where Peter says to Ananias, Why has Satan tempted or filled your heart?, says: "It should be observed that nothing but the creating Trinity can fill the human mind according to its substance, because the soul is filled with created things only according to operation and the impulse of the will. Satan does fill someone's heart, but not by entering him and his mind, nor by going into the entrance of the heart—for this power belongs to God alone—but by drawing the soul into an affection for evil through cunning and deceitful deception, through thoughts and the incitements of vices with which he is full. Satan therefore filled Ananias's heart not by entering it, but by inserting the poison of his malice." The same author 2 says: "The unclean spirit, driven from the hearts of the faithful by the flame of virtues, pours the poison of persecution into teachers of truth."

4. These authorities show that demons do not enter human hearts substantially, but do so through the effect of their malice; they are said to be driven out when they are not allowed to harm.

Distinctio IX: Distinction IX

Chapter 1 (47).

On the distinction of the orders, and how many there are. After what has been said, it remains to learn what Scripture teaches about the orders of angels; in several places 3 it declares that there are nine orders of angels: Angels, Archangels, Principalities, Powers, Virtues, Dominations, Thrones, Cherubim, and Seraphim. — In these orders three groups of three are found, with three orders in each, to suggest that the likeness of the Trinity is impressed upon them.

Hence Dionysius 1 teaches that there are three orders of angels, placing three in each. There are three higher, three lower, and three middle orders. The higher are Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones; the middle, Dominations, Principalities, and Powers; the lower, Virtues, Archangels, and Angels.

Chapter 2 (48).

1. What is called an order, and the meaning of each name. Here we must consider what is called an order, and then 2 whether these orders were distinguished from the very creation.

2. An order of angels is a multitude of heavenly spirits who resemble one another in some gift of grace, just as they share in gifts of nature. For example, Seraphim are those who burn with love more than the others: Seraphim means burning or kindling 3. Cherubim are those who excel others in knowledge: Cherubim means fullness of knowledge 4. Throne means seat; Thrones, as blessed Gregory says 5, are those filled with the grace of divinity, so that God sits in them and through them decrees and forms his judgments. Dominations are those who surpass Principalities and Powers. Principalities are those who arrange for their subjects what is to be done and preside over them in accomplishing divine mysteries. Powers are those who have received this more potently than others in their order, so that hostile powers subject to them are restrained by their power and cannot tempt human beings as much as they desire. Virtues are those through whom signs and miracles frequently occur; Archangels announce greater things, Angels lesser things.

‘participation’ (NW; ‘or participation’ added between the lines in T, omitted in CMX). 17 ‘decrees’] ‘discerns’ BCNOPVX. ‘and forms’ is the original reading in LMRTX. 22 ‘tempt as much’ transposed in LMT.]

Chapter 3 (49).

1. These names were given to them for our sake, not their own; they are taken from gifts of grace which they do not possess individually but excellently, and each order is named from its principal gift. These names were given to them for our sake, not their own. For they are known to themselves by contemplation, but become known to us by naming. Each order is named from gifts of grace that are given not individually but excellently in participation. In that heavenly homeland, where the good is complete, although some gifts are given excellently, nothing is possessed individually. For all things are in all, not equally, since some possess them more sublimely than others, though all possess them. Although the higher orders received all gifts of grace more sublimely and perfectly, they nevertheless took their names from the principal gifts, leaving the others to the lower orders as their names. Thus Seraphim, considered the most excellent order, received love, knowledge of divinity, and the other gifts of virtue more sublimely than all the others; yet that highest order took its name from the most excellent gift, love. For love is a greater gift than knowledge 1; and again, knowing is greater than judging, since knowledge informs judgment. Therefore the second order was named from the second gift, namely the knowledge of truth: Cherubim. The same should be understood of the others.

2. The excellence of the orders is therefore assigned according to the excellence of their gifts; yet, as Gregory says 2, those gifts are common to all. For all burn with love and are full of knowledge, and the same is true of the other gifts; but some received them more excellently than others, as was said, and are named from them. Hence Gregory says: "In that highest city each order is designated by the name of the gift it received more fully."

