Sentences, Books I–II

Single chapter (187).

1. The opinion of certain people who say that God can do nothing except what he does. Yet certain people, glorying in their own understanding, have tried to confine God's power within a measure. When they say, “God can do this much, and no more,” what is this but to enclose and restrict to a measure his power, which is infinite? For they say: God cannot do anything other than what he does, nor do better what he does, nor omit anything among the things he does. They try to support this opinion with plausible arguments and contrived reasons, as well as testimonies from sacred authorities, saying: (Their first argument.) God cannot do except what is good and just to be done; yet it is not just and good for him to do anything other than what he does. For if it is just and good for him to do something other than what he does, then he does not do everything it is just and good for him to do. But who would dare say this? — Second. They also add: He cannot do except what his justice requires; but his justice does not require him to do anything except what he does; therefore he cannot do except what he does. The same justice requires him not to do what he does not do; but he cannot act against his justice; therefore he cannot do any of the things he omits.

2. Reply to the preceding statement. We reply to these claims by disclosing the twofold meaning of the words and unfolding what they have wrapped up, as follows: “God cannot do except what is good and just,” that is, he can do only that which, if he did it, would be good and just: this is true. But he can do many things that are neither good nor just, because they neither are nor will be, nor are or will be done well, since they will never be done. — Reply to the second statement *. Likewise, regarding what was proposed second—“He cannot do except what his justice requires, and he cannot do what his justice requires not to be done”—we say that the word “require” is not fittingly said of God, nor is it understood properly. These expressions have a twofold sense. — If you understand “He cannot do except what his justice requires” to mean “except what his just will wills,” you speak falsely. For God's justice is understood as his own most equitable will. In this sense Augustine¹ understands the Lord's words in Genesis to Lot²: “I cannot do anything until you enter there,” explaining: “He said that he could not, though without doubt he could by power; but he could not by justice”—as if to say: he could, but he did not will to, and that will was just. — But if by these words you understand that he cannot do anything except what, if it were done, would accord with his justice, you speak truly. — Distinguish likewise the statement, “He cannot do what his justice requires him not to do”: if it means that he cannot do what he himself, who is supreme justice, does not will to do, it is false. But if you understand these words to mean that he cannot do what cannot accord with his justice, you speak truly.

3. Their third argument. They add another point, saying: God cannot do except what he ought to do; but he ought to do only what he does. For if he ought to do other things, then he does not do everything he ought; but if he does everything he ought and can do only what he ought, then he cannot do except what he does. — Again, either he ought to omit what he omits, so as not to do it, or he ought not. If he ought not, he omits it wrongly; but if he ought to omit it, then he ought not to do it. If he ought not, it is neither fitting nor necessary for him to do it; and if it is neither fitting nor necessary for him to do it, then he cannot do it. Therefore he cannot do except what he does. Nor can he omit what he does without failing to do it, because he ought to do it; and what he ought to do, he cannot omit. — Reply. But, as it seems to me, the word “ought” contains poison. It has a many-layered and obscure sense. It does not properly apply to God, who is not our debtor except perhaps by a promise; we, however, are his debtors by our transgression. To drain away this poison, distinguish the senses of the word: “God cannot do except what he ought,” that is, except what he wills, is false; for in this way he can be said to owe something because he wills it. But if one says “he can do only what he ought,” meaning that he can do only what, if he did it, would be fitting for him, this is true.

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4. Their fourth argument. They also add, saying: He does or omits nothing except for the best and most reasonable cause, even if that cause is hidden from us; according to it he must do and omit the things he does and omits. The reason by which he does some things and omits others resides in him; it is eternal and always abiding, and apart from it he cannot do or omit anything. Therefore, while it remains, he cannot omit what he does or do what he omits; and so he cannot do except what he does. — Reply. We reply to this too by resolving the ambiguity of the expression. When it is said, “The best reason or cause is that by which he does all that he does and omits the things he omits,” this is true, because in him is the most equitable and perfectly right will by which he does and omits what he wills; he cannot act against it, nor act apart from it. Nor would he act against it if he omitted the things he does or did the things he omits. But, with the same reason and cause remaining, he could have done other things and omitted these. Thus, although the reason by which he does some things and omits others resides in him, according to that same reason he can omit what he does and do what he omits.

