Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (181).

1. Whether there is any merit for hardening or mercy. Augustine says in his letter To Sixtus²: If «we seek the merit for hardening and mercy, we find merit for hardening, but find no merit» for mercy, «because there is none; otherwise grace would be emptied of meaning if it were not given freely, but repaid according to merits.» — Augustine, Against Julian³: «He has mercy according to grace, which is given freely, but hardens according to judgment, which is repaid according to merits.» — Hence⁴ we are given to understand that just as God's reprobation is his unwillingness to have mercy, so God's hardening is his not having mercy: he does not inflict anything that makes a person worse, but only withholds what would make a person better.

2. Here he gathers the foregoing points briefly and adds others. These points clearly show what the Apostle meant by mercy and hardening⁵: mercy invokes no merit, whereas hardening is not without merit. Here «mercy» means predestination, especially its effect; «hardening» does not mean God's eternal reprobation itself, for that has no merit, but the privation or withdrawal of grace, which in a certain way is the effect of reprobation. Sometimes, however, reprobation is taken to mean hardening, just as predestination is taken to mean its effect, the bestowal of grace; for the grace bestowed is the effect of predestination. — Since, then, there are no merits for the grace bestowed on a person for justification, there can much less be any merits for predestination itself, by which God chose whom he willed from eternity; nor are there merits for reprobation, by which from eternity he foreknew that some would be wicked and damned.

3. He gives the example of Jacob and Esau, saying that God chose neither one nor reprobated the other on account of merits. Just as he chose Jacob and reprobated Esau⁶, this was not on account of merits they then possessed, since they had none and did not yet exist; nor did he choose one or reprobate the other on account of future merits he foresaw.

Chapter 2 (182).

1. An opinion once held by Augustine, but later retracted. Some have thought that God chose Jacob because he foreknew that Jacob would be such as to believe in and serve him. Augustine says in Retractations⁷ that he once held this opinion. There he clearly shows that, if Jacob was chosen on account of future merits, the choice would no longer be by grace. He was therefore not chosen by God because he was going to be such a person; rather, he became such through election. Augustine says: «In discussing what God chose in the one not yet born, to whom he said the elder would serve him, and what he reprobated in the elder, likewise not yet born, I brought my reasoning to this point: God did not choose in his foreknowledge the works he himself was going to give, but chose faith in his foreknowledge; he chose the one whom he foreknew would believe in him, so that he might give him the Holy Spirit and, by doing good works, he might attain eternal life as well.»

2. He explains the foregoing opinion. Here he plainly says that God chose Jacob not on account of works, but on account of the faith by which he foresaw that Jacob would believe. — Augustine's retraction in the same work. But since there is merit in faith just as there is in works, Augustine retracted this, saying⁸: «I had not yet investigated the matter carefully enough, nor had I yet discovered the nature of the election of grace of which the Apostle says⁹: The remnant will be saved by the election of grace. It is certainly not grace if it proceeds from merits, so that what is given is repaid according to debt rather than bestowed by grace.» Therefore, what I said immediately afterward—«For the same Apostle says²: It is the same God who works all things in all people; nowhere, however, does it say: God believes all things in all people»—and what I then added, «What we believe is ours, but the good we do belongs to him who gives the Holy Spirit to those who believe,» I would certainly not have said if I had already known that faith itself is among the gifts of God given in the same Spirit. Both, then, are ours by the choice of the will, and both are given through the Spirit of faith and charity. — What I said a little later, «It is ours to believe and to will, but it is his to give to those who believe and will the power to do good through the Holy Spirit, through whom charity is poured into our hearts»³, is indeed true, but under the same rule: both are his, because he prepares the will, and both are ours, because they do not happen unless we will them.»

¹

² aliquid CMR. 11 itaque] utique xz (Augustine). 19 est] semper added in LRW, added interlinearly in T.]

³ qui LNRVW, corr. in qui T. 12 praevideret] praeviderent OPR, quod corr. OR.]

^{4 5 6 7}

Therefore even the merit of faith comes from God's mercy. God did not choose some from eternity on account of faith or any merits, nor bestow the grace of justification in time on that account; rather, in his free goodness he chose them to be good. Hence Augustine says in On the Predestination of the Saints⁴: «He did not choose us because he foresaw that we would be such, but so that we would become such through the very election of his grace, by which he made us acceptable in his beloved Son»⁵.

3. What Augustine says elsewhere seems contrary to this. What Augustine says⁶ on the prophet Malachi seems to conflict with this. There it is written⁷: I loved Jacob, but Esau I hated: «He has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills»⁸. But this will of God cannot be unjust. For it arises from the most hidden merits: though sinners too have become one mass because of original sin, there is nevertheless some difference among them. Something therefore precedes in some sinners by which they become worthy of justification; something likewise precedes in other sinners by which they become worthy of hardening. Augustine may therefore say that God's very will, by which he chooses some and reprobates others, arises from merits, though the merits are most hidden: he willed to choose some and reprobate others, and on account of merits the grace of justification is bestowed on some and not on others, who are thereby hardened.

4. It may be said that he retracted this. What he intended is unknown, unless perhaps he understood this in the sense that we said above he retracted. For in the same place⁹ he goes on to add certain other things that he plainly retracts in Retractations¹⁰, as anyone who reads both texts will see. It is therefore likely that he retracted this earlier statement as well.