3. And Gregory's statements. Here, however, a question arises: if each order is named from the gift it possesses more fully, then Cherubim excel all in knowledge, because they are named from knowledge. But the one who loves more knows more: as an authoritative text teaches 1, each there knows as much as he loves. Thus Seraphim excel not only in love but also in knowledge.

4. Explanation of that authoritative text. Therefore that text seems to be understood in this way: the comparison does not refer to all the orders, but to some, namely the lower ones. That order does not receive knowledge more fully as a gift than Seraphim, but more fully than the other, lower orders. Nor is each order named from everything it received more fully than the others, but from one of the things it received.

5. Another resolution of the same question. Or the comparison may refer not to the orders themselves but to other gifts—and not to all the other gifts, but to some. For just as human beings, though they have many gifts, possess some more excellently than others, so perhaps angels excel in some gifts and are less excellent in others.

Chapter 4 (50).

1. Whether the orders were distinguished in this way from the beginning of creation. It now remains to inquire whether these orders were distinguished in this way from the beginning of creation. That they were so distinguished from the first moment of their condition seems to be suggested by the testimony of an authoritative text 3, which says that some fell from each order. For Lucifer belonged to the higher order, than whom no one was created more dignified 4. The Apostle also names the Principalities and Powers of darkness 5, showing that some fell from those orders; although they exercise a ministry among evil things, they were not entirely deprived of the names of their orders.

Chapter 3. Almost everything is from Hugh, On the Sacraments, I, 5, 32 (PL 176, 261 D–262 A); a few additions, near the end, are from the Summa of Sentences, II, 5 (PL 171, 1113 B–D; 176, 86 A–C). Chapter 4. Partly from the Summa of Sentences, II, 5 (PL 171, 1113 B–D; 176, 86 A–C).

2. But this does not seem tenable. For then they did not burn with love or abound in wisdom, nor did God dwell in them: had they possessed these things, they would not have fallen. Therefore they were not then Seraphim, Cherubim, or Thrones.

3. That these orders did not exist before the Fall, because they did not yet possess the gifts of grace which, they say, were bestowed on some after others fell. To this we reply that before the fall of some, these orders did not exist, because they did not yet possess the gifts in whose participation they agree. When some fell, those gifts were bestowed on the others; the same gifts would have been given to those who fell if they had remained. Therefore Scripture says that some fell from each order, not because they had belonged to the orders and then fallen, but because, had they remained, some of them would have belonged to each order. They had different ranks in subtlety of nature and clarity of form, just like those who remained. — For, as we said earlier 1, some were created higher and others lower: the higher were subtler by nature and more discerning in wisdom, the lower less subtle by nature and less discerning in understanding. Only he could weigh these invisible differences among invisible things who arranged all things in number, measure, and weight 2. (Augustine, On Genesis 3:) "that is, in himself, who is the measure that sets a limit for every thing, the number that gives each thing its form, and the weight that draws every thing to stability—that is, limits, forms, and orders all things."

Chapter 5 (51).

1. Whether all angels of the same order are equal. We should also consider whether all angels of the same order are equal. Some have thought so, but this is neither probable nor worth asserting, because Lucifer, who belonged to the company of the higher angels, was more dignified even than those who had been created more excellent than others. From this we understand that, had he remained, he would have been in the higher order and would have been more dignified than the others in that same order.

2. He shows by analogy that not all members of the same order are equal. For just as there is one order of Apostles and another of Martyrs, yet among the Apostles some are more dignified than others, and likewise among Martyrs some are higher than others, so it is rightly believed to be among the orders of angels.

Chapter 6 (52).

1. How Scripture can say that a tenth order is completed from human beings when there are only nine orders. It should also be noted that Scripture says 1 the tenth order is to be restored from human beings. But since there are only nine orders, and there would not have been more even if those who fell had remained, readers wonder how Scripture can say that a tenth order is completed from human beings.

