Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (184).

On God's omnipotence, first considering why he is called omnipotent. We must now discuss God's omnipotence. The first question that arises is how God is truly called omnipotent: whether because he can do all things, or only because he can do what he wills. — That God can do all things is proved by several authorities. Augustine says in his book Questions on the Old and New Law¹: «God can indeed do all things, but he does not do them all at once.» He says in the same work²: «God could act because he could; reason forbade it,» that is, his will. For there he called the will «reason,» since God's will is rational and most just. We must therefore acknowledge that God can do all things.

Chapter 2 (185).

1. How God is said to be able to do all things, although we can do many things he cannot. It is asked how he can be said to be able to do all things, when we can do many things he cannot: he cannot walk, speak, and the like, which are entirely alien to the divine nature, since an incorporeal and simple substance cannot have the instruments for such actions. — Reply. I think we should answer that such actions—walking, speaking, and the like—are not alien to God's power, but belong to it. Although God cannot have such actions in himself—for he cannot walk or speak, and so on—he can perform them in creatures. He makes a person walk and speak and do such things. These actions therefore take nothing away from divine power, since almighty God can do them too.

2. An objection is raised about other things. There are certain other things God cannot do at all, such as sins: he cannot lie or sin. — Solution. God's omnipotence is not in any way diminished or impaired by the claim that he cannot sin, since this would be a matter of weakness, not power. If he could do this, he would not be omnipotent. That he cannot do these things must therefore be attributed not to impotence but to power. Hence Augustine says in Book XV of The Trinity³: «It is a great power of God that he cannot lie.» There are things that count as power in some beings but not in others, and things praiseworthy in some but blameworthy in others. God is therefore not less powerful because he cannot sin, since no one who can do this is omnipotent.

3. He raises another objection about other things. There are still other things God cannot do, so he seems unable to do all things: he cannot die or be deceived. — Hence Augustine says in his book On the Creed⁴: «Almighty God cannot die, cannot be deceived, cannot become wretched, cannot be overcome. Far be it from us to suppose that the Almighty can do these things or the like!» If he could be subject to such sufferings and defects, he would not be omnipotent. He is shown to be omnipotent precisely because these things cannot come near him; yet he can bring them about in others.

Chapter 3 (186).

1. God's omnipotence is considered in two respects. On careful consideration, his omnipotence appears in two respects: he does all things he wills, and he suffers absolutely nothing. In both respects God is most truly called omnipotent, since nothing can bring corruption upon him and nothing can impede what he does. It is therefore clear that God can suffer nothing at all, and can do all things except those that would impair his dignity and diminish his excellence; yet in this he is no less omnipotent, for such ability would be inability, not power. Let no one therefore presume to call God impotent in any respect: he can do everything that belongs to power, and for this reason he is truly called omnipotent.

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² comprobatur LNR. 8 et] ac LNR. 19 patiendum] corruptionem add. C. 22 propinquare] appropinquare PTX. 23 et om. LRTVWX. 30 posse om. BMOP, add. interl. C². 31 facere posse trp. LRT.]

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2. Some authorities teach that he is called omnipotent because he can do whatever he wills. Some authorities teach that God is truly called omnipotent because he can do whatever he wills. Hence Augustine says in the Enchiridion¹: «He is truly called omnipotent for no other reason than that he can do whatever he wills, and the effect of the omnipotent will is not hindered by the will of any creature.» — He says in On the Spirit and the Letter²: «God cannot do what is unjust, because he is supreme justice and goodness. He is omnipotent, not in the sense that he can do all things, but because he can bring about whatever he wills, so that nothing can resist his will and prevent its fulfillment, or in any way impede it.» — John Chrysostom says in a homily On the Exposition of the Creed³: «He is called omnipotent because his power can find no inability,» as the Prophet says⁴: «He has done all things whatsoever he willed.» He is therefore omnipotent, so that he can do everything he wills. Hence the Apostle⁵ asks: «Who will resist his will?» These authorities seem to show that God is called omnipotent solely because he can do all that he wills, not because he can do all things.

3. Interpretation of the foregoing authorities. We can answer that when Augustine says, «He is not called omnipotent because he can do all things,» and so on, he takes «all things» so broadly and generally as to include evils, which God neither wills nor can do. He did not therefore deny that God can do all the things it is fitting for him to be able to do. Likewise, when he says, «He is truly called omnipotent for no other reason than that he can do whatever he wills,» he does not deny that God can also do what he does not will. Rather, against those who said that God willed many things he could not do, he affirms that God can do whatever he wills, and that he is truly called omnipotent for this reason and no other: he can do whatever he wills.

4. How to understand «he can do whatever he wills.» Take care how you understand «he can do whatever he wills»: does it mean whatever he wills himself to be able to do, whatever he wills to do, or whatever he wills to be done? If you say that he is called omnipotent because he can do whatever he wills himself to be able to do, then Peter too, or any of the blessed saints, could now be called omnipotent in the same way, because each can do whatever he wills himself to be able to do and can do whatever he wills to do. For he does not will to do anything other than what he does, nor to be able to do anything other than what he can do. But he cannot do whatever he wills to be done: he wills those who are to be saved to be saved, yet he is unable to save them. God, however, can bring about whatever he wills to be done. If he wills something to be done by himself, he can do it by himself, and does so—as he made heaven and earth by himself because he willed it. If he wills something to be done by a creature, he works through that creature, as he makes houses and other artifacts through human beings. God has power from himself and acts through himself; a human being or angel, however blessed, does not have power from himself or act through himself.

5. Objection. Perhaps you will say: Neither the Son of God nor the Holy Spirit can act from himself, but only the Father. For the one who is from himself can act from himself; but the Son, since he is not from himself but from the Father, can act not from himself but from the Father, and the Holy Spirit from both. — Solution. We say that although the Son cannot act from himself and does not act from himself, he can and does act through himself, as does the Holy Spirit. Hence Hilary says in Book IX of The Trinity¹: «This is the unity of the nature, heretic, that you oppose: the Son acts through himself in such a way that he does not act from himself, and does not act from himself in such a way that he acts through himself.» He is said to act and have power through himself because he has the same natural power as the Father, by which he has power and acts. But since he has this power from the Father, not from himself, he is said to have power and act from the Father, not from himself. A human being or angel has power by gift, through which he has power.

6. Here it is shown fully why he is called omnipotent. The Trinity, then, is truly and properly called omnipotent because by itself—that is, by natural power—it can bring about whatever it wills to be done, and do whatever it wills itself to be able to do. He wills something to come about that he cannot bring about by himself or through a creature; and he wills nothing that he cannot bring about. Everything he wills to come about, he wills himself to be able to bring about; but not everything he wills himself to be able to bring about does he also will to come about. For if he willed it, it would come about, since nothing can resist his will.

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⁵ quia TX. 11 est trp. p. ipse LR. 24 nec] non LRTX. 24–1 (p. 297) posse omnia trp. BM. 26 vero] Deus add. OP. 25–26 a se] a se agat, et ita non a se agat ut per se agat (cf. textum).]

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