Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (197).

Certain things seem to conflict with the statement that God's will, which is God himself, cannot be thwarted. Here a question arises. It was said above¹ and supported by authorities that God's will—which is God himself and is called his good pleasure—cannot be thwarted, because by that will he did whatever he willed in heaven and on earth²; nothing resists it, as the Apostle testifies³. — Augustine in the Enchiridion⁴: “It is asked, then, how we should understand what the Apostle says of the Lord⁵: ‘Who wills all people to be saved.’ Since not all are saved, but more are damned, it certainly seems that what God wills to happen does not happen, because the human will impedes God's will. The Lord too, addressing the wicked city in the Gospel⁶, says: ‘How often I willed to gather your children, as a hen gathers her chicks, and you were unwilling.’ These words are spoken as though God's will had been overcome by the human will, and as though the most powerful had been unable to do what he willed because the weakest opposed him by their unwillingness. Where, then, is that omnipotence by which, according to the Prophet, he did in heaven and on earth whatever he willed? And how does nothing resist his will, according to the Apostle, if he willed to gather Jerusalem's children and did not do so?” These statements seem greatly to conflict with what was said above.

Chapter 2 (198).

1. Solution: how to understand “I willed to gather, and you were unwilling.” Let us hear the solution and first consider how we should understand what the Lord said. “For,” as Augustine says in the Enchiridion¹ while solving the foregoing question, “it was not said in the sense that the Lord willed to gather Jerusalem's children and what he willed did not happen because the city was unwilling; rather, the city was unwilling for her children to be gathered by him, but despite her unwillingness he gathered all her children whom he willed. For in heaven and on earth he did not will some things and do them, and will other things and not do them; he did whatever he willed.” The sense, then, is²: “How often I willed to gather your children, and you were unwilling”—that is, however many I gathered by my will, which is always effective, I gathered despite your unwillingness. It is plainly evident, then, that those words of the Lord do not conflict with what was said above.

2. How to understand “Who wills all people to be saved.” It remains to see how the Apostle's preceding words also do not contradict what was said above. Speaking of God, he says³: “He wills all people to be saved.” Many have strayed from the truth on account of these words, saying that God wills many things to happen that do not happen. But the words must not be understood as if God willed some to be saved and they were not saved. — Augustine in the Enchiridion⁴: “Who could be so impiously foolish as to say that God cannot turn the evil wills of people, whenever he wills, wherever he wills, and whoever's wills he wills, toward good?” “What is said in the Psalm, ‘He did whatever he willed,’ would surely not be true if he willed some things and did not do them; and, what is more shameful, if he did not do them because a human will prevented the Almighty from bringing about what he willed.”

3. Therefore, “when we hear and read in the sacred writings that he wills all people to be saved, we must not on this account detract in any way from God's all-powerful will; rather, we must understand what is written¹—‘He wills all people to be saved’—as though it said that no person is saved unless God himself wills that person to be saved: not that there are no people except those whom he wills to be saved, but that no one is saved unless he wills that person to be saved. Therefore he must be entreated to will it, because it must happen if he wills it.” For the Almighty must not be believed to have willed anything to happen that did not happen. — In the same way we understand²: “He enlightens every person coming into this world”: not because there is no person who is not enlightened, but because no one is enlightened except by him. It can also be understood in another way, provided we are not compelled to believe that the Almighty willed something to happen and it did not happen. For without any ambiguity, if, as the Truth sings³, he did whatever he willed in heaven and on earth, then he did not will whatever he did not do. From this it is plainly shown that by the will that is himself, God does not will anything to happen that does not happen, nor anything not to happen that does happen.

¹

² signorum LMNRVW. 6 signum] signa BCV. 7 ipsius] eius BCV. 25 suos] sub alas add. NTV, add. interl. W. 27 Ita haec] Haec ita T; Ita etiam (et N) haec NV.]

³

Chapter 3 (199).

1. Whether evils happen by God's will or against his will. Since it is established that all good things that happen happen by his will, and if he did not will them to happen they would by no means happen, it is rightly asked whether all the evils that happen, that is, sins, also happen by God's will or against his will.