2. For Gregory says 3 that human beings are taken up into the order of angels: some into the order of the higher angels, those who burn more with love; others into the order of the lower angels, those who are less perfect. It follows that a tenth order is not to be formed from human beings, as though there were nine angelic orders and a tenth of human beings; rather, human beings are placed in the angelic orders according to the quality of their merits.

3. Thus what is read about the tenth order being completed from human beings may be understood in this sense. What fell among the angels will be restored from human beings: so many fell that a tenth order could have been made from them. For this reason the Apostle says 4 that all things, those in heaven and those on earth, are restored in Christ, because the human race was redeemed through Christ, and from it the angelic loss is repaired. Nevertheless, humanity would still have been saved even if no angel had fallen.

Chapter 6. Summa of Sentences, II, 5 (PL 171, 1114 B–D; 176, 87 A–C); Hugh, On the Sacraments, I, 5, 30 (PL 176, 260 D); Honorius of Autun, Book of Twelve Questions, q. 5 (PL 172, 1180s).

‘that’ LRVX.]

Chapter 7 (53).

1. Human beings are admitted to blessedness according to the number of angels who remained, not those who fell. For human beings are admitted to blessedness according to the number of those who remained, not those who fell. Hence Gregory says: "That heavenly city consists of angels and human beings; we believe that as many of the human race will ascend to it as angels happened to remain there, as it is written in the Song of Deuteronomy: ‘He fixed the boundaries of the peoples according to the number of the angels of God.’" 2

2. Some say that human beings are to be restored according to the number of fallen angels. Some nevertheless think 3 that human beings are restored according to the number of angels who fell, so that the heavenly city is deprived neither of the number of its citizens nor rules with a larger multitude. — Augustine seems to think this in the Enchiridion 4, not asserting that more human beings are saved than angels fell, but only that no fewer are saved. He says: "The heavenly Jerusalem, our mother 5, the city of God, will not be defrauded of any number of its citizens, or perhaps will even reign with a greater multitude. For we do not know the number either of holy human beings or of unclean demons, in whose place the children of the Catholic mother, who seemed barren on earth 6, will remain without end in that peace from which those others fell. But the number of those citizens, whether it is, was, or will be, lies in the contemplation of that maker who calls things that are not as though they were 7." Behold, he clearly says that no fewer human beings are saved than angels fell, but he does not assert that more are saved.

Distinctio X: Distinction X

Chapter 1 (54).

1. Whether all heavenly spirits are sent, with two opinions and the authorities on which they rely. We must also investigate whether all those heavenly spirits are sent out to announce things. — Some think that among that multitude there are some who go out on an errand, and others who always stand within, as it is written in Daniel 1: Thousands upon thousands ministered to him, and ten thousand times ten thousand stood before him. Likewise Dionysius says in The Hierarchy 2, called the sacred principality, concerning the preeminence of the spirits: "Those higher hosts never withdraw from the inner presence, because those who are preeminent never undertake the use of an external office." Those who deny that angels are sent except for the lower orders rely on these authorities.

2. An objection to them. They are met with Isaiah's statement 3: One of the Seraphim flew to me—and that is a higher, more excellent order. Therefore, if angels from that order are sent, there is no doubt that angels from the other orders are sent as well. The Apostle also says 4: Are they not all ministering spirits, sent out for service? On these testimonies some assert that all angels are sent. It should not seem unfitting if even the higher angels are sent, since the one who is Creator of all also descended to these lower things.

3. The question: if all are sent, why is only one order designated by the name ‘Angels’? Here a question arises: if all are sent and are God's messengers, why is only one among the nine orders designated by the name ‘Angels’? — Some answer 5 that all are indeed sent, but some more often, as if under an assigned office; these are properly called Angels or Archangels. Others are sent more rarely—namely, the higher ones—when an extraordinary cause arises outside the common dispensation; when they undertake the ministry of angels, they also take the name. Hence in the Psalm 1: He makes his angels spirits, because those who are spirits by nature sometimes become angels, that is, messengers.

