Sentences, Books I–II

Chapter 1 (179).

1. Whether any of the predestined can be damned or any of the reprobate saved. It seems that none of the predestined can be damned, nor any of the reprobate saved. Hence Augustine says in On Correction and Grace¹: «It is said in the Apocalypse²: Hold fast what you have, so that no one may take your crown. If no one is to receive it unless this one loses it, the number of the elect is fixed,» that is, it cannot increase or diminish.

2. Objection. Some object, trying to prove that the number of the elect can increase and diminish, as follows: God could withhold from those to whom he does not withdraw grace; if that happened, they would certainly be damned. Therefore those who will be saved could be damned, and the number of the elect could diminish. It could also increase, because grace could be given to those who do not receive it, through which they would be saved; therefore those who will be damned without it could be saved if they received grace, and the number of the elect could increase.

3. Reply. We answer that the statement that the number of the elect cannot increase or diminish is made for this reason and is true: it cannot be the case both that someone is saved and is not predestined, or that someone is predestined and is damned. The meaning supplied by an implicit condition makes the assertion true and its contrary impossible.

If, however, the statement is understood simply, the impossibility is not admitted, as when one says, «A predestined person can—or cannot—be damned,» or «a reprobate person can be saved.» In these and similar expressions, the sense of the statement must be judged from the wording. The meaning differs according to whether these statements are taken conjunctively or disjunctively, as was explained above when we were discussing foreknowledge¹. If, when you say «a predestined person cannot be damned,» you understand it thus: it cannot be that he is predestined and damned, you speak truly, since you understand the statement conjunctively. But it is false if understood disjunctively, as if you meant that this person, whom I call predestined, cannot be damned. For he could have not been predestined, and so could have been damned.

4. How they press the question further. Nevertheless, they press further, arguing conjunctively as follows: «It cannot be that someone is predestined and damned. These two cannot be true together; but one of them cannot fail to be true, namely that this person is predestined, since he was predestined from eternity and cannot now fail to be predestined. Since it is impossible for both to be true and impossible for one to fail to be true, it seems impossible for the other to be true, namely that he is damned. If so, then he cannot fail to be saved.»

5. A solution in which he would rather hear others than teach. In solving this question I would rather hear others than teach. Still, we say a similar question can be raised about foreknowledge; and so we give the same answer here and there. The claim on which the whole question rests must be distinguished, namely, «It is impossible for one of them not to be true: that this person is now predestined, for he was predestined from eternity.» The expression «this person cannot now fail to be predestined» or «it cannot now be that he is not predestined» must be distinguished. It can be understood conjunctively or disjunctively. «It cannot be that he was predestined from eternity and is not predestined now; nor can it be true at once that he is predestined and is not predestined. But it can be that he was predestined from eternity and is predestined now; nor can it be true at once that he is predestined and is not predestined.»

¹ correctione LPV. 15 Oppositio om. LNPRW.]

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Nevertheless, it could have been from eternity that he was not predestined, and he could from eternity not have been predestined. Just as God could from eternity not predestine him, some grant that God can now have failed to predestine him from eternity. Therefore God can have failed to predestine him; thus this person can have been unpredestined. If he had not been predestined, he would not be predestined; therefore he can now be unpredestined. They say the same about foreknowledge and foreknown things. They do not grant this with respect to God's and human beings' acts or operations. Once something has been done or said, they do not grant that it can fail to be or to have been; rather, what has been done or said cannot fail to be or to have been, since they refer possibility or impossibility to the nature of the existing thing. But when God's foreknowledge or predestination is at issue, possibility or impossibility is referred to God's power, which has always been and is always the same, since predestination, foreknowledge, and power are one in God.

Chapter 2 (180).

1. What God's reprobation is, in what it consists, and what the effect of predestination is. Since predestination is the preparation of grace, that is, the divine choice by which God chose whom he wished before the foundation of the world, as the Apostle says¹, reprobation is to be understood conversely as God's foreknowledge of the iniquity of some and the preparation of their damnation. The effect of predestination is the grace by which we are justified in the present and are helped to live rightly and persevere in good, as well as the grace by which we are made blessed in the future. Reprobation is considered in two respects: one God foreknows but does not prepare, namely iniquity; the other he foreknows and prepares, namely eternal punishment. Hence Augustine and Hilary² say: «This rule must be held firmly: sinners are foreknown in their sins, not prepared for them; punishment, however, is prepared.» «For God,» Augustine says in On the Gift of Perseverance³, «prepared in his foreknowledge his good gifts for those he wished; and he certainly foreknew that he would give them to all to whom he gives them.» «God also prepared eternal fire,» says Fulgentius⁴, «for the wicked, whom he justly prepared to undergo punishment, but did not prepare to commit sins. God prepared what divine equity would repay, not what human iniquity would commit. For God was never the preparer of wickedness, as he prepared the saints to receive righteousness; he did not prepare the wicked to lose righteousness.» — Augustine says in On the Gift of Perseverance⁵: Just as God's predestination properly «is the foreknowledge and preparation of God's benefits, by which all who are delivered are most certainly delivered,» so God's reprobation is foreknowledge of the malice of some that will not end, and preparation of punishment that will not cease.

2. Hardening is in a certain way the effect of reprobation. Just as the effect of predestination is the bestowal of grace, so hardening seems in a certain way to be the effect of eternal reprobation.

3. How God is said to harden. «God does not harden,» as Augustine says in his letter To Sixtus⁶, «by imparting wickedness, but by not imparting grace,» since they are not worthy of it. «Those to whom it is not given are neither worthy of it nor do they merit it; rather, they are worthy of and merit not receiving it.» Hence the Apostle says⁷: God has mercy on whom he wills, and hardens whom he wills: calling predestination mercy, especially its effect, the bestowal of grace; and hardening, the privation of grace. — For, as Augustine says in To Simplicianus⁸, it must not be understood that God hardens «as though he compelled anyone to sin, but only that he does not grant the grace of his justification to certain sinners. He is said to harden them for this reason: he does not have mercy on them, not because he drives them to sin. He does not have mercy on those whom, by a most hidden equity far removed from human understanding, he judges should not receive grace»; «he does not disclose this, but the Apostle marvels at it, saying⁹: O the depth of the riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God!»

⁵ beatificabimur BCMNRVW. 2 enim] autem BCV. Aug. ait trp. LNRX.]

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