5. They add another argument to the question. They themselves add: There is a reason for him to do the things he does and not others; he cannot do except what there is a reason for him to do; and thus he cannot do except what he does. Again, there is a reason for him to omit what he omits; he cannot fail to omit what there is a reason for him to omit; and thus he cannot fail to omit what he omits. — Reply *. We say that these expressions are ambiguous and therefore must be distinguished. If, when it is said, “He cannot do except what there is a reason for him to do,” you understand that he cannot do except things that are reasonable, and things that would be reasonable if they were done, the sense is true. But if you understand that he cannot do other reasonable and good things except those he wills and does, the interpretation is false.

6. Another argument of theirs. Again, they add another point, saying: If God can do something other than what he does, then he can do what he did not foreknow; and if he can do what he did not foreknow, he can act without foreknowledge. For he does everything he foreknew he would do, and does nothing he did not foreknow. If it is impossible for anything to happen apart from his foreknowledge, then everything foreknown must happen; therefore, there is no reason why anything other than what happens could possibly happen; and so God cannot do except what happens. — This question is easily resolved from what was said above *. This question about foreknowledge can be easily resolved by what was said above when we treated foreknowledge.¹

7. They use authorities to assert their opinion. Those investigators who “wear themselves out searching”² append testimonies of the saints. For Augustine says in the book On the Creed³: “The only thing God cannot do is what he does not will.” This seems to mean that he cannot do anything except what he wills. But he wills only what he does, and so he seems able to do only what he does. — How the authority is to be understood *. It is to be understood this way: “The only thing God cannot do is what he does not will,” namely, that he is able to do it.

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⁴ quod BCL. 30 Rubrica om. RTW. 5 Responsio om. ORTW. 12–13 aliud Deus trp. BCV. 19 Rubrica om. RTW. 27 Rubrica om. LRVW.]

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8. Augustine *. In book VII of the Confessions 1, addressing God, he says: “You are not compelled against your will to do anything, because your will is not greater than your power; it would be greater if you yourself were greater than yourself.” From this it seems that God cannot do more than he wills, just as he does not will more than he can. For just as his will is not greater than his power, so his power is not greater than his will; therefore, just as he wills no more than he can, they say that he can no more than he wills. — Reply. We say that neither is will greater than power, nor power greater than will, because power and will are one and the same thing, namely God himself; he would be greater than himself if will were greater than power, or power greater than will. Nor does this authority deny that God can do more than he wills, since more things are subject to his power than to his will. Let us therefore acknowledge that God can do many things he does not will, and can omit things he does.

9. He confirms by authorities that God can do more than he does *. To hold this more certainly and firmly, let us assert from the testimonies of Scripture that God can do more than he does. The Truth himself says according to Matthew: “Do you think that I cannot appeal to my Father, and he will at once provide me with more than twelve legions of angels?” From these words it is plainly indicated that the Son could ask for what he did not ask, and the Father could provide what he did not provide. Therefore each could do what he did not do. — Augustine also says in the Enchiridion: “The will of the Almighty can do many things that it neither wills nor does. For he could have caused twelve legions of angels to fight against those who seized Christ.” — Again, in the same work: “Why were miracles not performed among some people, which, had they been performed, would have led those people to repentance, while they were performed among others who would not believe? Then what is now hidden will not be hidden. Nor did God unjustly refuse that they be saved, though they could have been saved.

If he had so willed. Then in the clearest light of wisdom it will be seen—what the faith of the devout now holds before it is seen by manifest knowledge—how certain, immutable, and most effective is the will of God, which can do many things and does not will them, yet wills nothing that it cannot do.” — The same author says in On Nature and Grace: “The Lord raised Lazarus in the body. Should one say, ‘Could he not raise Judas in mind?’ He could indeed, but he did not will to.” By these and many other authorities it is clearly taught that God can do many things he does not will.

10. That God can will and do other things than he wills or does without mutability of power or will *. This can also be proved by reason. God does not will to justify all people, and yet who doubts that he can? Therefore God can do something other than what he does; and yet, if he did something else, he would not thereby be other than himself. He can also will something other than what he wills, and yet his will cannot in any way be different, new, or mutable. For even if he can will what he has never willed, he can will it not newly and not with a new will, but only eternally; for he can will what he could have willed from eternity. For he has the power to will both now and from eternity, although he neither wills it now nor willed it from eternity.