Chapter 1. The text is composed from the Summa of Sentences, II, 6 (more likely in the form PL 171, 1115 A–C than 176, 87 C–88 A), and Hugh, On the Sacraments, I, 5, 33 (PL 176, 262 B–C); their common source is Gregory the Great, Homilies on the Gospels, homily 34, no. 12 (PL 76, 1254 A–C). more often and as if under an assigned office, and these are properly called Angels or Archangels; others are sent more rarely, namely the higher ones, when a cause arises outside the common dispensation, and when they undertake the ministry of angels they also take the name. Hence in the Psalm 1: He makes his angels spirits, because those who are spirits by nature sometimes become angels, that is, messengers.

Chapter 2 (55).

1. Some think Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael belonged to a higher order; these are names of spirits, not orders. They think Michael, Gabriel, and Raphael belonged to a higher order. "Michael 2 is interpreted ‘Who is like God?’; Gabriel, ‘strength of God’; Raphael, ‘medicine of God.’" These are not names of orders but of spirits. — Some say each of these is the proper and singular name of one spirit; others say they are not singular, determinate names of one spirit, but names that belong now to this spirit, now to that, according to the quality of the matters they are sent to announce or carry out. Some names of demons are similar: some think them proper to one, others common to many. For the devil, called thus in Greek, is interpreted as ‘accuser’ or ‘one flowing downward’; in Hebrew he is called Satan, that is, ‘adversary.’ He is also called Belial, that is, ‘apostate’ or ‘without a yoke.’ He is also called Leviathan, that is, ‘their addition’ 3. You will find many other names, either proper to one spirit or common to many.

2. How those who say all angels are sent explain the authorities cited above which seem to oppose them. Those who assert that all angels are sent explain the previously cited authorities of Daniel and Dionysius 4 as follows: the higher hosts are said to stand before God and never withdraw from the inner presence not because they are never sent, but because they rarely go out to external things; even then they do not withdraw from the inner presence, but always stand before and contemplate God. Those sent frequently do the same 1.

3. Whom others say are sent and whom they say are not, with an explanation of the authorities that seem to oppose them. Others say that the three highest orders—Seraphim, Cherubim, and Thrones—stand before the Creator in such a way that they do not go out to external things; the three lower orders, however, are sent out; and the three middle orders stand between the two groups, not only in dignity or place but also in office, because they receive the divine command from the higher orders and carry it to the lower. Therefore, since the highest announce God's command to the middle, the middle to the lowest, and these to human beings, they rightly say that all are called angels. Perhaps for this reason the Apostle said 2 that all spirits are ministers of the Son and are sent for service; or by ‘all’ he included not every order, but individual angels from the lower orders. They explain what Isaiah says 3 by Dionysius's words 4: "Those spirits who are sent receive the name of the office they carry out." Hence they say the angel sent to Isaiah to cleanse and set the Prophet's lips aflame belonged to one of the lower orders; he was said to be a Seraph because he came to burn and consume Isaiah's sins.

Distinctio XI: Distinction XI

Chapter 1 (56).

1. Each soul has a good angel assigned for its protection and an evil one for its exercise. It should also be known that good angels are assigned to protect human beings, so that each of the elect has an angel specially appointed for his progress and protection. — Hence in the Gospel 1 Truth, forbidding the scandalization of the little ones, says: Their angels always see the face of the Father. He calls them the angels of those to whose protection they have been assigned. On this passage Jerome 2 teaches that from the beginning of birth each soul has an angel assigned to protect it, saying: "Great is the dignity of souls, since each has an angel assigned to guard it from birth."

2. Gregory also says 3 that each person has one good angel assigned to protect him and one evil angel to exercise him. For although all good angels commonly will our good and strive for everyone's salvation, the angel assigned to protect a particular person especially exhorts him to good, as we read of the angel of Tobias 4 and the angel of Peter in the Acts of the Apostles 5. Similarly, although evil angels desire human beings' evil, the one assigned to exercise a person incites him more strongly to evil and presses harder to harm him.