2. What different people say about this: some say God wills evils to exist or happen; others say he does not *. Different people hold different views on this and are found to contradict one another. Some⁴ say that God wills evils to exist or happen, though he does not will evil; others⁵ say that he does not will evils either to exist or to happen. On this, however, both groups agree: both acknowledge that God does not will evil. Each group relies on arguments and authorities to support its claim.

3. Why some say that God wills evils to exist or happen. Those who say that God wills evils to exist or happen support their position in the following ways.

4. Their first argument for saying that God wills evils to happen *. They say: If he did not will evils to exist or happen, they would in no way exist or happen. For if he wills them not to exist or happen, and cannot bring about their nonexistence or nonoccurrence, something resists his will and power. He would not be omnipotent, since he could not do everything he wills, but impotent, as we are when at times we cannot do what we will. But because he is omnipotent and in no way impotent, it is certain that evils cannot happen or exist unless he wills them. For how could evil be done by anyone against his will, when Scripture says⁶: “Who will resist his will?”

5. Second argument *. Augustine also said above⁷: “It must happen if he wills it.” But he either wills evils to happen or not to happen; if he wills them not to happen, they do not happen; yet they do happen. Therefore he wills them to happen.

6. Third argument *. Again, it is good for evils to exist or happen; otherwise the supremely good God would not permit them to happen. Hence Augustine says in the Enchiridion⁸: “Although those things that are evil, insofar as they are evil, are not good, nevertheless it is good that not only good things but also evils exist. For unless it were good that evils exist too, they would in no way be permitted to exist by the omnipotent good, for whom it is surely as easy to do what he wills as it is to prevent what he does not will from existing. Unless we believe this, our confession by which we profess belief in the omnipotent Father is endangered.” — Here you have it plainly that it is good for evils to exist; but God is the author of every good, and wills every good that exists to exist. Since, then, it is good for evils to happen or exist, he wills evils to happen or exist. Those who say that God wills evils to exist or happen use these and other such arguments and authorities.

⁴

⁵ salvum add. N. 7–8 Rubrica om. RTW. 13 si] sit BC, sive MNOP. 14 quaecumque] quodcumque BCLWX (Aug.). 16 quoad] non add. BM. 22–23 Rubrica om. MTW. 25 vel] nec RCVW. 23 varie] diversa V.]

⁶

7. Here he explains the arguments of those who say that evils do not happen by God's will. Those who say that evils do not happen or exist by God's will reply to the arguments just presented as follows: God neither wills evils to happen nor wills them not to happen or wills that they not happen; rather, he merely does not will them to happen.

8. Why it is not true that God wills evils to happen *. If he willed evils to happen or exist, he would indeed make them happen or exist, and so he would be the author of evils. But the authorities of the saints testify that he is not the author of evils; therefore evils do not happen by his will.

9. Here he explains why it is not true that God wills evils not to happen, or wills against their happening *. Again, if he were unwilling for evils to happen, or willed them not to happen, and they nevertheless happened, he would not be omnipotent, since his will would be impeded by the effect of the human will. Therefore they do not grant that God wills evils to happen, lest he be understood as their author; nor do they grant that he wills evils not to happen, or wills against their happening, lest he seem impotent.

10. It is true that God does not will evils to happen *. They say only that he does not will evils to happen, so that he may be shown to be not their author but their permitter. Hence the Evangelist, having shown that God is the author of all good things by saying¹: “All things were made through him,” goes on to deny that he is the author of evils, saying: “And without him nothing was made,” that is, sin². He did not say that it was made through him, or against his will and unwillingly, but only “without him,” that is, without his will, because sin does not happen by his will.

11. Evils happen not because God wills or wills against them, but because he does not will them *. Evils happen, then, neither because God wills them nor because he wills against them, but because he does not will them. For God's will does not underlie whether evil happens or does not happen, but rather that he permits it to happen, since it is good to permit evils to happen. He surely permits this willingly—not willing the evils, but willing to permit them to happen—because evils are not good, nor is it good for them to happen or exist.

Chapter 4 (200).

