Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (207).

1. Sometimes a person wills something different from God with a good will; at other times a person wills with an evil will the same thing God wills with a good will. We should also know that sometimes a human being’s will is evil when it wills the same thing God wills to happen, and sometimes it is good when it wills something different from what God wills.

2. A human will is judged good in two respects. For a human will to be good, we must consider what it is fitting for that person to will, and to what end. The difference between God’s will and a human will is such that in some cases it is fitting for God to will one thing and for a human being to will another. Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion: “Sometimes,” he says, “a human being wills something with a good will that God does not will, though God wills the opposite with a much better and more certain will, for his will can never be evil—as when a good son wishes his father to live, while God wills with a good will that he die. Again, it can happen that a human being wills with an evil will what God wills with a good will: for example, when an evil son wishes his father to die, and God also wills this. The former wills what God does not will, while the latter wills what God also wills; and yet the piety of the one who wills something different is more consonant with God’s good will than the impiety of the one who wills the same thing. For it matters greatly what it is fitting for a human being to will and what it is fitting for God to will, and toward what end each person directs his will, so that it may be approved or disapproved.” A person can will something good that it is not fitting for him to will; or he can will something good that it is fitting for him to will, but not direct it toward a right end, and so his will is not good.

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Chapter 2 (208).

1. That God’s good will is fulfilled through the evil wills of human beings, as happened in Christ’s Passion, where something occurred that God willed with a good will and the Jews with an evil will; yet they also willed something God did not will. We must not omit that God’s good will is sometimes fulfilled through a human being’s evil will, as happened in the crucifixion of Christ: God willed with a good will that he die, while the Jews crucified him with an impious will. With an evil will the Jews willed something God willed with a good will, namely that Christ suffer and die; but they also willed something else God did not will, namely to kill Christ, which was an evil act and a sin. God did not will the Jews’ deed, but he did will Christ’s Passion, as Christ says to the Father in the Psalm: “You have known my sitting”—that is, “you willed and approved”—my Passion, for it pleased you. The whole Trinity therefore willed that Christ suffer, yet did not will that the Jews kill him: it willed Christ’s penalty, but not the Jews’ guilt. Yet it did not will that it not happen; for if it had not willed it to happen, it would not have happened.

2. Objection. An objection is raised against this as follows: If God willed Christ to be killed by the Jews, the statement must be distinguished. If it means that he willed to undergo the Passion, or the crucifixion inflicted by the Jews, it is true. But if it means that he willed the Jews to kill him, it is false. God did not will the Jews’ act, which was evil; he willed the good Passion, and this will was fulfilled through the Jews’ evil wills. — Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion: “God fulfills certain of his wills, which are certainly good, through the evil wills of wicked people: thus Christ was killed for us through the malicious Jews, by the Father’s good will. This was so great a good that Peter, when he did not want it to happen, was called Satan by the one who was killed.” Here you plainly see that Christ’s being killed was a great good; and because Peter did not want this good, he was rebuked.

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Chapter 3 (209).

Whether it pleased good men that Christ suffer and die: it pleased them with a view to our liberation, but not to his torment. This resolves the question often asked: whether the holy men ought to have been pleased that Christ suffer or be killed. It ought to have pleased them with a view to our redemption, but not with a view to his torment. They therefore willed and ardently desired Christ’s death for the sake of human liberation and the fulfillment of the divine will, but they did not desire it because they took pleasure in his affliction. Thus they rejoiced and grieved over the same thing, yet rejoiced for one reason and grieved for another. They willed Christ to die for humanity’s redemption, and yet their hearts were moved in different ways, for different reasons, by his death.

Chapter 4 (210).

1. How one ought to regard the sufferings of the saints, whether to will or not to will them. If it is asked whether we should regard the sufferings and martyrdoms of the saints in the same way, we say that there is a difference between the Passion of the Head and those of the members. Christ’s Passion is the cause of our salvation; the passion of no saint is. We have been redeemed by no one’s passion except Christ’s. The sufferings of the saints benefited not only those who suffered but also other believers; nevertheless, they are not our redemption. Only the Passion of the one who is God and man could accomplish this. The pious minds of believers therefore willed and wished his Passion to take place, just as they believed it would.

2. We can will or not will the sufferings of the saints, and either with a good will. We can will or not will the sufferings of the saints, and either with a good will, provided that we set before ourselves right ends. Someone who was pleased by Paul’s suffering because he saw that by this means Paul’s reward was increased and made ready seems to have had a good will, one that accorded with Paul’s own will, by which he longed to depart and be with Christ. Likewise, someone who wished him to avoid suffering and escape the hands of the wicked out of compassionate concern also had a good will. — Hence Augustine in the Enchiridion:

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“The wills of the pious faithful who did not want the Apostle Paul to go to Jerusalem, lest he suffer there the evils foretold by the prophet Agabus, appeared good; yet God willed him to suffer this for proclaiming the faith of Christ, exercising him as Christ’s martyr. God did not fulfill his good will through the Christians’ good wills, but through the Jews’ evil wills. Those who did not will what God willed belonged more truly to him than those through whom what he willed was done willingly, because the latter did with an evil will the very thing God willed with a good will.”

3. The same happened in Christ’s Passion. Judas, the Jew, and the devil willed the same thing God willed, but they willed it with an evil will, whereas God willed it with a good will: namely, that Christ should die. Nevertheless, they willed the deed, which God did not will.

Here ends the first book on the mystery of the Trinity.

⁴ explicit in LW, finit in X. || Primus Liber transposed in TWX.]

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