3. Whether each person has one angel, or one is assigned to many. It is often asked whether individual angels are assigned to individual people, or one angel is assigned to many for protection or exercise. Since there are as many elect as good angels, it is clear that the total number of good and evil human beings together is greater than the number of good angels. Since the elect are as many as the good angels, the good angels are more numerous than the evil angels, and there are more evil people than good people, it is beyond doubt that there are more good people than evil angels, and more evil people than either the evil or the good angels.

4. He confirms that one angel may be assigned to many people, either at once or at different times. Therefore one must say that the same good or evil angel is assigned to many people for protection or exercise, either at the same time or at different times. ‘at the same time or at different times,’ since some think 1 that all the people who exist at any one time can each have their own angel, good or evil. For although the total number of human beings, counting all who have been, are, and will be, is greater than the number of angels, human beings replace those who die and so are never all present together in this life, whereas angels never die but are all present together. Thus it is possible that while they live in this life individual human beings have individual angels, good or evil, appointed to protect or exercise them. In any case, whether this is so or not, there is no doubt that everyone has an angel assigned to him, whether that angel is appointed to many at once or to one alone. Nor is it surprising for one angel to be assigned to protect many people, since the protection of many is assigned to one person, so that each of them is said to have his own lord, bishop, or abbot.

Chapter 2 (57).

1. Whether angels increase in merit or reward up to the Judgment. We should also consider whether good angels increase in merit or reward up to the Judgment.

2. Some think that they increase in both. Some think that they increase in merits and merit more each day, because each day they serve human needs and attend to human progress. They also think that they increase in reward, namely in their knowledge and love of God. For although, as they say, at their confirmation they received eternal and perfect blessedness, their blessedness nevertheless increases each day, because they love and know more and more. — Their love is now both their merit and their reward. Their love by which they love God and us is both merit and reward. merit, because through it both their services rendered on its account merit reward and they advance in blessedness; and it itself is also the reward, because through it they are blessed.

3. They confirm what they say by authorities. They confirm by the testimonies of the Saints that angels advance in knowledge, and thereby in blessedness. For Isaiah 1 speaks in the person of the angels admiring the majesty of Christ as he ascends: Who is this who comes from Edom, with garments dyed from Bosra? And in the Psalm 2: Who is this King of glory? From these it is clear that the angels knew the mystery of the incarnate Word more fully after its accomplishment than before. And just as they advanced in knowledge of this mystery, so, they say, they advance in knowledge of the Godhead. That they advanced in knowledge of this mystery the Apostle clearly teaches, saying 3: What is the dispensation of the mystery hidden from the ages in God, so that through the Church the manifold wisdom of God might be made known to the Principalities and Powers in the heavens. On this passage Jerome 4 says that «the angelic orders did not understand the aforesaid mystery fully until Christ’s Passion was completed and the Apostles’ preaching had spread among the nations».

4. How Augustine seems in this opinion to oppose Jerome. Augustine seems to contradict these words, however, saying on the same passage of the Epistle 5: «The mystery of the kingdom of heaven, which was revealed at the fitting time for our salvation, was not hidden from the angels. Therefore the aforesaid mystery was known to them from the ages, because every creature exists not before the ages but from the ages».

5. Resolution of the aforesaid authorities *. — Haymo *. Consider, reader, that the illustrious teachers seem to disagree on this point. Therefore, following Haymo 6, let us resolve the apparent contradiction as follows: «Let us say that the mystery had been known in part from the ages to those angels who are of greater dignity, through whose ministry those things were announced, as being its intimates and messengers; but that it remained unknown to those of lesser dignity» until these things were accomplished and preached through the Church; then they were perfectly known by all the angels.

6. It is therefore established that all angels advanced over time in knowledge of the divine mysteries. Hence they themselves not inappropriately say 1 that the angels’ knowledge and blessedness increase until the future consummation, when they will be most perfect in knowledge and blessedness, so that neither will increase further nor diminish.