1. How to understand Augustine's statement “It is good for evils to happen.” They say that Augustine's statement¹, “It is good for evils to happen, and the omnipotent good would not permit evils to happen unless it were good for them to exist,” was made because God draws good things out of the evils that happen; nor would he permit them to happen unless he did something good from them.

2. He confirms this sense with another authority of Augustine *. Hence Augustine, in the same book, the Enchiridion², plainly indicating that this is the meaning of the words just cited, says: “God the Almighty, who holds supreme power over things, since he is supremely good, would in no way permit any evil to exist in his works unless he were so omnipotent and good as to bring good even out of evil.” — Again, in the same work³: “God judged it better to bring good out of evils than not to permit any evils.” From this sense it is said, and it is true, that it is good for evils to happen, because from the evils that happen goodness, that is, usefulness, comes to the good who are called according to his purpose, the saints⁴. For, as the Apostle says⁵, all things work together for good for such people, even evils, because these benefit them, though they harm others who do them. Hence Scripture sometimes even calls evil good, as Jerome says in his Commentary on Mark⁶: “Evil,” he says, “was good for Judas”—that is, for us. Yet it does not follow that, because something is good for this or that person, it is good simply. For properly and simply good is what is good in itself and for the one who does it.

Chapter 5 (201).

The fourfold meaning of “good.” For there is something that is good in itself and for the person to whom it is done, but not good for the person doing it, as when help is given to a poor person, but not for God's sake. And there is something good in itself and for the person doing it, but not for the one to whom it is done, as when truth is preached for God's sake to someone who does not obey. And there is something good in itself, for the person doing it, and for the one to whom it is done, as when truth is preached for God's sake to a believer. Hence the Apostle 1 says: “We are a good odor to God, to some an odor of life, to others an odor of death.” There is another thing that is neither good in itself nor for the person doing it, and that condemns him unless he repents, such as evil; yet it is useful for something. For, as Augustine says in the Enchiridion 2: “All things were created by the Trinity, supremely and equally and immutably good; they are not supremely, equally, and immutably good, but each is nevertheless good; together, however, all things are very good 3, because from them all is constituted the wondrous beauty of the universe. In it even what is called evil, when rightly ordered and placed in its proper place, brings goodness into greater prominence, so that it pleases more and is more praiseworthy when compared with evils.”

⁷ ponit LRTW. 2 illorum] eorum OPX. 3 Rubrica om. MRW. 8 fiunt mala] mala fiunt BCL. 9 Rubrica om. MRW. 15 Rubrica om. MRVW.]

⁸

⁹ ergo V, autem X, om. N. 16 utilitas] humilitas MV²xz, patientia OPX, patientia humilitas R, vel humilitas add. interl. V² (on which readings cf. PL 191, 1448 C).]

¹⁰

¹¹

Chapter 6 (202).

1. Evils are useful to the universe, and the elect benefit from their own evils when they do them and from others' evils when they suffer them. From this it is clear that some good comes from the evils that happen, since good things become more pleasing and praiseworthy. Good things sometimes come even to those who do these evils, if they are saints called according to his purpose 4. “For,” as Augustine says in On Correction and Grace⁵, “God so works all things together for good for such people⁶ that if any of them stray and go astray, he even makes this itself serve their good, because they return more humble and more learned,” as Peter did 7. “Those evils too which the faithful piously suffer at the hands of the wicked,” as Augustine says in book XIII of On the Trinity 8, “are of benefit to them, either for the removal of sins, or for the exercise of righteousness, or for demonstrating the misery of this life.” Therefore both Job felt the hand of God 9 and the Apostle the thorn of Satan 10, and each made progress because he bore evil well.

2. From what has been said he concludes, showing in what ways it is good for evils to happen. If someone carefully considers what has been written, it is easy to perceive that good comes from evils and that it was said for this reason that it is good for evils to happen or exist—not because evil is good, or because it is good for evil to be done. For it is not good for someone to do evil, because it is not good for anyone to do evil. If this were good, God, who is the author of every good, would surely be its author. But if God were its author, a person would do evil with God as its author, and so that person would become worse with God as its author. And if a person became worse with God as its author, the person would become worse with God willing it.