5. The statement may also be understood in this sense. It may be taken to mean not that anyone is predestined on account of merits or merits the grace of justification, but that some are not so wicked as to merit having grace withheld from them. No one can merit God's grace by which he is justified; but one can merit that it not be bestowed, and that one be utterly cast away. Some have fallen so deeply into wickedness that they merit this and are worthy of it; others live in such a way that, although they do not merit the grace of justification, they do not merit being utterly rejected and deprived of grace. Hence Augustine said, «In some sinners there precedes something by which they are worthy of justification, and in others something by which they are worthy of hardening.» But this is frivolous.

6. The false opinion of those who speak carnally about God's hidden judgments. — Augustine, On the Words of the Apostle¹¹: «Many, trying to explain this deep mystery and to ponder the unfathomable depth of God's judgments according to the conjectures of their own hearts, have gone off into tales of vanity, saying that souls sin up in heaven and, according to their sins, are sent down to bodies on account of their merits and shut up in them as in prisons fit for them»¹². Such people followed their own thoughts¹³, and wishing to dispute to plumb God's deep mystery, they themselves plunged into the depths, saying that souls had previously lived in heaven and there done good or evil, and that on account of their merits they had been thrust down into earthly bodies. The Catholic faith rejects this, because of the Apostle's clear statement¹: When they had not yet been born or done anything good or evil, and so forth. «Faithful ignorance is better than rash knowledge»².

⁸

⁹ ex… sed LMOPTX, corrected in T. 5 credit] condidit BC, erit MOPX, corrected to credidit in O². 24 videtur adversari transposed in LNR. 32 elegit corrected to eligit in PT.]

¹⁰ hic NVW. 8–9 Potest²… accipi] Quidam… accipiunt BENVW. 13 profundum iniquitatis trp. LMRX. 16 peccatoribus om. LT, del. C, add. interl. V. 18 Sed… est om. BCMOPWX.]

¹¹

7. From the preceding chapters he concludes the point about predestination and reprobation: they do not arise from merits. He chose, then, whom he willed by gratuitous mercy, not because they were going to become believers, but so that they might be believers; and he gave them grace not because they were believers, but so that they might become so. — Augustine says in Retractations³: «For the Apostle⁴ says: I obtained mercy so that I might be faithful; he does not say, because I was faithful. Mercy is indeed given to one who is faithful, but it was given earlier so that he might become faithful.» Likewise he reprobated whom he willed, not on account of future merits he foresaw, «but by a most righteous truth that is remote from our understanding»⁵.

8. Question. It is asked whether, just as some are said to have been chosen so that they might become good and faithful, it should also be granted that some were reprobated so that they might be evil and unbelieving, and hardened so that they might sin. — Reply. This must in no way be granted: reprobation is not the cause of evil in the way predestination is the cause of good; nor does hardening make a person evil in the way mercy makes a person good.

Chapter 3 (183).

1. Whether the things God once knows or foreknows he always knows and foreknows, and whether he foreknew them. Moreover, one must consider whether all the things God once knows or foreknows he always knows and has known, and whether he foreknows what he does not now know or foreknow.

2. He first answers about foreknowledge, saying God does not always foreknow what he once foreknew. We first answer about foreknowledge, saying that God foreknew many things that he does not now foreknow. Since his foreknowledge concerns only future things, when things that were future become present or pass away, they cease to be objects of God's foreknowledge; they remain objects of his knowledge forever. God therefore foreknew from eternity all things that were going to be future, and ceases to foreknow them only when they cease to be future. When he ceases to foreknow some things he previously foreknew, he does not know them less than he did before. This is not said because his knowledge has diminished, but because of the meaning of the word «foreknowledge»: to foreknow is to know before something happens; therefore God can be said to foreknow only what is future.

3. He now discusses knowledge, saying God always knows what he once knows. We speak differently about knowledge. God always knows all the things he knows at any time; for every knowledge he ever has, he always had, has, and will have.

4. Objection. An objection is raised as follows: Long ago God knew that this man would be born, and he has been born; now God does not know that he will be born; therefore God once knew something he does not now know. Likewise, God knew the world was to be created, but now he does not know it is to be created; therefore he once knew something he does not now know. Countless other examples of this kind could be given. — Solution. We say that God now knows the same thing about this man's birth and the world's creation that he knew before they happened, although his knowledge must be expressed in different words then and now. What was future then is past now, so the words must change to designate it. As we speak at different times, we designate the same day with «tomorrow» while it is still future, «today» while it is present, and «yesterday» when it is past. So before the world was created, God knew it was to be created; after it was created, he knows it as created. This is not different knowledge, but precisely the same knowledge of the world's creation. Just as the ancient Fathers believed Christ would be born and die, while we believe he has already been born and died, we and they believe the same things, not different ones. «The times changed,» as Augustine says⁶, and therefore the words changed, «not the faith.» We must therefore hold without doubt that God always knows all the things he ever knows. and the like, which he can nevertheless perform in creatures. For he causes a person to walk and speak and do such things. Nothing is therefore taken away from divine power by these actions, since almighty God can do these things as well.

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¹³ aut CPX. 7–8 Rubrica (inauthentica) V, om. alii. 13 est om. MOP. 18 Responsio om. RVW. 23–24 Rubrica om. RVW.]

¹⁴ quae RWX. 19 possent] possunt RTX. 21 nunc] et added between the lines in M, omnia added in BC. 22 oporteat] oporteret LMW.]

¹⁵