7. The opinion of others who say that angels did not advance in certain of the aforesaid respects. Others say that at their confirmation the angels were endowed with such love and knowledge of the Godhead that they neither advanced further in these respects nor will do so. They did, however, advance in knowledge of external things, such as knowledge of the mystery of the Incarnation and the like; but not in contemplation of the Godhead, since they do not understand, nor will understand, the Trinity in unity and unity in Trinity more fully than they apprehended it at their confirmation. They likewise say that the angels did not advance in charity after their confirmation, because their charity was not afterward increased. Thus they say that they did not advance in merits, namely as regards the power of meriting, though not as regards the number of merits. For afterward they did many good things they had not done then; but their charity, from which those deeds proceeded, was not increased: by that charity they merited as much before those deeds were added as afterward, with them added.

8. What is more probable *. What the others said above seems more probable: namely, that angels advance in knowledge and in other respects up to the Judgment.

9. Certain authorities seem to conflict with the more probable opinion. The words of certain authorities nevertheless seem to conflict with it. For Isidore says in his book On the Highest Good 2: «Angels know all things in the Word of God before they come to be». — Resolution *. But he did not say that all angels know all things perfectly, and therefore he did not rule out their advancing in knowledge.

10. Gregory too says in Book IV of the Dialogues 3: «What is there that they do not know, when they know Him who knows all things?» He seems to say that angels know everything and that there is nothing they do not know. — Another resolution *. But this should be understood of those things whose knowledge makes the knower blessed, such as things pertaining to the mystery of the Trinity and unity.

1 Isai. 63, 1. Compare the Ordinary Gloss on this passage: «This is spoken in the person of the angels» (in Lyra, IV, 101r). 2 Ps. 23, 8; 3 Eph. 3, 9–10; 4 On this passage (PL 26 [1845], 483 C); 5 De Genesi ad litt., V, c. 19, n. 38 (PL 34, 334s; CSEL 28-I, 162); 6 Haymo Altiss., on Eph. 3, 10 (PL 117, 715 A).

1 That is, Summa sent., II, 6 (PL 171, 1115 D–1116 A; 176, 88 C); 2 Sententiae, I, c. 10, n. 17 (PL 83, 556 C); 3 Book IV, c. 33 (PL 77, 376 B). Compare also Moralia, II, c. 3, n. 3 (PL 75, 556 D).

Apparatus: 19 Epistolae om. LMRX. 23 Rubrica om. LVW. 1 Idem om. BCOPV. 4 quibusdam praedictorum praedictis BCX. 11 perceperunt pepererint BCPX. 13 scilicet sed X, sed hoc LNTVW, non MR, sed exp. R. 14 sed om. LNTVX. 18 Rubrica om. MRVW. 24 Determinatio om. RVWX. 28 Rubrica om. LMRVW.

Distinctio XII: Distinction XII

Distinctio XIII: Distinction XIII

Distinctio XIV: Distinction XIV

Distinctio XV: Distinction XV

Distinctio XVI: Distinction XVI

Distinctio XVII: Distinction XVII

Distinctio XVIII: Distinction XVIII

Distinctio XIX: Distinction XIX

Distinctio XX: Distinction XX

Distinctio XXI: Distinction XXI

Distinctio XXII: Distinction XXII

Distinctio XXIII: Distinction XXIII

Distinctio XXIV: Distinction XXIV

Distinctio XXV: Distinction XXV

Distinctio XXVI: Distinction XXVI

Distinctio XXVII: Distinction XXVII

Distinctio XXVIII: Distinction XXVIII

Distinctio XXIX: Distinction XXIX

Distinctio XXX: Distinction XXX

Distinctio XXXI: Distinction XXXI

Distinctio XXXII: Distinction XXXII

Distinctio XXXIII: Distinction XXXIII

Distinctio XXXIV: Distinction XXXIV

Distinctio XXXV: Distinction XXXV

Distinctio XXXVI: Distinction XXXVI

Distinctio XXXVII: Distinction XXXVII

Distinctio XXXVIII: Distinction XXXVIII

Distinctio XXXIX: Distinction XXXIX

Distinctio XL: Distinction XL

Distinctio XLI: Distinction XLI

Distinctio XLII: Distinction XLII

Distinctio XLIII: Distinction XLIII

Distinctio XLIV: Distinction XLIV

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