3. A person does not become worse with God as author. To say that something happens with God as its author is to say that it happens with God willing it. For to say that something happens with God as its author is the same as saying that it happens with God willing it. But a person does not become worse with God as author; therefore neither does a person become worse with God willing it. Augustine plainly argues this from the lesser in Eighty-Three Questions 1, saying: “No wise person is the author of another's becoming worse. For this fault is so great that it cannot befall a wise person. But God surpasses every wise person; much less, then, does a person become worse with God as author. For God's will surpasses the will of a wise person by far. When it is said that something happens with someone as author, it is said that it happens with that person's will. Therefore vice is a fault of the will by which a person becomes worse. If this vice is far removed from God's will, as reason shows, we must ask from whom it comes.” Here Augustine plainly says that a person does not become worse with God as author or willing it, but by a fault of that person's own will. What someone does as evil, then, is not done with God as author; thus evils do not happen with God willing them.

Chapter 7 (203).

1. There is no cause in God for a person to become worse. Next, that same Augustine, asking what the cause is of a person becoming worse, asserts that it is not in God, saying in the same book 2: “For a person to become worse, the cause is either in that person, in another, or in nothing. If it is in that person, there is no cause; if in another, it is either in God, in some other person, or in something that is neither God nor a person. But it is not in God, for God is the cause of good things; therefore it is either in a person, in something that is neither God nor a person, or in nothing.” From these words it is plainly shown that it is not good for a person to become worse, because God, who is the cause only of good things. And if it is not good that a human being become worse, then it is not good that evil be done by him; therefore God does not will that evil be done by him.

¹²

¹³

2. Another proof that evils are not done with God as their author. Again, it is shown in another way that evils are not done with God as their author—that is, by his will—because he is not the cause of tending toward nonbeing. To tend toward nonbeing is evil; but he is not the author of evil. Whoever does evil tends toward nonbeing; therefore it is not with God as author that anyone does evil. It is therefore not good that anyone do evil, since God is the author of good alone. Augustine explains this plainly in the same book, saying: “He who is the author of all that exists, and whose goodness is such that everything that exists should exist, is the cause of good alone. Accordingly, he is not the author of evil; and therefore he is the highest good, from which to fall short in any respect is evil, while falling short itself is evil. He is not, then, the cause of falling short—that is, of tending toward nonbeing—he who, so to speak, is the cause of being, since he is the author of all that exists, which is good insofar as it exists.” See, then, plainly, that to fall away from God, who is the highest good, is evil; therefore doing evil is evil, and evils are not done with God as author or by his will.

3. A sophistical objection by certain people, who try to prove that evil deeds come from God. It has now been sufficiently shown that evils are not done with God as author. Certain people, however, proceeding sophistically and therefore hateful to God, say: “God exists; therefore what is done is from God. But everything true that exists is from Truth, who is God; therefore what is done or exists as evil is from God; therefore evils are done with God as author.”

4. Reply: he grants that every truth is from God and exposes the sophism. It is easy for us to answer them, though what they say seems unworthy of a reply. For every truth is from God, as Augustine says. Ambrose agrees with this when, treating the Apostle’s words “No one can say, ‘Jesus is Lord,’ except in the Holy Spirit,” he says that “every truth, whoever says it, is from the Holy Spirit.” Since it is true, then, that evils are done, this truth expressed by the statement “evils are done” is from God; but it does not follow that it is from God that evils be done. For if that were said, God would be understood to be the author of evils. — By a parallel example he shows that the inference is false. The falsity is made clear by this parallel: God forbids theft; but it is true that theft is done; therefore God forbids a truth. The inference does not follow.

5. He approves the side of the question held by those who say that God does not will evils to be done. Let us therefore leave aside this and other such empty arguments, and favor the sounder side of the question stated above, which is more fully supported by the testimonies of the saints. Let us say that God does not will evils to be done, yet neither wills that they not be done nor wills that they be done. For everything he wills to be done is done, and everything he wills not to be done is not done. Yet many things are done that he does not will to be done, such as all evils.